Daniel Iny

The respondent lawyer brought a motion to dismiss conduct and capacity applications issued against her by the Law Society, alleging abuse of process, bias, discrimination, and prosecutorial misconduct.

She claimed that the Law Society, its investigators, counsel, and Tribunal adjudicators discriminated against her as an Indigenous Christian woman and infringed her Charter right to freedom of religion.

The Tribunal reviewed the extensive evidentiary record and found no evidence to support the allegations of bias, discrimination, or improper motives.

The Tribunal concluded that the respondent failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or any conduct amounting to an abuse of process, and dismissed the motion.

The Law Society brought a capacity application alleging the respondent lawyer was incapacitated between 2014 and 2019 due to a mental illness.

The respondent, an Indigenous woman and registered nurse, contested the application, arguing she was never incapacitated, her religious expressions were misinterpreted as delusions, and the psychiatric assessments were tainted by systemic racism.

The Tribunal accepted the expert psychiatric evidence that the respondent suffered from a lifelong mental illness that rendered her incapacitated during the relevant period, but found she has been in remission since 2019 due to adherence to a treatment plan.

The Tribunal ordered a three-year return-to-practice plan under s. 40 of the Law Society Act, requiring the respondent to remain under the care of a treating regulated professional and provide annual compliance reports, finding this to be the least restrictive accommodation necessary to protect the public.

In a professional misconduct proceeding against a lawyer involving alleged mortgage fraud, the Law Society sought to disclose documents obtained from investigations of other lawyers.

The respondent lawyer sought unredacted disclosure, arguing the 'innocence at stake' exception to solicitor-client privilege applied.

The Tribunal held that the 'innocence at stake' exception is limited to criminal proceedings and does not apply where a licence to practise a profession is at stake.

The Tribunal reviewed the documents individually, finding the presumption of privilege over certain trust and administrative records was rebutted given the nature of the mortgage transactions, and ordered disclosure of specific documents with directed redactions to protect solicitor-client communications.

In a professional conduct proceeding involving allegations of mortgage fraud, the respondent lawyer brought a motion seeking disclosure of privileged information obtained by the Law Society during investigations of other lawyers involved in the same transactions.

The Tribunal considered whether the Law Society Act clearly and unambiguously authorizes the disclosure of third-party privileged information to a licensee who was not retained in the matter.

The Tribunal deferred making a final decision on the legal question and instead ordered a practical review procedure to determine whether the documents are privileged and whether their disclosure is absolutely necessary for the respondent's defence.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a judicial review application.

The parties had previously submitted an agreement on costs, which the court had inadvertently overlooked.

Pursuant to the agreement, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $8,000 in costs thrown away, with no costs awarded for the judicial review application itself.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision refusing to reconsider a default judgment.

The default judgment was issued after the applicant's former counsel failed to respond to Tribunal communications, despite the applicant having previously participated in the proceedings.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's reliance on a deeming rule to penalize the applicant for its lawyer's negligence was unreasonable, as it failed to conduct a contextual analysis.

The application was granted, the Tribunal's decisions were quashed, and a new hearing was ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision declaring her a vexatious litigant.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine if the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that the applicant's son, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant himself, was improperly attempting to represent his mother and pursue the litigation on his own behalf without her sworn authorization or proper medical evidence of her capacity.

Concluding that the application was an abuse of process and an attempt to circumvent prior orders, the Divisional Court dismissed the proceeding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Panel that upheld the revocation of his licence to practise law for professional misconduct, including mortgage fraud and misappropriation of client funds.

The appellant argued that the Hearing Division erred in deeming facts and documents admitted after he provided only generic denials and objections to a request to admit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's conduct amounted to a refusal to engage in the admissions process and that the Appeal Panel made no reviewable errors in its comprehensive reasons or its order.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Kimmel J. dated October 19, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division that upheld findings of professional misconduct relating to five separate client matters over a five-year period.

The misconduct included breaching a Small Claims Court production order, failing to serve a client, breaching confidentiality by sending a termination letter containing legal advice to a client's psychiatrist, delaying the deposit of trust funds, misleading the court about an unpaid costs order, and improperly proposing a mutual withdrawal of Law Society complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors of law in the Appeal Panel's decision, and upheld the costs award against the appellant.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the respondents (lawyers of his former employer) without leave to amend.

The motion judge found the claims were covered by absolute privilege as they related to lawyers' work in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the respondents had no duty to the appellant and their interactions were through litigation, and upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

Following a successful motion for an urgent interlocutory injunction against picketing union members, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $110,000.

The defendants argued for no or nominal costs, citing labour injunction jurisprudence.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $55,000 plus disbursements, finding that while the picketers' conduct was aggressive and crossed the line, it did not warrant the judicial disapproval reflected in substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, a former Canada Post employee terminated in 1988, brought an action against his former union and its retained lawyer for civil conspiracy and other torts, alleging they deliberately provided inadequate representation during his grievance.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the essential character of the claim was a Duty of Fair Representation complaint within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

The court also found the claim was statute-barred and, as against the lawyer, an abuse of process attempting to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The plaintiff, Bank-Strox Renovation Inc., sought an urgent interim and interlocutory injunction against Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 183, Derek Melo, and other unidentified individuals, to restrain unlawful picketing activities during a legal strike.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance, which proved unsuccessful in preventing ongoing obstruction, trespass, threats, and physical altercations at multiple job sites.

The court determined there was a serious issue to be tried and a reasonable likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business and goodwill.

Balancing the constitutional right to picket with the employer's right to carry on business, the court granted an interlocutory injunction against the Union and its members, agents, and representatives, but denied it against Derek Melo personally due to insufficient evidence.

The injunction included terms for a brief vehicle delay and a come-back provision for future amendments.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action, concerning events from 2004 and 2005, was dismissed in 2017 after years of inactivity, largely attributed to the plaintiff's former counsel's severe mental health issues.

Applying the four-part test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp, the court found that while the motion was brought promptly, the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay, the delay was not due to inadvertence, and the defendant would suffer significant prejudice if the action were permitted to continue.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, appearing self-represented, failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal on April 17, 2019.

Despite attempts by counsel for the respondents and the court to contact the appellant at the phone number he had provided, he could not be reached.

The court dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion to vary or set aside an order that affirmed the Registrar's dismissal of his judicial review application for delay.

The underlying application concerned police street checks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant's delay in seeking the extension was unreasonable, there was no reasonable explanation for the entirety of the delay, the respondents would suffer prejudice, and the merits of the appeal were not high.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the defendant employer for unpaid overtime.

The proposed class included non-management employees subject to the defendant's overtime policy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed valid causes of action in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence.

The court certified the action, finding that there was an identifiable class, common issues regarding systemic practices and aggregate damages, that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and that the plaintiff was an appropriate representative.