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A purchaser cannot refuse to close a real estate transaction merely because the seller transferred title to their Powers of Attorney prior to closing.
The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser in a failed real estate transaction.
The defendant refused to close on the purchase of a property after the title transferred from the original seller (Esther Hunter) to her Powers of Attorney (the plaintiffs' children) prior to the closing date.
The defendant claimed he was justified in refusing to close because he could not obtain title insurance due to concerns about the validity of the Power of Attorney.
The court found that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was binding despite the title transfer, that the defendant did not provide a valid written objection to title by the required deadline, and that the requisitions raised were not proper title objections.
The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $248,318.60 less the $40,000 deposit, totaling $208,318.60, plus pre-judgment interest.
The defendant's counterclaim for return of the deposit was dismissed.
Co-estate trustees removed for failing to administer estate, leaving property uninsured, and hostility toward co-trustee.
The applicant, a co-estate trustee and the lawyer who drafted the deceased's will, applied to remove the two respondent co-estate trustees (the deceased's sons).
The administration of the estate had stalled for four years due to hostility and lack of cooperation from the respondents, resulting in late tax filing penalties and the estate's main asset (a house) remaining uninsured while the respondents lived there rent-free.
The court found a clear necessity to remove the respondents as estate trustees to protect the estate assets and the welfare of the beneficiaries, particularly a third brother who was a disabled beneficiary of a discretionary trust.
The applicant was appointed as the sole estate trustee.
Co‑operative by‑law upheld but automatic expulsion invalid; board must vote to disqualify members.
A member of a limousine drivers’ co‑operative brought an application under the Co‑operative Corporations Act seeking an order compelling the co‑operative to enforce its by‑law disqualifying members who held interests in competing airport limousine services.
Certain respondents had acquired shares in a holding company that owned a competing limousine operator.
The court held that the by‑law governing membership qualifications was validly enacted and that members were estopped from challenging its validity after years of operating under it.
However, the provision purporting to automatically terminate membership upon breach was inconsistent with the statute, which requires expulsion by board resolution after due process.
The court directed that the board may disqualify members with interests in the competing company following proper procedures but dismissed the application against a respondent who had divested his shares.
Summary judgment granted where deemed admissions left no genuine issue for trial.
The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action relying on deemed admissions arising from the defendant’s failure to respond to a Request to Admit.
The defendant brought a cross‑motion seeking leave to withdraw the deemed admissions and an extension of time to respond, arguing the failure was inadvertent because the company had been represented by a layperson unfamiliar with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court applied the test governing withdrawal of admissions and accepted that the failure was inadvertent and that any prejudice could be compensated in costs.
However, the court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring a trial.
Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for damages equivalent to three months’ notice.
Motion to set aside default judgment denied due to implausible explanation, delay, and lack of merit.
The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default summary judgment that had set aside two property transfers as fraudulent conveyances.
The court found that the defendant failed to satisfy the preconditions for setting aside a default judgment, as his explanation for the default was implausible, he delayed in seeking relief, and he failed to present a defence on the merits.
The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff had no standing to attack the transfers because he was not a creditor at the time they were made, noting that the Fraudulent Conveyances Act protects both past and future victims of fraud.
The motion was dismissed.