Brian Nathan Radnoff

The court-appointed receiver of a partnership brought a motion seeking expanded investigative powers to examine a partner and two former employees under oath regarding potential insider transactions.

The partner opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for production of the receiver's investigative materials.

The court granted the receiver the power to examine the partner, limited to transactions within two years of the receivership, finding it just and convenient to investigate the concerns.

However, the court denied the request to examine the former employees as premature, requiring the receiver to exhaust ordinary investigatory tools first.

The partner's cross-motion was dismissed, and the receiver's fees and activities were approved.

The applicant, LAF Canada Company, sought an extension of its lease with the respondent, Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., on the basis that the force majeure clause in the lease was triggered by government-mandated COVID-19 closures.

The court found the case to be on all fours with Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company, 2023 ONCA 159, and held that the force majeure clause applied, extending the lease by 348 days.

LAF was not required to pay rent during the extension period, having already paid rent during the closure periods.

The court also awarded costs to LAF.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiffs for interim and interlocutory relief restraining the use of corporate funds by J.D.H. Holdings Limited to pay the defendants' legal and professional fees in an oppression action.

The plaintiffs also sought an accounting and repayment of such funds, or, in the alternative, a partial reimbursement to Jonshal Enterprises Inc. The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm or overwhelming fairness concerns to justify the relief sought, and that any damages could be addressed at trial.

The court considered a motion by the JDH Defendants for production and disclosure of documents over which the plaintiffs claimed privilege in an oppression and breach of fiduciary duty action.

The court found that the plaintiffs met their initial onus to establish litigation privilege over communications from and after December 16, 2019, and denied the defendants’ request for the court to review the 282 documents.

The court ordered both sides to produce redacted versions of privileged documents (excluding those with current litigation counsel and post-litigation communications) and to meet and confer regarding any non-privileged questions.

No costs were awarded to either side.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation claim brought by the plaintiffs, a tattoo artist and her company.

The defamation arose from negative online reviews and social media posts by the defendants regarding alleged misadventures and disputes over tattoo services, pricing, and plagiarism.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expressions, while attracting public attention, were fundamentally about private contractual and consumer disputes and did not relate to a matter of public interest as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP legislation.

The court also awarded costs against the defendants, noting the motions were inappropriate and tactical.

The applicant, CCI Bioenergy Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction to compel the respondent, Veolia Water Canada, Inc., to continue an agreement for organic waste processing services and to reinstate two of CCI's employees, following an explosion at the facility and subsequent termination of services by Veolia.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions, finding the injunction sought was mandatory, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court determined that CCI failed to establish a strong prima facie case or demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored Veolia due to the breakdown of trust and potential safety issues.

The motion for injunction was dismissed, but a sealing order for CCI's financial statements and personal employee information was granted.

Costs were awarded to Veolia.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that awarded the respondent $600,000 in damages and set aside the transfer of the appellants’ matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found that one appellant failed to return funds obtained from the respondent for a joint venture that never materialized and subsequently fraudulently conveyed the matrimonial home to his wife for nominal consideration to avoid a breach of trust claim.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the amount owed, fraudulent intent, and the wife's payment of good consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, including the presence of multiple badges of fraud.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a parking agreement's rate calculation clause and the determination of new parking rates.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by deeming the clause unambiguous despite fundamental undefined terms, and by improperly relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence while rejecting expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the Court re-interpreted the clause, establishing the monthly parking rates based on the appellants' expert evidence.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned commercial real estate corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholder and the corporation.

The applicant alleged oppression regarding the provision of financial information, the triggering of a shotgun buy-sell clause while the application was pending, and improper disbursements made to the majority shareholder.

The court found no oppression regarding the information provision or the shotgun clause, concluding the applicant was not entitled to an additional sum for her shares beyond the designated price.

However, the court found the majority shareholder's receipt of improper disbursements was oppressive and ordered an equalization payment of $154,717 to the applicant.

The Pointer Group Incorporated brought a motion for security for costs of the appeal and the underlying action and anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, had insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate that the appeal was both frivolous and vexatious, or that Dr. Gill had insufficient assets.

The court also found no "other good reason" to order security for costs, as the appeal presented arguable errors of law and there was no indication of vexatious conduct or difficulty in collecting costs from Dr. Gill.

