Peter W. Hogg

A judgment creditor sought disclosure of a mortgage discharge statement to enforce a writ of seizure and sale against debtors' property.

The appeal addressed whether federal privacy legislation barred disclosure absent express consent.

The Court held disclosure could be ordered under the court-order exception and that implied consent arose in the enforcement context once judgment and seizure steps were completed with notice.

The Court emphasized access to justice and rejected requiring additional formalistic motions where substantively identical relief was sought.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgagee was ordered to produce the statement.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Securities Commission order that imposed significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for failing to report insider trades and failing to adequately supervise trading.

The appellants argued that the AMP provision of the Securities Act, which allows fines up to $1 million per infraction, violates s. 11(d) of the Charter because its magnitude constitutes a true penal consequence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionality of an administrative penalty is assessed based on the actual penalty imposed, not the theoretical maximum.

The court found the fines were proportionate to the regulatory goal of deterring non-compliance in capital markets and did not amount to a penal sanction.

The court also upheld the Commission's findings regarding the appellants' failure to supervise and its consideration of the public interest in determining the sanctions.

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they breached securities laws and acted contrary to the public interest.

The Commission found that the appellant Rowan failed to file insider reports, traded during blackout periods, and failed to disclose his control over certain trust accounts.

The Commission also found that the other appellants failed to adequately supervise Rowan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Commission's interpretation of 'control or direction' under the Securities Act, its public interest findings, or its imposition of administrative monetary penalties.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which held that several provisions of the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act were ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part.

A majority of the Court found that the provisions regulating controlled activities (such as clinical practice and research) exceeded Parliament's criminal law power and intruded into provincial jurisdiction over health and property and civil rights.

However, provisions prohibiting specific negative practices, such as the use of reproductive material without consent, were upheld as valid criminal law.

The parties appealed the trial judge's costs award in a shareholder oppression and valuation proceeding.

The trial judge had awarded the dissenting shareholders substantial indemnity costs up to the date of a settlement offer, and awarded the corporation partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both costs appeals, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court also ordered no costs for the main appeals due to divided success.

The minority shareholders of Ford Canada dissented from a squeeze-out transaction and sought fair value for their shares, along with an oppression remedy against Ford Canada and Ford U.S. regarding a transfer pricing system that caused the Canadian subsidiary to lose money over a ten-year period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the transfer pricing system was oppressive and that the business judgment rule did not protect the directors.

However, the Court reversed the dismissal of the oppression claim against Ford U.S., finding that the parent company's actions were oppressive.

The Court also held that minority shareholders were not entitled to compensation for historical oppression that occurred before they acquired their shares, and that fair value does not include a component for historical oppression.

The trial judge's order directing a reference to a Master to determine shareholdings was set aside.

Kirkbi held patents for LEGO construction sets.

When the patents expired in Canada, Ritvik began manufacturing and selling interchangeable bricks.

Kirkbi claimed an unregistered trade-mark in the 'LEGO indicia' (the pattern of raised studs) and sued for passing off under s. 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act.

Ritvik challenged the constitutionality of s. 7(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7(b) is intra vires Parliament as a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power.

However, Kirkbi's passing-off claim was dismissed because the doctrine of functionality bars purely functional designs from being the basis of a trade-mark, whether registered or unregistered.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit.

At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation.

The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.

The appellant, executor of her late husband's estate, challenged the validity of ad valorem probate fees imposed by Ontario Regulation 293/92 under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the probate levy is a direct tax, not a fee, because it is compulsory, levied by a public body for a public purpose, and lacks a nexus between the quantum charged and the cost of the service provided.

The Court concluded that the tax was unconstitutional because it was imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council without clear and unambiguous authorization from the legislature, violating the principle of no taxation without representation codified in section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appeal was allowed, the regulation was declared invalid, and the appellant was refunded the fees paid.

The federal government introduced legislation to limit its cost-sharing obligations to certain provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan.

British Columbia referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the federal government had the authority to unilaterally limit its obligations and whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations prevented the introduction of such legislation without provincial consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had the authority to amend the Plan, as parliamentary sovereignty allows Parliament to amend its statutes.

The Court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the legislative process and cannot create substantive rights to veto proposed legislation.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for employees of Alberta Government Telephones (AGT).

The Board assumed jurisdiction, finding AGT to be a federal undertaking and not immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while AGT is an interprovincial undertaking within federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it is a provincial Crown agent and therefore immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Court found no clear Parliamentary intention to bind the provincial Crown in the Code, and AGT did not waive its immunity by its conduct.

The appellant provincial telephone utility appealed a decision holding that, although it was a federal undertaking, it was not immune from federal telecommunications regulation.

The Court held that the utility's participation in an integrated national telecommunications network, together with its interprovincial transmission activities and organizational arrangements, made it an interprovincial undertaking under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority nevertheless concluded that, as an agent of the provincial Crown, it was protected by s. 16 of the Interpretation Act because the Railway Act did not clearly bind the Crown and the utility had not waived immunity through its conduct.

The appeal was allowed, with one judge dissenting on waiver.

The appellant union challenged the federal Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, which extended collective agreements and fixed wage increases for public sector employees, arguing it violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter and equality before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the guarantee of freedom of association does not include a constitutional guarantee of the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike.

The Court also found no violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as the legislation was directed at a valid federal objective of dampening inflationary expectations.

The Governor in Council referred questions to the Supreme Court regarding the validity of Manitoba's unilingual legislation under s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Court held that the requirement to enact, print, and publish laws in both English and French is mandatory, rendering all unilingual Acts of the Manitoba Legislature invalid and of no force or effect.

However, to avoid a legal vacuum and preserve the constitutional principle of the rule of law, the Court deemed the invalid current Acts temporarily valid for the minimum period necessary for their translation, re-enactment, printing, and publication.

The Governor in Council referred a constitutional question to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding whether Canada or Newfoundland has the right to explore and exploit, and the legislative jurisdiction over, the mineral and other natural resources of the continental shelf offshore Newfoundland.

The Court held that the continental shelf rights are an extraterritorial manifestation of external sovereignty.

Since Newfoundland did not possess external sovereignty prior to joining Confederation, and international law did not recognize continental shelf rights at that time, the rights accrued to Canada.

Consequently, Canada has both the right to explore and exploit the resources and the legislative jurisdiction over them under its residual peace, order, and good government power.