Constantine Alexiou

The plaintiff tenant brought an action for breach of contract and a construction lien against the defendant landlord and property manager for renovations completed in his rental unit.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement with the deceased principal of the property manager, whereby the plaintiff would renovate the unit and be paid for labour and materials upon the sale of the building.

The defendants denied the existence of the contract.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, establishing an enforceable oral contract.

The court awarded the plaintiff $30,142 in damages for breach of contract, to be paid from funds posted in court, and recognized a valid lien for $26,859.15.

The plaintiff corporation, acting without counsel, sued multiple defendants for fraud, breach of contract, and interference with contractual relations after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim and for security for costs.

The court set aside a noting in default against one defendant, finding the plaintiff had improperly requisitioned it.

The court struck the majority of the claims without leave to amend, finding they were frivolous, vexatious, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The breach of contract claim against the property owners was struck with leave to amend.

The plaintiff was ordered to post $150,000 in security for costs before taking any further steps.

The applicant sought an order declaring a holograph codicil to be a valid testamentary document.

The deceased had written the codicil entirely in her own hand and wrote her name in the attestation clause, but left blanks for the date and the executor's name.

The court found that while the document was wholly handwritten, the deceased did not intend her handwritten name in the attestation clause to serve as her signature to give legal effect to the document.

The application was dismissed, and the codicil was not admitted to probate.

Under Construction Incorporated (UCI) brought an ex parte motion seeking a declaration that O'Neil Davis's construction lien had expired, along with orders to discharge the lien and release funds posted to vacate it.

UCI's evidence, a lawyer's affidavit, was deemed insufficient by the Master due to lack of detail regarding efforts to confirm non-perfection, the status of UCI's own lien (for potential sheltering), and Davis's classification as a contractor or non-contractor, which affects lien expiry dates.

The Master emphasized the need for clear evidence for ex parte relief and offered UCI 14 days to file supplementary materials, failing which the motion would be dismissed without prejudice.

The Debtor appealed a Master's order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), which had arisen upon the Debtor's filing of a proposal.

The Master found that the Respondent creditor would be materially prejudiced by the continued stay and that it was equitable to lift it, allowing the Respondent's $1 million claim to be quantified in a civil action rather than through the summary procedure under s. 135 of the BIA.

The appeal court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in concluding that the Respondent had established some chance of success in its civil action and that the civil action was the appropriate forum for determining the complex, credibility-dependent claim against both the Debtor and a co-defendant, thereby avoiding inconsistent findings and prejudice.

The applicant tenants exercised an option to purchase their rented home, but the respondent landlord refused to complete the sale, alleging the tenants breached the lease by installing an outdoor cat enclosure without written consent.

The court found that the cat enclosure did not constitute a 'renovation' under the lease, meaning no breach occurred.

Alternatively, the court held that even if a breach had occurred, the tenants were entitled to relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, as the breach was minor, the tenants acted reasonably, and the loss of the option would be disproportionate to any harm suffered by the landlord.

The application was granted and the landlord was ordered to convey the property.

The applicant tenant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the new owner of the property from demolishing or renovating the premises, claiming the former landlord breached a right of first refusal (ROFR) in the lease.

The respondents moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and for security for costs.

The court dismissed the injunction motion and discharged the CPL, finding no serious issue to be tried because the tenant had signed an Estoppel Certificate confirming no material default by the landlord and postponing its interest to the new mortgage.

The respondents' motion for security for costs was dismissed as they failed to show the tenant had insufficient assets.

The appellant challenged the validity of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) transferring his late mother's house to his sister, the respondent, in exchange for $100,000 and a promise of lifetime residence.

The appellant argued the mother lacked capacity, did not understand English sufficiently (non est factum), and was subject to undue influence without proper independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the mother understood the MOA, was not coerced, and received competent independent legal advice that rebutted the presumption of undue influence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her objection to a Master's report that found her mortgage was a fraudulent conveyance and preference, and therefore void.

The appellant argued the respondent was estopped from challenging the mortgage due to delay and acquiescence, and that the delay gave rise to laches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent did not know the facts underlying the fraudulent mortgage until discovery, and that laches requires both delay and prejudice, which the appellant failed to establish.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement directing that an order go as per the amended draft order filed by the parties.

Competing applications arose from an aborted commercial sublease transaction.

The sub-tenant sought a declaration that the sublease was null and void and requested the return of its deposit, arguing that conditions regarding head landlord approval and creditworthiness were not properly satisfied within the contractual time limits.

The court found that notice of the head landlord’s approval by email satisfied the agreement and applicable statutory provisions, and that the sub-tenant’s own failure to timely provide required financial information prevented it from relying on the timing of the creditworthiness condition.

Applying the principle that a party cannot rely on the non‑fulfillment of a condition it caused, the court held the sublease binding and breached by the sub-tenant.

The deposit was forfeited and damages were to be determined in a subsequent proceeding.

Estate litigation concerning the validity of a memorandum of agreement under which a mother agreed to transfer her home to one daughter for $100,000 in exchange for continued caregiving.

The applicant alleged lack of capacity, language barriers, undue influence, and contractual uncertainty, and argued the agreement died with the deceased.

The court held the memorandum of agreement was a valid and enforceable contract for the sale of the property and survived the deceased’s death.

Evidence from the drafting solicitor and independent Macedonian-speaking lawyer rebutted the presumption of undue influence and demonstrated the deceased’s clear intention and capacity.

A subsequent handwritten note was found merely to reaffirm the agreement and not constitute an independent inter vivos gift.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The court found the motion had no merit, declined to grant an oral hearing, and dismissed the motion.

The court also ordered that the moving party may not file any further documents or communicate with court staff regarding the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court judge had dismissed the appellant's appeal of a master's order setting aside a noting in default.

The appellant argued the judge erred in referring the matter to a master and that the master's order was final.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the referral was permitted under Rule 37.15(1.1) and the order remained interlocutory.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

Following the dismissal of an appeal from a master's order setting aside a noting in default, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs due to unsubstantiated allegations of fraud made by the self‑represented appellant against the respondent and her counsel.

The court held that such allegations justified a higher scale of costs.

While most of the claimed hours were reasonable, the amount sought for preparing costs submissions was excessive.

The court awarded reduced substantial indemnity costs inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank for defaulted loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the loan defaults despite some inaccuracies in the bank's documents.

The court also rejected the appellant wife's claims of undue influence and non est factum regarding a personal line of credit, noting she signed the documents at her husband's request without reading them and there was no freestanding obligation for the bank to provide independent legal advice.

The appellant, an execution creditor of a dissolved corporation, appealed an order dismissing his action for lack of capacity to sue.

The motion judge had found that the appellant's action against the dissolved corporation was a nullity and that he lacked capacity to advance the corporation's claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Business Corporations Act, a civil action may be brought against a dissolved corporation and its property remains available to satisfy judgments.

The court found that the appellant acquired the dissolved corporation's rights from the Public Guardian and Trustee upon execution of his consent judgment, giving him the legal capacity to advance the claim.