Christopher Martin Rupar

The Attorney General of Canada appealed from the Alberta Court of Appeal's ruling that the federal Impact Assessment Act and Physical Activities Regulations were entirely ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the designated projects scheme is unconstitutional because it is not in pith and substance directed at regulating effects within federal jurisdiction — those effects do not drive the scheme's decision-making functions — and because the defined term 'effects within federal jurisdiction' does not align with federal legislative jurisdiction.

However, the secondary scheme in ss. 81 to 91 of the IAA, which governs projects on federal lands or outside Canada, was found to be clearly intra vires and severable.

The dissent would have upheld the entire legislation as validly directed at assessing and regulating adverse federal effects.

The appellant First Nation's reserve land was flooded in the 1920s–1930s to power hydroelectricity generation without its consent, without compensation, and without lawful authorization.

The trial judge found Canada breached its fiduciary duty and awarded $30,000,000 in equitable compensation, valuing the flooded land based on general expropriation principles and excluding the land's value to the hydroelectricity project.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by treating compliance with minimum expropriation obligations as sufficient to discharge the fiduciary duty, which required Canada to negotiate compensation reflecting the full value of the land to the project.

The appeal was allowed and the equitable compensation award returned to the Federal Court for reassessment to include the value of the flooded land for hydroelectricity generation.

Côté J. dissented, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's compensation assessment and no evidentiary basis for the majority's approach.

Three retired female members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police commenced a constitutional application challenging pension provisions that prevented job-sharing members from purchasing full-time pension credits for their service, a benefit available to members on unpaid leave.

The majority of the Court held that the pension plan's treatment of job-sharers created a distinction based on the enumerated ground of sex, as the program was disproportionately composed of women with childcare responsibilities.

The Court found that this arrangement perpetuated a long-standing source of economic disadvantage to women — gender biases embedded in pension plans historically designed for full-time male employees — thereby establishing a prima facie breach of s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Attorney General failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective capable of justifying the limitation under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court granted a declaration that the inability of full-time RCMP members who temporarily reduced working hours under a job-sharing agreement to purchase full-time pension credit for that service violated their s. 15(1) equality rights.

The appeal was allowed with costs throughout, with three justices dissenting on the application of the equality framework and the sufficiency of causal nexus.

An Indigenous rights-holder sought judicial review over the federal law-making process, alleging a duty to consult before introduction and enactment of omnibus environmental legislation that could affect Treaty 8 harvesting rights.

A majority held the reviewing court lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Courts Act because the impugned ministerial conduct was legislative in character and not reviewable as action of a federal board, commission, or tribunal.

The Court further held the duty to consult does not attach to the legislative process itself, given separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty, and parliamentary privilege.

The appeal was dismissed, while leaving open that enacted legislation may still be challenged through constitutional and other established remedies where rights are adversely affected.

This appeal concerned whether records generated under the Independent Assessment Process in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement were subject to federal access, privacy, and archiving legislation, and whether they could be ordered destroyed.

The Court held the supervising judge had authority under the settlement framework to direct disposition of the records and found no palpable and overriding error in concluding the agreement contemplated confidentiality, limited retention, claimant choice, and eventual destruction.

The Court also upheld the modified order requiring a 15-year retention period with a notice program so claimants could elect archival preservation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Independent Counsel.

The appellant sought to compel disclosure of a lawyer’s accounts receivable records under statutory audit and enforcement powers in federal tax legislation.

The court held that Parliament had clearly intended the statutory definition to exclude a lawyer’s accounting records from solicitor-client privilege as a matter of interpretation.

However, in light of the companion constitutional ruling, the disclosure scheme as applied to legal professionals was invalid, and the request for disclosure could not proceed.

The appeal was allowed only to vary the lower disposition, and the compliance application was dismissed.

In a constitutional challenge to federal tax requirement powers, legal professional secrecy was weighed against the state’s audit and collection objectives.

The court held that compelling production from legal advisers without adequate notice to clients, without judicially supervised safeguards, and with an overbroad accounting-records exception produced unreasonable seizures under s. 8.

The impugned provisions failed minimal impairment and were not justified under s. 1.

The provisions were read down to exclude notaries and lawyers acting as legal advisers, and the accounting-records exception was declared invalid.

On a constitutional appeal, the appellants sought declarations that Métis and non-status Indians fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction under s. 91(24), that the federal Crown owes them a fiduciary duty, and that they have consultation and negotiation rights.

The Court held that Métis and non-status Indians are “Indians” under s. 91(24), restored the broader trial declaration, and rejected restricting Métis status to the Powley framework for this jurisdictional purpose.

The Court found this declaration had practical utility in ending the federal-provincial jurisdictional impasse.

The Court declined the second and third declarations as restatements of settled law lacking practical utility.

The Court held that core search-and-seizure and record-keeping provisions in the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing scheme, as applied to lawyers and law firms, unjustifiably infringed Charter protections.

