Jason R. Russell

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault arising from a single incident and was subjected to mandatory lifetime registration under SOIRA pursuant to ss. 490.012 and 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, despite a judicial finding that he was unlikely to reoffend.

The majority held both provisions overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, as mandatory registration captures offenders not at increased recidivism risk and lifetime registration applies even where multiple offences arose from a single transaction without an intervening conviction.

The Crown failed to justify the provisions under s. 1, as neither minimally impairing alternatives nor evidence of salutary effects were demonstrated.

The declaration for s. 490.012 was suspended one year and applied prospectively, while the declaration for s. 490.013(2.1) was immediate and retroactive.

Four judges dissented in part, finding s. 490.012 constitutional given the heightened recidivism risk of all convicted sex offenders and the history of judicial misuse of discretion.

The appellant was arrested and detained for longer than 24 hours before being brought before a justice for a bail hearing, in contravention of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the appellant's Charter rights were breached by the detention.

The trial judge found that the extended detention was attributable to a systemic and ongoing problem in the province that was not being satisfactorily addressed, and accordingly stayed the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay on the basis that it was an inappropriate individual remedy for a systemic Charter breach.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal had no basis to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion and restored the stay of proceedings.

These companion criminal appeals addressed whether breathalyzer maintenance records are first party disclosure or third party disclosure in impaired driving prosecutions.

The Court held that such maintenance records are generally third party records, requiring an accused to establish likely relevance through an O’Connor application.

The majority found the records were not part of the fruits of the investigation and not obviously relevant on the evidentiary record.

Because likely relevance was not shown, disclosure orders were not warranted.

The appeals were dismissed, with a dissent concluding the records should be disclosed as first party material.

The Court held that asking a detainee whether they wished to say anything after invoking counsel breached the duty to hold off.

A majority found the breach serious enough to exclude the resulting statement and ordered a new trial.