The accused sought to introduce evidence of a prior ongoing sexual relationship with the complainant — a 'friends with benefits' arrangement — in a sexual assault trial under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.
The majority held that the evidence failed to satisfy s. 276(2) because the accused did not identify any specific, legitimate purpose for the evidence beyond a bare invocation of 'context', meaning its only operative relevance was to support the prohibited twin-myth inferences.
The improper admission of the evidence, and the subsequent broadening of sexual activity evidence at trial, might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.
Brown J. dissented, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, that the relationship evidence did not solely derive its relevance from twin-myth reasoning, and that a new trial was procedurally unfair given that the Crown itself relied on the sexual nature of the relationship to advance its theory of the case.
