Marie Deschamps

The appellants, representing the Metis people of Manitoba, sought declarations that Canada breached fiduciary obligations and failed to act in accordance with the honour of the Crown in implementing land grant provisions under ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The majority held that while no fiduciary duty arose, s. 31 constituted a solemn constitutional obligation to the Metis as an Aboriginal people, engaging the honour of the Crown.

The Crown failed to act with diligence in implementing the land grants, exhibiting a persistent pattern of errors and inaction over more than a decade that substantially frustrated the purpose of giving Metis children a head start over incoming settlers.

The claim was not barred by limitations or laches.

The appellant, who had been granted confidential informer status by one police force, was transferred to the Surete du Quebec, which failed to clarify his status despite repeated inquiries.

The application judge found the appellant was not a confidential informer with the SQ, rejecting his claims of express promises.

The majority held the application judge erred by failing to analyze whether an implicit promise of confidentiality arose from the nexus between the two police forces, and remitted the matter for reconsideration.

The dissent would have upheld the application judge's findings, concluding the appellant knew he did not have informer status and his claim was opportunistic.

The appellants appealed from the Court of Appeal's reversal of the CCAA court's decision regarding the priority of pension plan wind-up deficiency claims over court-ordered DIP financing charges.

The majority held that wind-up deficiencies under s. 75(1)(b) of the Pension Benefits Act were subject to a statutory deemed trust under s. 57(4), but that the deemed trust was superseded by the DIP charge by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The majority further held that while the employer-administrator breached its fiduciary duty by failing to ensure the pension plan beneficiaries had adequate notice and representation in the CCAA proceedings, a constructive trust was not an appropriate remedy because the breach did not result in an identifiable asset that it would be unjust for the wrongdoer to retain.

The Supreme Court considered whether provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec limiting family patrimony, compensatory allowance, partnership of acquests, and spousal support to married and civil union spouses infringed s. 15(1) of the Charter by excluding de facto spouses.

A 5-4 majority on s. 15(1) found the exclusion violated equality rights based on marital status.

However, the Chief Justice found the infringement justified under s. 1, joining the four judges who found no s. 15(1) violation, resulting in a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the impugned provisions.

The dissent would have struck down some or all of the provisions as unjustified discrimination against de facto spouses.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of counselling the commission of murder.

The respondent, a victim of severe spousal abuse, had attempted to hire a hit man to kill her husband.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis of the common law defence of duress.

The Supreme Court held that duress requires compulsion to commit a specific offence and is not available where threats were not made for the purpose of compelling the commission of an offence.

However, given the uncertainty in the law, the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal, and the exceptional circumstances, a stay of proceedings was entered rather than ordering a new trial.

Fish J. dissented in part, favouring a new trial over a stay.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appeal addressed whether a federal regulator had statutory authority to implement a market-based regime requiring negotiations over compensation for retransmission of local television signals.

The majority held the proposed regime exceeded statutory authority and conflicted with the copyright scheme governing retransmission rights and exceptions.

The dissent would have found a sufficient statutory basis and no operational conflict between the two statutes.

The appeal was allowed, with costs throughout.

In an insolvency appeal, the Court addressed when environmental remediation orders issued by a provincial regulator constitute provable monetary claims under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.

The majority held that orders not framed in monetary terms may still be compromised where the statutory and factual context shows sufficient certainty that compliance will ripen into a financial liability to the regulator.

Applying that framework, the majority found the remediation orders fell within the claims process and dismissed the appeal.

The dissenting judges would have required evidence approaching certainty that the province would itself perform remediation before treating most orders as contingent monetary claims.

This criminal appeal considered whether a roadside detention in a police cruiser and a related pat-down search violated Charter protections against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A majority found the pat-down search unconstitutional because securing the accused in the cruiser was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

The majority nevertheless admitted the cocaine evidence under section 24(2) based on good-faith conduct and evolving detention-law context.

The conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with dissenting reasons favouring exclusion and acquittal.

The Court held that the relevant service under the Human Rights Code was education generally, not a segregated special-education comparator class.

It found prima facie discrimination where a student with severe dyslexia was denied meaningful access to education after the closure of a diagnostic remediation centre and inadequate replacement supports.

The District failed to justify its conduct because it did not properly assess reasonable alternatives before cutting essential services.

The discrimination finding and individual compensation remedies were restored against the District, while broader systemic orders and provincial liability were set aside.

The Court considered whether a patent specification for erectile-dysfunction treatment satisfied disclosure obligations under s. 27(3) of the Patent Act where cascading claims ended with two individual compounds but did not identify the tested effective compound.

The Court held sufficiency must be assessed on the specification as a whole and not by isolating a single surviving claim under s. 58.

Because a skilled person would need further testing to determine which claimed compound worked, the specification did not enable successful use of the invention from the disclosure alone.

The appeal was allowed, the prohibition order was set aside, and the patent was held invalid for insufficient disclosure.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The Court considered constitutional challenges to Criminal Code evidentiary presumptions governing breath test prosecutions for blood alcohol levels over the legal limit.

A majority held that sections 258(1)(c), (d.01), and (d.1) did not infringe section 7 or section 11(c) but did infringe section 11(d), with section 258(1)(d.01), section 258(1)(d.1), and a severed version of section 258(1)(c) justified under section 1.

The Court allowed the appeal in part and upheld the respondent's conviction.

The Court considered whether 2008 Criminal Code amendments limiting evidence to challenge breath test reliability applied to a trial concerning earlier events.

A majority held the amendments affected substantive rights because they eliminated the Carter defence as an independent route to raise reasonable doubt and therefore should not apply retrospectively.

The Court restored the trial acquittal and allowed the appeal.

A dissent would have treated the provisions as procedural evidentiary rules with immediate effect.