J. Gregory Richards

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for a declaration of a right of way over the respondents' property.

They argued that the original grant met all four requirements to establish an easement by grant and that the trial judge erred in considering post-grant evidence and in finding the grant ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the grant was ambiguous and lacked sufficient metes and bounds descriptions.

The trial judge correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the nature and location of the servient tenement over which the right of way was granted as it existed at the date of the grant, which was fatal to the claim.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her former legal and financial advisors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with advice provided during negotiation of a marriage contract.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions asserting that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process because the plaintiff had a statutory remedy under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set aside the marriage contract against her spouse.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to her claims more than two years before commencing the action.

The court further held that attempting to obtain, through damages against advisors, relief that should have been pursued through family law proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

On an appeal from a Master's production order, the appellants challenged an order requiring disclosure of seven years of post-contract financial statements and tax returns relating to companies in which a non-party had an interest.

The court held that, given the pleadings alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from advice leading to a marriage contract, the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's broad damages claim, including restitutionary assessment for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court rejected arguments that post-valuation records were irrelevant, that the order caused prejudice, or that disclosure should await a pending summary judgment motion.

The appeals were dismissed.

A member of a limousine drivers’ co‑operative brought an application under the Co‑operative Corporations Act seeking an order compelling the co‑operative to enforce its by‑law disqualifying members who held interests in competing airport limousine services.

Certain respondents had acquired shares in a holding company that owned a competing limousine operator.

The court held that the by‑law governing membership qualifications was validly enacted and that members were estopped from challenging its validity after years of operating under it.

However, the provision purporting to automatically terminate membership upon breach was inconsistent with the statute, which requires expulsion by board resolution after due process.

The court directed that the board may disqualify members with interests in the competing company following proper procedures but dismissed the application against a respondent who had divested his shares.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that a lease agreement for a municipal solid waste demonstration plant expired on January 28, 2003, and ordering the third party to indemnify the respondent municipality.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that the automatic three-year extension was triggered when the facility first accepted waste, not when it was fully completed.

The Court also upheld the finding that the third party was bound by an indemnity undertaking contained in its proposal, which was incorporated into the agreement between its wholly-owned subsidiary and the municipality.

The appellants, commercial fishers, challenged a communal fishing licence issued under a pilot sales program that granted members of three aboriginal bands the exclusive right to fish for salmon for 24 hours.

They argued the licence discriminated against them on the basis of race, violating their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the program was protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter because it had an ameliorative purpose and targeted a disadvantaged group.

The Court established that if a program meets the criteria of s. 15(2), it does not violate the s. 15 equality guarantee.

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) brought an urgent application to the Ontario Labour Relations Board for a cease and desist order regarding an unlawful strike by the Amalgamated Transit Union that shut down public transit.

The Board Chair held a teleconference hearing at 5:30 a.m. without the Union's participation, granting the order.

Later that day, a Vice-Chair reconsidered the decision, limiting each side's presentation time, and upheld the order.

The Union applied for judicial review, arguing a denial of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board had broad discretion to abridge its procedures and that the urgent circumstances justified the expedited process and limited presentation time.

The appellant hospital appealed a motion judge's order refusing to approve a 1998 infant settlement and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the claim for damages.

The plaintiff sought the amendment based on new expert evidence indicating her life expectancy had increased by 30 to 35 years since the settlement was reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly focused on the best interests of the child under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and reasonably relied on the uncontradicted expert evidence regarding life expectancy.

The Minister of Revenue appealed a trial decision that allowed an automobile dealership to exclude its wholesale financial liabilities for new vehicles from its paid-up capital as 'current accounts payable' under the Corporations Tax Act.

The Minister also appealed the trial judge's award of solicitor and client costs to the dealership.

The Divisional Court dismissed the tax appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the legislation or assessment of expert accounting evidence.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the award to a party and party scale because there was no finding of reprehensible conduct by the Minister to justify solicitor and client costs.

The appellant, executor of her late husband's estate, challenged the validity of ad valorem probate fees imposed by Ontario Regulation 293/92 under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the probate levy is a direct tax, not a fee, because it is compulsory, levied by a public body for a public purpose, and lacks a nexus between the quantum charged and the cost of the service provided.

The Court concluded that the tax was unconstitutional because it was imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council without clear and unambiguous authorization from the legislature, violating the principle of no taxation without representation codified in section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appeal was allowed, the regulation was declared invalid, and the appellant was refunded the fees paid.

The appellant land developer suffered financial losses due to a two-year delay by the respondent transit authority in determining the precise location and acreage required for a new transit station on the appellant's land.

The municipality withheld development approvals during this period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the damages resulting from the delay were the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation and were compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act is a remedial statute that must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken.