Alexander Pless

The appellant challenged the Quebec Court of Appeal's opinion that ss. 1 to 7 of the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, S.C. 2017, c. 3, exceeded Parliament's criminal law power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority held that the pith and substance of the impugned provisions — prohibiting compelled genetic testing and non-consensual use or disclosure of genetic test results in connection with contracting and the provision of goods and services — was a valid exercise of the criminal law power, as the provisions respond to a reasoned apprehension of harm to autonomy, privacy, equality, and public health.

A concurring minority agreed on the result but characterized the pith and substance more narrowly as protecting health by giving individuals control over the intimate information revealed by genetic testing.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the impugned provisions lacked a well-defined threat and adequate evidentiary foundation to constitute a valid criminal law purpose, falling instead within provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights under s. 92(13).

In consolidated constitutional reference appeals, the Court upheld the cooperative capital markets framework and confirmed the draft federal statute was within Parliament's general trade and commerce power.

It held the memorandum did not legally bind provincial legislatures or impermissibly transfer primary legislative authority, and that the federal scheme validly targeted systemic risk and financial crime.

This appeal concerned whether records generated under the Independent Assessment Process in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement were subject to federal access, privacy, and archiving legislation, and whether they could be ordered destroyed.

The Court held the supervising judge had authority under the settlement framework to direct disposition of the records and found no palpable and overriding error in concluding the agreement contemplated confidentiality, limited retention, claimant choice, and eventual destruction.

The Court also upheld the modified order requiring a 15-year retention period with a notice program so claimants could elect archival preservation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Independent Counsel.

In an appeal concerning transportation regulation, the appellant sought to invalidate amending rail interswitching regulations on the basis that the regulator followed improper governmental direction in the rule-making process.

The appellant accepted that the regulator had statutory authority and that a presumption of proper administrative action applied.

The Court held that no evidentiary foundation was provided to rebut that presumption.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the federal respondent.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.