It confirmed sections 62, 63, 63.1 and 64 of the Act violated section 8 in this context, and that related regulatory obligations infringed section 7 when combined with inadequate privilege safeguards.

The appeal was allowed in part: findings against sections 5(i) and 5(j) were set aside, while the remaining constitutional relief largely stood.

The Court allowed the appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal and set aside the divestiture order under s. 92 of the Competition Act.

A majority held the merger likely prevented competition substantially, but concluded the efficiencies defence in s. 96 succeeded because proven efficiency gains outweighed proven anti-competitive effects after the Commissioner failed to quantify quantifiable effects.

This administrative law appeal concerned judicial review of a staffing tribunal decision rejecting an abuse-of-authority complaint under federal public service staffing legislation.

The Court held that the tribunal reasonably concluded there was no legal requirement to use a particular appointment process based on whether a position was new or reclassified.

It further held the reviewing court improperly assessed a different theory than the one advanced in the complaint and impermissibly reweighed the record on judicial review.

The appeal was allowed, with the tribunal decision restored.

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a US-based distributor of the patented medicine Thalomid, sold the drug to Canadians through the Special Access Programme.

The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board requested pricing information, asserting jurisdiction under the Patent Act over medicines 'sold in any market in Canada'.

The appellant argued that under commercial law principles, the sales occurred in the United States.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that a purposive interpretation of the Patent Act supported the Board's consumer protection mandate to regulate prices of medicines delivered and dispensed in Canada, regardless of the commercial locus of the sale.

The appellant, a former member of the Canadian Forces, brought a class action against the Crown challenging the deduction of his disability pension from his long-term disability benefits.

The Crown argued the action should be stayed because the lawfulness of the deduction could only be challenged by judicial review.

Applying TeleZone, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to entertain the action and declined to exercise its residual discretion to stay the proceedings, as the essential character of the claim was for alleged breaches of s. 15(1) of the Charter rather than a veiled application for judicial review.

During a labour dispute, veterinarians employed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) stopped working, halting meat inspections at Quebec slaughterhouses.

The CFIA subsequently ordered the uninspected meat destroyed.

The slaughterhouse operators sued the veterinarians and their union for damages in the Quebec Superior Court.

The defendants brought recourses in warranty against the CFIA.

The CFIA moved to dismiss, arguing the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because its decision had not been quashed on judicial review by the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the CFIA's appeal, holding that judicial review is not a prerequisite for a civil action for damages against the federal Crown, and that a lawful administrative decision can still constitute a civil fault under Quebec law.

The appellant generic drug manufacturer sought damages against the federal Crown for losses incurred when Health Canada prohibited the sale of its drug.

The Crown successfully moved for summary judgment in the lower courts on the basis that the appellant was required to first invalidate the prohibition decision via judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its companion decision in TeleZone.

The Court held that section 17 of the Federal Courts Act grants concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages against the Crown, and nothing in the Act requires a plaintiff to successfully challenge the underlying administrative decision on judicial review before pursuing a tort action.

The appellant obtained import permits from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to import wheat.

The permits were revoked while the cargo was en route, and a new permit with different conditions was issued, causing the appellant to incur additional costs.

The appellant brought an action for damages in the Federal Court without first seeking judicial review of the licensing decisions.

The Crown successfully moved to strike the claim on the basis that judicial review was a prerequisite.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its companion decision in TeleZone, holding that the Federal Court has concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages against the Crown and that a prior successful judicial review application is not required.

The respondent, a prison inmate, spent over four years in solitary confinement.

He brought an action for damages in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the federal Crown and a prison warden, alleging arbitrary detention and cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Charter.

The appellants argued that the claim was a collateral attack on the segregation orders and that the respondent must first seek judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in TeleZone, held that the Federal Courts Act does not grant the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over such damages claims, and the provincial superior court has jurisdiction to hear the action without prior judicial review.

The respondent, TeleZone Inc., brought an action for damages against the federal Crown in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice after its application for a telecommunications licence was rejected by Industry Canada.

The Attorney General of Canada challenged the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, arguing that based on the Grenier principle, the claim was a collateral attack on the Minister's decision and that TeleZone had to first seek judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, overruling Grenier.

The Court held that the Federal Courts Act and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act grant concurrent jurisdiction to provincial superior courts to hear damages claims against the federal Crown, and there is no requirement to first quash the underlying administrative decision via judicial review in the Federal Court.

The appellants were subcontractors to a general contractor who submitted a bid for a design-build construction project.

The owner awarded the contract to a non-compliant bidder.

The general contractor settled its claim against the owner, but the subcontractors sued the owner in tort for pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the owner did not owe a duty of care to the subcontractors.

The claim did not fall within a recognized category of pure economic loss, and recognizing a new duty of care was not justified because the subcontractors could have protected themselves by forming a joint venture with the general contractor.