Peter T. Fallis

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it had the exclusive right to terminate a real estate agreement.

The agreement contained a clause allowing either party to terminate if severance approval was not obtained by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the final executed offer contained a mutual termination clause, rejecting the appellant's argument that uninitialed handwritten portions should be disregarded.

The court also rejected the appellant's promissory estoppel argument, finding the relationship was governed by contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application regarding a failed real estate transaction and the discharge of a Certificate of Pending Litigation, the parties could not agree on costs.

The respondents sought costs of $15,859.77, claiming partial indemnity costs up to the date of their offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, including proportionality, hourly rates, and travel time.

The court reduced the hourly rate for travel time by 50% but ultimately found the total amount claimed by the respondents to be reasonable and proportional.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs fixed at $15,859.77.

The applicant buyer sought a declaration that it had the exclusive right to terminate an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property requiring severance approval.

The respondent sellers had added a mutual termination clause during the sign-back process, which the buyer did not initial but included in subsequent offers.

The court found the APS was a binding contract and interpreted the mutual termination clause objectively, concluding that both parties had the right to terminate the agreement if severance approval was not obtained by the specified deadline.

The buyer's application was dismissed, and the Certificate of Pending Litigation was ordered discharged.

Following an application challenging the legality of a municipal by-law authorizing an agreement with a conservation organization to use an unopened road allowance for a public trail, the court had previously found the by-law illegal for failure to comply with municipal notice requirements but declined to quash it, dismissing the application.

The parties subsequently made written submissions on costs.

The applicants argued they achieved primary success because the by-law was declared illegal, while the municipality and the added party sought costs or alternatively no costs due to divided success.

The court held that success on the application was clearly divided because the by-law was found illegal yet remained in force.

Exercising its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

Property owners applied under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001 to quash a municipal by-law authorizing an agreement allowing the Bruce Trail Conservancy to use an unopened road allowance for a footpath adjacent to the applicant’s property.

The court found the municipality failed to comply with its own notice by-law because the notice was posted on the municipal website for only one week rather than the required two weeks and the newspaper notice was improperly placed and incomplete.

The court therefore concluded the by-law was illegal because it was not passed in accordance with the municipality’s notice requirements.

However, exercising its discretion under s. 273(1), the court declined to quash the by-law due to the absence of evidence regarding consequences of the illegality or impact on the applicant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Land Titles to freeze the land records for a property after the applicant registered a self-to-self transfer despite having no prior interest in the land.

The applicant argued the Director lacked the authority under the Registry Act to freeze the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director had the jurisdiction under sections 23, 97(f), and 97.1(c) of the Registry Act to investigate and take preventative action against suspicious registrations.

The court also held that the Director's decision to freeze the records was reasonable and noted it would deny relief under its inherent jurisdiction as the applicant was attempting to create an interest in land where none existed.

Following resolution of a motion by consent permitting the applicant to file a fresh notice of application in litigation arising from termination of employment by a municipal employer, the court addressed competing claims for costs.

The applicant sought $5,000 in costs while the respondent sought $10,000.

The court noted that success on the motion was divided and that the proposed fresh notice of application had originally sought relief well beyond the narrow issue capable of adjudication under the Municipal Act.

Considering the discretionary nature of costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 57.01 and 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded that fairness favoured making no costs order.

The appellants sought costs for both the appeal and the original application following their successful appeal.

The court had previously awarded $30,000 based on an agreement between counsel, but counsel later advised this was based on a misunderstanding regarding whether the amount covered only the appeal or both proceedings.

The court amended its order, noting the public interest nature of the case and the magnitude of the impact on the respondent.

The court awarded the appellants modest costs fixed at $15,000 for the appeal and $15,000 for the original application.

The respondent campground owner challenged the inclusion of third-party owned, seasonally-used trailers in its property tax assessment.

The application judge held that the trailers did not form part of the 'current value' of the land because they were not part of the fee simple.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the term 'fee simple' in the definition of 'current value' does not limit assessment to interests owned by the freehold owner, and that the trailers were properly assessed as land.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal, finding the tax was direct and constitutionally valid.

The appellant, an execution creditor of a respondent who held a 25 per cent interest in a parcel of land as a tenant in common, sought a sale of the entire parcel under the Partition Act.

The application was dismissed at first instance and by the majority of the Divisional Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a sheriff holding a writ of seizure and sale has neither a legal interest in the land nor a right to possession.

Consequently, the execution creditor does not qualify under the Partition Act to apply for partition or sale of the entire property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, executor of her late husband's estate, challenged the validity of ad valorem probate fees imposed by Ontario Regulation 293/92 under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the probate levy is a direct tax, not a fee, because it is compulsory, levied by a public body for a public purpose, and lacks a nexus between the quantum charged and the cost of the service provided.

The Court concluded that the tax was unconstitutional because it was imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council without clear and unambiguous authorization from the legislature, violating the principle of no taxation without representation codified in section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appeal was allowed, the regulation was declared invalid, and the appellant was refunded the fees paid.