Troy L. Couillard

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Alberta had dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding the verdict was not unreasonable and the convictions were properly upheld.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction, arguing errors in credibility assessment, burden of proof analysis, and reliance on impermissible generalizations and stereotypes.

The Court held that the trial judge's reasons disclosed a clear path of reasoning and permitted effective appellate review.

It concluded the trial judge properly applied the governing credibility principles and did not impose a higher scrutiny standard on the appellant's evidence.

The Court further held the impugned comments were case-specific credibility findings rather than stereotypical reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction was upheld.

In a criminal appeal concerning adequacy of reasons, the appellant challenged convictions that included sexual assault.

The court held that, read fairly, the trial judge’s reasons made clear that the alibi evidence was neither credible nor reliable.

The court further held that the reasons were sufficient to explain the reasoning process.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions remained affirmed.

In a criminal appeal concerning admissibility of fresh evidence, the Court addressed whether post-trial statements by a witness were admissible and reasonably capable of belief.

The appellate record involved convictions for second degree murder and assault with a weapon that had been set aside with a new trial ordered.

The Court held that the witness statement satisfied the admissibility criteria and could reasonably have affected the outcome.

The decision admitting fresh evidence and ordering a new trial was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction where forensic DNA source evidence was treated as probative despite defence evidence that it lacked scientific foundation.

The Court held that the trial judge applied materially different levels of scrutiny to the Crown and defence experts, accepting the Crown expert evidence at face value while intensely scrutinizing the defence expert.

That asymmetry was unwarranted and tended to shift the burden of proof.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered, with admissibility of the impugned DNA source opinion to be determined at any retrial if tendered.

In a criminal appeal from a sexual assault conviction, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the trial verdict.

The Court accepted the majority reasons of the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable and grounded in the evidentiary record.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal substantially on the dissenting appellate reasons below.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction affirmed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

He argued that the majority of the Court of Appeal applied the incorrect standard of review, erred regarding the admissibility of footprint evidence, and erred in finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard from W. (D.).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonable, there was no basis to intervene on the evidentiary issue, and the trial judge did not err in applying the reasonable doubt standard to the whole of the evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for child luring arising from sexually explicit computer communications with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old.

The central issue was the interaction between the presumption in s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code and the reasonable steps requirement in s. 172.1(4).

The Court held that where an interlocutor is represented as underage, the accused is presumed to believe that representation unless rebutted by evidence that includes reasonable steps taken to ascertain age.

Because the appellant took no reasonable steps despite repeated assertions that the interlocutor was 13, the Court upheld the substituted convictions and dismissed the appeal.