Daniel Iny

The plaintiff's action was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14 after failing to set the action down for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the registrar's dismissal order.

The court applied the Reid factors and a contextual approach, finding that the delay was adequately explained, resulted from counsel's inadvertence, and that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a mortgage registered against his property, alleging that the defendant mortgagee never advanced the funds.

The plaintiff also claimed against the lawyer who provided him with independent legal advice, alleging negligence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding the mortgage discharge, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the advance of funds required a trial.

The court granted the lawyer's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim against him on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively, that the lawyer did not breach his duty of care.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action sought repayment of approximately $58,000 in alleged loans, but little progress occurred after a failed summary judgment motion, leading to administrative dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and relevant Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court found that although the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, the dismissal resulted from inadvertence, the motion to set aside was brought promptly once discovered, and the defendants failed to establish prejudice.

Emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the lack of demonstrable prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal order and allow the action to proceed subject to a timetable.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants, arguing procedural irregularities in the application process.

The appellants contended that opposing counsel lacked authority to act for all applicants, the application judge lacked authority to hear the matter, the affidavit evidence was inadmissible, and the reasons were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to any of the procedural complaints and upholding the vexatious litigant order.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents due to the appellants' persistent groundless allegations.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging her daughter fraudulently transferred title of a jointly owned property into her own name and subsequently encumbered it with multiple mortgages.

One of the mortgagees brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, and the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment against the mortgagees and default judgment against her daughter.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the 'full appreciation' test could not be met on the incomplete documentary record, and that a trial was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid the fraud and to allocate the loss among the competing parties under the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.

A housing co‑operative applied under s. 171.13 of the Co‑operative Corporations Act for termination of a member’s membership and occupancy rights, a writ of possession, arrears, and costs.

The respondent member had a lengthy history of housing charge arrears, repeated late payments, and insufficient‑funds payments, and failed to attend the board meeting considering termination.

The court held that eviction decisions of democratically governed housing co‑operatives attract judicial deference and are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.

Finding the board’s process fair and its decision reasonable, and no exceptional equitable circumstances warranting relief under the Act, the court granted the application.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his solicitor negligence claim against the respondent law firm.

The appellant alleged his former solicitor negligently handled his breach of fiduciary duty claim against a real estate agent, pressuring him into a settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the standard of care for solicitors.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondents.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and found no genuine issue for trial, as the underlying issue of forged guarantees had already been adjudicated in a previous action.

The appellant argued she was denied natural justice because the motion judge proceeded in her absence after she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, agreeing that the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the substantial indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge due to the serious allegations of dishonesty.