Deborah R. Hatch

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after the trial judge dismissed his application under s. 276.1 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity.

The Alberta Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in dismissing that application, but the majority applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b) to affirm the conviction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered the complainant's evidence supplemented.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the trial judge's error did not lead to a miscarriage of justice and fell within the curative proviso, as the remaining evidence was otherwise overwhelming and a conviction was inevitable.

The Court also expressly declined to endorse the majority's application of s. 683(1), a remedy neither party had sought before the Court of Appeal and which all parties before the Supreme Court urged it to reject.

The appellant was arrested and detained for longer than 24 hours before being brought before a justice for a bail hearing, in contravention of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the appellant's Charter rights were breached by the detention.

The trial judge found that the extended detention was attributable to a systemic and ongoing problem in the province that was not being satisfactorily addressed, and accordingly stayed the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay on the basis that it was an inappropriate individual remedy for a systemic Charter breach.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal had no basis to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion and restored the stay of proceedings.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of a prior ongoing sexual relationship with the complainant — a 'friends with benefits' arrangement — in a sexual assault trial under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the evidence failed to satisfy s. 276(2) because the accused did not identify any specific, legitimate purpose for the evidence beyond a bare invocation of 'context', meaning its only operative relevance was to support the prohibited twin-myth inferences.

The improper admission of the evidence, and the subsequent broadening of sexual activity evidence at trial, might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

Brown J. dissented, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, that the relationship evidence did not solely derive its relevance from twin-myth reasoning, and that a new trial was procedurally unfair given that the Crown itself relied on the sexual nature of the relationship to advance its theory of the case.

The appellant challenged a provincial appellate decision that had set aside an acquittal for manslaughter and ordered a new trial.

The Court addressed corroboration and hearsay issues arising from the trial judge's treatment of confirmatory evidence.

A majority concluded that the appeal should be allowed substantially for the reasons given in the dissenting reasons below and restored the acquittal.

The result confirms that the identified hearsay-test error did not affect the trial outcome.

In a criminal appeal from a sexual assault conviction, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the trial verdict.

The Court accepted the majority reasons of the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable and grounded in the evidentiary record.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal substantially on the dissenting appellate reasons below.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction affirmed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation on the sole ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court held that the complainant's evidence, together with confirmatory admissions made during a police interview, provided an adequate evidentiary foundation for guilt.

The court agreed with the majority in the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

He argued that the majority of the Court of Appeal applied the incorrect standard of review, erred regarding the admissibility of footprint evidence, and erred in finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard from W. (D.).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonable, there was no basis to intervene on the evidentiary issue, and the trial judge did not err in applying the reasonable doubt standard to the whole of the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, break and enter, and possession of stolen property based on complex circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge delivered a bare guilty verdict and provided extensive written reasons 11 months later, after an appeal had been filed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the written reasons should not have been considered on appeal, as the combination of the inordinate delay and other factors rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity, creating a reasonable apprehension that the reasons were an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reasoning for the verdict.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant brought nearly $35,000 in cash to post bail for a client.

The police seized the money without a warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

When the Crown applied to extend the detention of the money under s. 490(2) of the Criminal Code, the appellant cross-applied for its return.

The Provincial Court judge ordered the money returned, finding the seizure unlawful.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Provincial Court judge has no jurisdiction under s. 490(2) or outside the Code to order the return of unlawfully seized property.

The proper procedure is an application for replevin or Charter review to a superior court.

The appeal was allowed and the Court of Appeal's order was set aside.