Daniel Iny

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the respondents (lawyers of his former employer) without leave to amend.

The motion judge found the claims were covered by absolute privilege as they related to lawyers' work in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the respondents had no duty to the appellant and their interactions were through litigation, and upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

Following a successful motion for an urgent interlocutory injunction against picketing union members, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $110,000.

The defendants argued for no or nominal costs, citing labour injunction jurisprudence.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $55,000 plus disbursements, finding that while the picketers' conduct was aggressive and crossed the line, it did not warrant the judicial disapproval reflected in substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, a former Canada Post employee terminated in 1988, brought an action against his former union and its retained lawyer for civil conspiracy and other torts, alleging they deliberately provided inadequate representation during his grievance.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the essential character of the claim was a Duty of Fair Representation complaint within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

The court also found the claim was statute-barred and, as against the lawyer, an abuse of process attempting to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The plaintiff, Bank-Strox Renovation Inc., sought an urgent interim and interlocutory injunction against Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 183, Derek Melo, and other unidentified individuals, to restrain unlawful picketing activities during a legal strike.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance, which proved unsuccessful in preventing ongoing obstruction, trespass, threats, and physical altercations at multiple job sites.

The court determined there was a serious issue to be tried and a reasonable likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business and goodwill.

Balancing the constitutional right to picket with the employer's right to carry on business, the court granted an interlocutory injunction against the Union and its members, agents, and representatives, but denied it against Derek Melo personally due to insufficient evidence.

The injunction included terms for a brief vehicle delay and a come-back provision for future amendments.

The appellant, appearing self-represented, failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal on April 17, 2019.

Despite attempts by counsel for the respondents and the court to contact the appellant at the phone number he had provided, he could not be reached.

The court dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the defendant employer for unpaid overtime.

The proposed class included non-management employees subject to the defendant's overtime policy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed valid causes of action in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence.

The court certified the action, finding that there was an identifiable class, common issues regarding systemic practices and aggregate damages, that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and that the plaintiff was an appropriate representative.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a mortgage registered against his property, alleging that the defendant mortgagee never advanced the funds.

The plaintiff also claimed against the lawyer who provided him with independent legal advice, alleging negligence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding the mortgage discharge, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the advance of funds required a trial.

The court granted the lawyer's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim against him on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively, that the lawyer did not breach his duty of care.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action sought repayment of approximately $58,000 in alleged loans, but little progress occurred after a failed summary judgment motion, leading to administrative dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and relevant Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court found that although the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, the dismissal resulted from inadvertence, the motion to set aside was brought promptly once discovered, and the defendants failed to establish prejudice.

Emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the lack of demonstrable prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal order and allow the action to proceed subject to a timetable.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.

A housing co‑operative applied under s. 171.13 of the Co‑operative Corporations Act for termination of a member’s membership and occupancy rights, a writ of possession, arrears, and costs.

The respondent member had a lengthy history of housing charge arrears, repeated late payments, and insufficient‑funds payments, and failed to attend the board meeting considering termination.

The court held that eviction decisions of democratically governed housing co‑operatives attract judicial deference and are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.

Finding the board’s process fair and its decision reasonable, and no exceptional equitable circumstances warranting relief under the Act, the court granted the application.