Dr. Gill was awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion.

This judgment addresses two related applications concerning the interpretation of a Parking Agreement and an Assignment Agreement.

The primary issues involved determining the correct formula for calculating parking rates, the necessity and admissibility of expert evidence, whether retroactive payments were due, and the authority of the parties to negotiate and fix parking rates.

The court interpreted the Parking Agreement to require rates based on commercial, bona fide, arm's length public parking rates, not landlord-to-tenant rates.

It rejected expert evidence as unnecessary for rate determination and found the submitted evidence from both sides deficient.

The court ordered retroactive payments from June 1, 2019, and implied a good faith obligation for all parties to negotiate the parking rate, clarifying that neither 1284225 Ontario Limited nor 200 Ferrand Realty Limited could unilaterally negotiate or impose rates.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against the Developer Defendants for alleged misappropriation of $9 million.

Concurrently, the Developer Defendants sought to set aside their noting in default and obtain leave to file a Statement of Defence, asserting they had purged previous contempt orders related to a Mareva and Disclosure Order.

The court reviewed the Developer Defendants' efforts to provide an accounting and disclosure, acknowledging remaining gaps but finding that they had done all that was reasonably possible given the circumstances and passage of time.

The court emphasized that perfect compliance was not required to purge contempt.

Consequently, the Developer Defendants' motion to set aside default and for leave to file defences was granted, and the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment was dismissed.

No costs were awarded to either party, as the plaintiffs were justified in bringing their motion given the history of non-compliance.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal of their certification motions in two proposed class actions, the parties consensually resolved the issue of costs.

The Divisional Court ordered costs payable by the plaintiffs/appellants to the various defendants/respondents in the total amount of $92,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their certification motions in two proposed class actions arising from a privacy breach at two hospitals.

Rogue hospital employees accessed the contact information of maternity patients and sold it to RESP salespeople.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the accessed information (names, addresses, phone numbers, and basic hospital visit details) was personal but not highly private, and that the intrusion would not be regarded by a reasonable person as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation, or anguish.

Although the motions judge erred in his class definition, the appeal was dismissed because the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion were not met.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division that upheld findings of professional misconduct relating to five separate client matters over a five-year period.

The misconduct included breaching a Small Claims Court production order, failing to serve a client, breaching confidentiality by sending a termination letter containing legal advice to a client's psychiatrist, delaying the deposit of trust funds, misleading the court about an unpaid costs order, and improperly proposing a mutual withdrawal of Law Society complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors of law in the Appeal Panel's decision, and upheld the costs award against the appellant.

The moving defendants sought to strike the plaintiff's Superior Court action as an abuse of process.

The defendants had previously commenced 67 separate Small Claims Court actions against the plaintiff regarding HVAC rental contracts.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced this Superior Court action against the defendants, seeking damages for breach of contract and defamation, and seeking to traverse or stay the Small Claims Court actions.

The court found that the Superior Court action was duplicative of the plaintiff's defences in the Small Claims Court actions and sought to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

The court concluded it would be an abuse of process to permit the Superior Court action to proceed while the Small Claims Court actions were pending, and ordered the action stayed.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to determine the appropriate sanction for the Developer Defendants' continuing contempt of a Mareva and Disclosure Order, following a Court of Appeal decision remitting the matter for re-sentencing.

The court found that the defendants had still not purged their contempt, having failed to properly account for the plaintiffs' $9 million investment.

The court sentenced the individual defendants to 30 days of intermittent incarceration, struck the statement of defence, and deemed the defendants noted in default, with leave to apply to file a defence only if they fully purge their contempt.

The defendant paralegal, Eric Sabbah, brought a motion to strike and dismiss claims brought by the plaintiff, Utilebill Credit Corporation.

The plaintiff alleged various torts, including conversion, unlawful interference with economic interests, inducing breach of contract, injurious falsehood, and statutory violations, stemming from Mr. Sabbah's actions in assisting residential homeowners to cancel HVAC equipment rental contracts with the plaintiff.

The court dismissed all claims against Mr. Sabbah, except for the claim of conspiracy, for which the plaintiff was ordered to provide further particulars of the alleged unlawful means.

The court emphasized the protection of solicitor-client privilege and the impropriety of suing opposing counsel for advice given to clients.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.