Brian Nathan Radnoff

The applicant, LAF Canada Company, sought an extension of its lease with the respondent, Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., on the basis that the force majeure clause in the lease was triggered by government-mandated COVID-19 closures.

The court found the case to be on all fours with Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company, 2023 ONCA 159, and held that the force majeure clause applied, extending the lease by 348 days.

LAF was not required to pay rent during the extension period, having already paid rent during the closure periods.

The court also awarded costs to LAF.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiffs for interim and interlocutory relief restraining the use of corporate funds by J.D.H. Holdings Limited to pay the defendants' legal and professional fees in an oppression action.

The plaintiffs also sought an accounting and repayment of such funds, or, in the alternative, a partial reimbursement to Jonshal Enterprises Inc. The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm or overwhelming fairness concerns to justify the relief sought, and that any damages could be addressed at trial.

The court considered a motion by the JDH Defendants for production and disclosure of documents over which the plaintiffs claimed privilege in an oppression and breach of fiduciary duty action.

The court found that the plaintiffs met their initial onus to establish litigation privilege over communications from and after December 16, 2019, and denied the defendants’ request for the court to review the 282 documents.

The court ordered both sides to produce redacted versions of privileged documents (excluding those with current litigation counsel and post-litigation communications) and to meet and confer regarding any non-privileged questions.

No costs were awarded to either side.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation claim brought by the plaintiffs, a tattoo artist and her company.

The defamation arose from negative online reviews and social media posts by the defendants regarding alleged misadventures and disputes over tattoo services, pricing, and plagiarism.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expressions, while attracting public attention, were fundamentally about private contractual and consumer disputes and did not relate to a matter of public interest as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP legislation.

The court also awarded costs against the defendants, noting the motions were inappropriate and tactical.

The applicant, CCI Bioenergy Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction to compel the respondent, Veolia Water Canada, Inc., to continue an agreement for organic waste processing services and to reinstate two of CCI's employees, following an explosion at the facility and subsequent termination of services by Veolia.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions, finding the injunction sought was mandatory, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court determined that CCI failed to establish a strong prima facie case or demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored Veolia due to the breakdown of trust and potential safety issues.

The motion for injunction was dismissed, but a sealing order for CCI's financial statements and personal employee information was granted.

Costs were awarded to Veolia.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that awarded the respondent $600,000 in damages and set aside the transfer of the appellants’ matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found that one appellant failed to return funds obtained from the respondent for a joint venture that never materialized and subsequently fraudulently conveyed the matrimonial home to his wife for nominal consideration to avoid a breach of trust claim.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the amount owed, fraudulent intent, and the wife's payment of good consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, including the presence of multiple badges of fraud.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a parking agreement's rate calculation clause and the determination of new parking rates.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by deeming the clause unambiguous despite fundamental undefined terms, and by improperly relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence while rejecting expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the Court re-interpreted the clause, establishing the monthly parking rates based on the appellants' expert evidence.

The Pointer Group Incorporated brought a motion for security for costs of the appeal and the underlying action and anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, had insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate that the appeal was both frivolous and vexatious, or that Dr. Gill had insufficient assets.

The court also found no "other good reason" to order security for costs, as the appeal presented arguable errors of law and there was no indication of vexatious conduct or difficulty in collecting costs from Dr. Gill.

Dr. Gill was awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion.

This judgment addresses two related applications concerning the interpretation of a Parking Agreement and an Assignment Agreement.

The primary issues involved determining the correct formula for calculating parking rates, the necessity and admissibility of expert evidence, whether retroactive payments were due, and the authority of the parties to negotiate and fix parking rates.

The court interpreted the Parking Agreement to require rates based on commercial, bona fide, arm's length public parking rates, not landlord-to-tenant rates.

It rejected expert evidence as unnecessary for rate determination and found the submitted evidence from both sides deficient.

The court ordered retroactive payments from June 1, 2019, and implied a good faith obligation for all parties to negotiate the parking rate, clarifying that neither 1284225 Ontario Limited nor 200 Ferrand Realty Limited could unilaterally negotiate or impose rates.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against the Developer Defendants for alleged misappropriation of $9 million.

Concurrently, the Developer Defendants sought to set aside their noting in default and obtain leave to file a Statement of Defence, asserting they had purged previous contempt orders related to a Mareva and Disclosure Order.

The court reviewed the Developer Defendants' efforts to provide an accounting and disclosure, acknowledging remaining gaps but finding that they had done all that was reasonably possible given the circumstances and passage of time.

The court emphasized that perfect compliance was not required to purge contempt.

Consequently, the Developer Defendants' motion to set aside default and for leave to file defences was granted, and the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment was dismissed.

No costs were awarded to either party, as the plaintiffs were justified in bringing their motion given the history of non-compliance.

The defendant paralegal, Eric Sabbah, brought a motion to strike and dismiss claims brought by the plaintiff, Utilebill Credit Corporation.

