Lawrence F. Wallach

The defendant brought a motion for leave to file a late responding affidavit to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion, after the deadline in a peremptory timetable order had passed.

The defendant also sought to cross-examine the plaintiff's affiants, which the plaintiff opposed on the basis that the defendant had not filed an affidavit.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured allowing the late affidavit to ensure the case was decided on its merits.

The court also held that under Rule 39.02(1), a party is not required to serve an affidavit as a condition precedent to cross-examining an adverse party's affiant.

The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment against the defendants for a loan of $1.25 million.

The defendants argued the loan included fees that exceeded the criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment for the undisputed advanced funds of $1,050,000.00, as the defendants failed to provide an actuary certificate to prove the criminal interest rate for the remaining disputed amount.

The court awarded interest at 30% up to the issuance of the claim, and 2% thereafter.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) regarding two properties, alleging they were part of a real estate partnership with his father.

The court found there was a triable issue regarding an interest in land but declined to grant the CPL based on equitable factors.

The court concluded that damages would be a satisfactory remedy and that a CPL should not be used to secure a claim for damages.

The motion was dismissed and the interim CPL was discharged.

Following a successful application for the partition and sale of a property, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' delay and failure to comply with prior orders.

The respondents argued the costs claimed were disproportionate and should be deferred to the reference.

The court rejected the deferral and awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $35,000 inclusive, noting that the respondents' misconduct had already been addressed through prior admonishments and costs orders.

An application under the Partition Act sought partition and sale of a residential property jointly owned by three registered owners, while a related application alleged that one owner held her one-third interest in trust or constructive trust for another family member who had contributed financially to the property.

The court found no evidence of an express trust and held that the claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds.

The constructive trust claim also failed because the alleged contributor’s payments were analogous to rent and did not establish unjust enrichment or a causal link warranting a proprietary remedy.

As a co-tenant, the moving party had a prima facie right to partition and sale, and the hardship of relocation did not amount to oppression sufficient to deny that right.

The court ordered partition and sale of the property with accounting issues to be determined on a reference.

The court-appointed Manager moved for approval of its fees, its counsel's fees, and a proposed Fee Allocation Methodology to distribute the costs among various properties in a complex real estate receivership.

Several mortgagees and lien claimants opposed the fee approval and the allocation methodology, arguing that time was not docketed on a property-by-property basis and that the methodology was unfair.

The court approved the fees and the methodology, finding that strict property-by-property accounting would be cost-prohibitive and that the proposed allocation was fair and equitable.

The court also rejected arguments that the Manager's charge should be subordinated to prior liens or subject to the doctrine of marshalling.

The applicants and respondents entered into joint venture agreements to invest in commercial real estate projects through jointly owned companies.

The applicants discovered that the respondents were commingling funds, failing to make their required equity contributions, and diverting the applicants' funds to their own personal benefit and to companies they solely owned.

The court found that the respondents breached their contractual and fiduciary duties and were unjustly enriched.

The court imposed constructive trusts over several properties owned by the respondents, appointed a receiver over the respondents' assets, and cancelled the respondents' shares in the jointly owned companies where they had not contributed equity.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The court found the motion had no merit, declined to grant an oral hearing, and dismissed the motion.

The court also ordered that the moving party may not file any further documents or communicate with court staff regarding the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants, arguing procedural irregularities in the application process.

The appellants contended that opposing counsel lacked authority to act for all applicants, the application judge lacked authority to hear the matter, the affidavit evidence was inadmissible, and the reasons were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to any of the procedural complaints and upholding the vexatious litigant order.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents due to the appellants' persistent groundless allegations.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of claim, declaring him a vexatious litigant, and prohibiting further motions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claim against one respondent for failing to articulate a valid cause of action.

However, the court set aside the vexatious litigant declaration because no notice was given, and set aside the prohibition on further motions as the appellant's conduct did not meet the threshold.

The court also granted the appellant leave to amend his statement of claim regarding alleged breaches of the Condominium Act and unjust enrichment, while upholding the striking of the remainder of the pleading.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing their claim that the respondent's mortgage amounted to a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidentiary foundation capable of supporting an inference of fraud.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action on summary judgment.

The motions judge found the action was statute-barred because the cause of action accrued more than six years before the Statement of Claim was issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the principle that a cause of action accrues once the plaintiff knows some damage has occurred and has identified the tortfeasor.

The court found the appellant's letter sent prior to the limitation period demonstrated his awareness of the respondents' conduct and the resulting damages.