Andrew M. Stikuts

The applicant, a common shareholder in a family-owned real estate holding corporation, brought an application seeking dissent rights regarding the sale of corporate assets, an oppression remedy, and the appointment of a liquidator.

The court found that the applicant's dissent rights under the Business Corporations Act had been validly waived by a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement that granted the mother sole discretion to sell assets.

The oppression claim was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of participation or any unfair prejudice.

However, the court ordered the appointment of an independent liquidator to wind up the corporation, finding that the current directors lacked the necessary expertise to manage the complex tax and legal implications of the liquidation.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The court found the motion had no merit, declined to grant an oral hearing, and dismissed the motion.

The court also ordered that the moving party may not file any further documents or communicate with court staff regarding the appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a decision by the City's General Manager of Parks, Forestry and Recreation to close an off-leash dog area in Ledbury Park.

The General Manager closed the area due to unresolved conflicts between park users and adjacent residents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision was reasonable and that the General Manager appropriately balanced competing community interests.

The court also held that the applicants were accorded adequate procedural fairness given the policy nature of the decision.

Following an earlier ruling declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, multiple applicants sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation, including unsupported allegations of misconduct, disregard of procedural orders, and repeated technical objections, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed each applicant’s bill of costs and assessed overall reasonableness, reducing or excluding amounts relating to deferred motions for security for costs and instances of over‑lawyering.

Several cost awards were fixed globally rather than assessed strictly by docketed hours.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to multiple applicant groups in varying amounts.

The applicants, comprising 27 parties adverse to the respondent in 14 different actions, brought an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of commencing multiple actions against his former lawyers and others, alleging widespread conspiracies and fraud after losing previous litigation.

The court found that the respondent persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, sought to relitigate previously decided issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The court granted the application, prohibiting the respondent and his corporations from instituting or continuing any proceedings without prior leave of the court.

The City of Toronto brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review regarding the cancellation of an off-leash dog park designation at Ledbury Park.

The City argued the cancellation was an administrative or political decision not subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the cancellation of the off-leash designation affected the legal rights, privileges, and immunities of dog owners, and therefore constituted the exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that permitted the respondent to convert a 20-storey affordable rental apartment building into a condominium.

The Divisional Court found that the Board applied the wrong legal test by merely 'having regard to' the Provincial Policy Statement 2005 instead of ensuring its decision was 'consistent with' it, as required by the Planning Act.

Furthermore, the Board failed to properly consider the specific mandatory criteria in the City's Official Plan regarding condominium conversions and the health of the rental housing market.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that allowed the respondent to convert a 161-unit affordable rental apartment building into a condominium.

The municipality argued the Board erred in its application of the Planning Act and disregarded provincial and municipal policies protecting rental housing.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's decision for failing to consider the specific city-wide housing policies and condominium conversion policies in the Provincial Policy Statement 2005 and the municipality's Official Plan.

The appellant, who was successful on appeal, sought costs for both the first and second trials on a solicitor and client basis.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs of both trials and the appeal on a party and party basis.

The court directed the assessment officer to award costs normally given to a legally assisted litigant for the period the appellant was represented, and costs normally given to a self-represented litigant for the period he was unrepresented.

The court also issued a correction to its main reasons regarding a cited case on malicious prosecution.

The appellant was acquitted of robbery and subsequently sued the respondent police officers for malicious prosecution.

At trial, the jury found the officers lacked reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution but found they were not actuated by malice.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions on malice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury that malice could be inferred from the officers' reckless indifference to evidence of the appellant's innocence.

Rather than ordering a third trial, the Court exercised its jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act to enter judgment for the appellant in the amount of $75,000 as assessed by the jury.

The appellant challenged the trial judgment in an employment-related unjust enrichment dispute arising from extra hours worked in exchange for equivalent time off.

The court held that there was a juristic reason for the respondent's retention of the benefit because the parties' contract contemplated compensation through equivalent time off.

Since the appellant voluntarily placed himself beyond the point of enforcing that contractual entitlement, he could not establish the absence of juristic reason.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.