The plaintiff alleged various torts, including conversion, unlawful interference with economic interests, inducing breach of contract, injurious falsehood, and statutory violations, stemming from Mr. Sabbah's actions in assisting residential homeowners to cancel HVAC equipment rental contracts with the plaintiff.

The court dismissed all claims against Mr. Sabbah, except for the claim of conspiracy, for which the plaintiff was ordered to provide further particulars of the alleged unlawful means.

The court emphasized the protection of solicitor-client privilege and the impropriety of suing opposing counsel for advice given to clients.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants (defendants) successfully challenged the sanction (judgment in the action) imposed by the motion judge for contempt, due to procedural flaws.

The Court of Appeal upheld the initial costs award for the contempt finding, but set aside the costs for the sanctions hearing and the action, and ordered no costs for the appeal, acknowledging the appellants' underlying contemptuous conduct as the root cause of the proceedings.

The appellants, found in contempt for multiple failures to disclose assets and account for misappropriated investment funds, appealed the motion judge's decision to grant judgment against them for approximately $9 million as a sanction for contempt.

The Court of Appeal held that while striking a defence or barring participation can be a sanction for contempt, final judgment is not directly available as a punishment for contempt under Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court found that the motion judge erred by relying on the merits of the action to grant judgment while simultaneously barring the appellants from addressing those merits.

The judgment was set aside, and the matter remitted to a different judge for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellants, having been found in contempt of a Mareva injunction and ordered to pay approximately $9 million to the respondents, appealed the judgment.

In this endorsement, the Court of Appeal addressed two motions: the respondents' motion for security for costs of the appeal and the proceeding, and the appellants' cross-motion for a stay of a judgment debtor examination order.

The court granted the respondents' motion for security for costs in part, finding the appellants' contempt a compelling reason under Rule 61.06(1)(c).

The court dismissed the appellants' motion for a stay, determining that the examination order was not automatically stayed and that compliance would not cause irreparable harm given the appellants' existing obligations to disclose assets.

The plaintiffs sought interim orders to compel the sale of a property and non-party document disclosure, alleging oppression and fraud by the defendants.

The court applied the strong prima facie case test for the mandatory interlocutory injunction.

It found a strong prima facie case of oppression due to the defendants' breach of shareholder agreements, diversion of funds, and lack of credibility, evidenced by their non-compliance with previous court orders.

The court approved the plaintiffs' proposed sale of the property for $12 million over the defendants' $15 million offer, citing the plaintiffs' offer's certainty and the defendants' unreliability.

The court also granted the non-party production order.

The applicants, Dawn and Scott McIntosh, sought to schedule a motion in Toronto to stay an action (the "2020 Oshawa Action") brought by HomeLife Superior Realty Inc. in Oshawa.

McIntosh argued the Oshawa action should have been a counterclaim in the existing Toronto action and sought to dismiss it as frivolous or an abuse of process.

The court declined to schedule the motion in Toronto, emphasizing Rule 37.03(1) which presumptively requires motions to be heard in the region where the affected proceeding was commenced.

The court found no reason to deviate from this rule, noting the Oshawa action was not improperly brought, there was a history of litigation in Oshawa related to the real estate transaction, and McIntosh was already involved in other Oshawa proceedings.

The plaintiffs sued two law firms and their lawyers for professional negligence related to a commercial asset sale and subsequent arbitration.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the claims.

The court dismissed both motions, finding genuine issues requiring a trial against the FLPC Defendants and deeming partial summary judgment inadvisable for the SWL Defendants due to the risk of inconsistent findings and the central role of credibility issues.

The appellant, Stoney Creek Centre Inc., appealed a judgment requiring it to pay the $3 million face amount of a mortgage, plus interest, to discharge it, rather than the approximately $2.7 million actually advanced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the mortgage financing agreement.

The court held that the parties had expressly agreed that the borrower would bear the lender's financing costs, making the full face value of the mortgage payable.

The appellants appealed from an order of the application judge that determined the respondents had not substantially interfered with an easement in favour of the appellants, assuming the easement to be valid.

The Court of Appeal found the evidentiary record before the application judge was insufficient to support any conclusions on the issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge's order, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for a fresh hearing or trial.

The court identified numerous unresolved questions regarding the validity of the easement, including issues relating to the title history, the precise location and dimensions of the easement, compliance with part lot subdivision control provisions, and whether the respondents' actions constituted substantial interference with the easement rights.

The plaintiff, an employment staffing agency, sought an interlocutory injunction against a former Director of Branch Operations and his new employer for alleged breaches of non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants.

The court found the Proprietary Information, Developments Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement to be valid and binding, rejecting the argument of lack of fresh consideration as the agreement was a condition of employment and presented on the first day.

A strong prima facie case was established for the former employee's solicitation of a major client (Cisco) and misuse of proprietary information (knowledge of a former colleague's value to Cisco).

However, no strong prima facie case was found for solicitation of another client (Bank of Montréal) or employee inducement.

The court determined that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm from loss of goodwill and market share, which would be difficult to quantify in damages.

The balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.