Claude Joyal

The applicant sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a recommendation included in the Report of the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission.

The deadline was missed because counsel failed to account for the holiday period.

The respondent objected, arguing the report is consultative and the application is premature.

The Court suspended the motion for an extension of time until the Minister of Justice issues a response to the Commission's report, as the statutory process must run its course to crystallize the issues.

A Canadian citizen imprisoned in the United States challenged provisions of the International Transfer of Offenders Act that allow the Minister to refuse transfer requests.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the statutory scheme, with the majority finding no breach of s. 6(1) mobility rights because there is no constitutional right to serve a foreign sentence in Canada.

Concurring reasons found a s. 6(1) limitation but held it justified under s. 1 based on security and public safety objectives.

The Court emphasized that ministerial discretion in transfer decisions must still be exercised reasonably and with due regard to Charter values.

The appellant did not pursue the reasonableness challenge to the specific refusal decision before the Court.

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The media organizations challenged rules and a directive that limited filming, taking photographs, and conducting interviews to predetermined locations in courthouses, and prohibited the broadcasting of official audio recordings of hearings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while these activities are protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter and the measures infringe freedom of expression, the limits are reasonable and justified under s. 1.

The measures advance the pressing and substantial objective of maintaining the fair administration of justice by ensuring the serenity of hearings, protecting the privacy of litigants, and reducing stress on witnesses.

The appellant newspaper appealed orders compelling its journalist to answer questions that could reveal a confidential source, and a publication ban on reporting settlement negotiations in the Sponsorship Scandal litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no class-based constitutional privilege exists for journalists, the common law Wigmore framework applies in Quebec civil proceedings to determine journalist-source privilege on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also quashed the publication ban, finding it was improperly issued without notice and failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as the media was not bound by the parties' confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant, named in a security certificate, sought a stay of proceedings after learning that CSIS had destroyed operational notes from his interviews and that the ministers had introduced new evidence late in the process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that CSIS has a statutory and constitutional duty to retain and disclose its operational notes in targeted investigations, as the destruction of such notes compromises the judicial review process and the named person's right to procedural fairness under section 7 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was premature and inappropriate at this interlocutory stage, and that the designated judge's decision to grant an adjournment remedied the late disclosure.

The Court also confirmed that new evidence may be admitted at any stage of the security certificate review.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision striking down portions of the Tobacco Act and the Tobacco Products Information Regulations.

The respondent tobacco manufacturers cross-appealed the provisions upheld by the lower court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the restrictions on tobacco advertising, sponsorship, and the requirement for 50% health warning labels infringed the manufacturers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, these limits were demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court found that Parliament's objectives of protecting public health and preventing youth smoking were pressing and substantial, and the measures chosen were proportional and minimally impairing.

The government of Quebec submitted questions concerning the constitutional validity of ss. 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act to the Court of Appeal, arguing they encroached on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Court of Appeal found the provisions unconstitutional.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions relating to maternity and parental benefits are a valid exercise of Parliament's jurisdiction over unemployment insurance under s. 91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as their pith and substance is the replacement of employment income during an interruption of work.

The respondent, a former employee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), brought an action against the Crown for damages resulting from inadequate air quality at the ICAO headquarters leased by the Crown.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the claim fell within labour relations governed by the ICAO Service Code and that ICAO's immunity extended to the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute was an extra-contractual civil liability claim against a third party, not a labour dispute.

The Court found that ICAO's immunity did not transfer to the Crown and the Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim.

An RCMP officer challenged the constitutionality of legislation excluding RCMP members from the federal public sector labour relations regime, alleging infringements of freedom of association, freedom of expression, and equality rights under the Charter.

The majority held that s. 2(d) protects the formation of independent employee associations and lawful collective activity, but does not require Parliament to include RCMP members within a particular statutory labour relations scheme.

The majority further held that the exclusions did not infringe s. 2(b) or s. 15(1), emphasizing that the Charter generally imposes no positive obligation of legislative inclusion absent exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that the exclusion had an anti-associational purpose and failed s. 1 justification.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of federal toxic-substances provisions and an interim order limiting PCB releases after a prosecution for alleged discharge into a river.

The majority held that environmental protection through prohibitions against toxic substances is a legitimate criminal law purpose and that Part II of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act created a valid scheme targeting toxic substances through prohibitions backed by penal sanctions.

The dissent concluded that the scheme was fundamentally regulatory rather than prohibitory and could not be sustained under either the criminal law power or the national concern branch of peace, order and good government.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the summary conviction court.

Constitutional appeals challenging federal tobacco advertising and labelling restrictions.

The Court held that Parliament had authority under the criminal law power to legislate in relation to tobacco advertising, promotion, and warning requirements aimed at protecting public health.

A majority further held that the impugned advertising ban, trademark restrictions, and unattributed package warning provisions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1 because the government failed to demonstrate minimal impairment.

Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the Act were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants, two major tobacco companies, sought an interlocutory stay to suspend the enforcement of new packaging regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act pending their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the Act's constitutionality.

The Court established the three-part test for interlocutory relief in Charter cases: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

While the applicants demonstrated a serious question and irreparable financial harm, the Court held that the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the public interest in health, which the regulations aimed to protect.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

The respondents were prevented by airport officials from distributing political pamphlets and recruiting members at a federal airport.

The appeal concerned whether the airport regulations and related governmental action infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and, if so, whether the restriction was justified under s. 1.

The Court held that political expression in non-security areas of an airport engaged Charter protection and that the blanket prohibition on solicitation and advertising infringed that freedom.

The restriction was not saved under s. 1, with members of the Court variously emphasizing overbreadth, vagueness, lack of a sufficient objective, and the impropriety of relying on government property rights alone to suppress expression.

The respondents were locked out by their employer during a labour dispute.

A collective agreement was signed and a memorandum governing the return to work was agreed upon, with a portion of the workforce returning immediately and the rest gradually recalled.

The appellant Commission held that the workers not immediately recalled were only eligible for unemployment insurance benefits once production reached a certain level.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Federal Court of Appeal's decision that the stoppage of work terminated on the date the collective agreement was signed, as the lack of intent to perform the contract of service had ended.

The applicants brought a motion to state four constitutional questions pursuant to Rule 32(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court reviewed the proposed questions and the 1984 amendment to Rule 32(1), which clarified that constitutional questions under the Charter are only stated when the constitutional validity, applicability, or operability of a statute or regulation is raised.

The Court found that questions 1 and 2 met this test, but questions 3 and 4 did not.

The motion was granted in part, and time was extended to state questions 1 and 2 only.

The appellant, an agent of the Crown in right of Quebec, purchased over 10 per cent of the shares of a company governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act, becoming an insider.

It refused to submit an insider report, claiming Crown immunity under s. 16 of the federal Interpretation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insider reporting provisions applied to the appellant.

By purchasing shares, the appellant implicitly accepted the benefits of the statutory regime and could not accept the benefit of the law without also incurring its burdens.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a trustee in bankruptcy, acquired the right to sell goods purchased by the bankrupt company.

He argued that the company incurred liability to pay excise tax on the goods at the time of purchase, making it a claim provable in bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the Court of Appeal's reasons, finding no obligation arose prior to bankruptcy as the goods were not sold or retained for use.

The trustee was held liable to pay the tax upon selling the goods, deductible as an administration expense.