William L. Vanveen

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Commissioner of Competition to provide further particulars of alleged misleading representations pleaded under paragraph 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act concerning premium text messaging services.

The defendants argued that the statement of claim failed to identify the specific alleged misrepresentations and related details necessary to prepare their defences.

The court held that the pleading sufficiently described the alleged deceptive marketing practices and that the requested particulars largely sought evidentiary details, which are properly obtained through discovery rather than particulars.

Given that the alleged representations could number in the hundreds or more and concerned matters within the defendants’ knowledge, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the request for further particulars.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari of a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for bid rigging and conspiracy.

They argued that the Requests for Proposals were not calls or requests for bids or tenders under s. 47 of the Competition Act because they did not result in a contractual entitlement to perform services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could conclude that the procurement process created a bidding contract and that the appellants had made bids in response to a call or request for bids or tenders.

Multiple applicants charged with bid‑rigging under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act and conspiracy under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry.

They argued that the government Requests for Proposals used to procure information technology services merely created standing offers or pre‑qualification lists and therefore could not constitute “calls for bids or tenders” within the meaning of the Competition Act.

The court reviewed the Contract A/Contract B tendering framework and relevant procurement jurisprudence, emphasizing that the existence of a bidding contract depends on the parties’ intention to create binding rights and obligations.

It held that there was some evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the RFP process created contractual relations sufficient to constitute bids or tenders, even though the government retained discretion not to award work.

The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.