David G. Stinson

This case involved an application seeking various forms of relief, including access to an apartment and personal protection, which the court found to be without legal merit and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The court determined that the primary relief sought, related to residential tenancy, fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, with no costs awarded.

This endorsement addresses a motion for default judgment brought by family members of victims of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS 752 crash, which was downed by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The plaintiffs sought compensation for wrongful death, including damages under the Family Law Act, pain and suffering for the estates, and punitive damages.

The defendants did not defend the action.

The court consolidated this action with a previous, identical proceeding (Zarei v. Iran) and adopted Justice Belobaba's findings on liability (that the downing was an intentional act of terrorism) and the viability and quantum of damages.

The court also addressed preliminary procedural issues, granting orders to seal the court file, anonymize the plaintiffs' names due to fear of retribution, and appoint litigation administrators for the deceased estates.

The court awarded specific amounts for loss of guidance, care, and companionship, pain and suffering for each deceased victim's estate, and further punitive damages, reasoning that the prior punitive award in Zarei only sanctioned the wrongs against those specific victims, and a new award was necessary to punish the defendants for the torts committed against the present plaintiffs.

This decision addresses the costs of a successful motion for judgment brought by the plaintiffs (Sub-Prime Mortgage Corporation and Elle Mortgage Corporation) to enforce minutes of settlement.

The court determined the liability, scale, and quantum of costs for both the plaintiffs and Terry Walman, a defendant to the counterclaim who also participated in the motion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs as per their mortgage terms, while Mr. Walman was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The defendants were ordered to pay costs to both the plaintiffs and Mr. Walman.

The Superior Court of Justice issued supplementary reasons regarding the terms for a 90-day stay on the enforcement of a writ of possession, previously granted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs (mortgagees) sought to impose conditions on the defendants (mortgagors) during this stay, including monthly payments for accruing debt and realty tax arrears, proof of property insurance, and appraisal inspections.

The defendants opposed, arguing these constituted new substantive relief beyond the original consent judgment.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 1.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, imposed terms requiring the defendants to pay $3,000 monthly towards realty tax arrears and to provide immediate evidence of property insurance.

The request for appraisal inspections was denied.

The court also clarified the duration of the stay in light of the termination of the provincial state of emergency.

The plaintiff landlord claimed $425,000 for breach of a commercial lease but was awarded only $5,719.37 at trial.

In this costs decision, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of over $73,000, arguing complexity and a lease clause.

The defendant argued it was the successful party, having offered a settlement close to the final award, and sought costs in its favour or no costs for the plaintiff.

The court applied Rule 57.05(1) due to the judgment being within Small Claims Court jurisdiction, finding the case not complex enough to warrant Superior Court costs.

The court also noted the plaintiff's unreasonable refusal of a reasonable settlement offer and the defendant's deficient offer.

Ultimately, the court exercised its discretion to order no costs to be paid by or to either party.

The defendant, Recipe Unlimited Corporation, moved to strike the plaintiff's (Angus Inc.) Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), alleging failure to plead material facts for claims of inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and "misrepresentation in the marketplace." The court dismissed the motion regarding inducing breach of contract and intentional interference, finding the pleadings sufficient.

However, the claim for "misrepresentation in the marketplace," interpreted as injurious falsehood, was struck with leave to amend due to insufficient particulars of malice and intent to induce non-dealing.

The plaintiff landlord claimed damages for breach of a commercial lease after the defendant tenant abandoned the premises.

The court addressed five key questions: whether the landlord accepted repudiation prior to formal termination, whether leasing to another tenant (FroYo) constituted mitigation, whether the landlord took reasonable steps to mitigate damages both before and after deciding to sell the plaza, and whether the sale of the plaza ended the landlord's right to claim damages under the lease.

The court found that the landlord did not accept repudiation, took reasonable mitigation steps, and that the FroYo lease was a collateral transaction not constituting mitigation.

Crucially, the court determined that the sale of the plaza limited the landlord's claim for damages to the date of sale and dismissed the claim for diminution in sale price due to the vacancy.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a declaration and compliance order against a unit owner and her tenant for repeated breaches of noise rules.

The tenant, Ms. Kalicharan, was found to have created excessive noise disturbing a neighbour, and the owner, Ms. Lyn, was responsible for ensuring tenant compliance.

The court found the corporation's enforcement discretion was exercised reasonably and in good faith, granting the declaration and compliance order, but declined to order tenancy termination as that falls under the Landlord and Tenant Board's jurisdiction.

Costs were to be addressed separately.

This appeal addressed the scope of expert disclosure required from a defendant at the discovery stage, specifically concerning foundational documents like letters of instruction, after a Rule 53.03 compliant expert report has been served but before a decision to call the expert at trial has been made.

The Master had ordered disclosure, finding an implied waiver of litigation privilege.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that serving a Rule 53.03 report does not automatically waive litigation privilege over foundational documents at the discovery stage, distinguishing cases where experts are confirmed to testify at trial.

The court emphasized that privilege continues unless there is a reasonable suspicion of improper influence or specific rules mandate disclosure.

Peter Ekstein was catastrophically injured as a pedestrian.

He had a personal auto policy with Chubb and was the owner/CEO of a company with an auto policy (including optional enhanced benefits and OPCF-47 endorsement) with Continental Casualty Company (CNA).

Chubb began paying statutory accident benefits (SABS) but served a priority notice on CNA.

An arbitrator found CNA to be the priority insurer, deeming Ekstein a "named insured" under the CNA policy due to "regular use" provisions.

CNA appealed.

The Superior Court found the arbitrator erred in deeming Ekstein a "named insured" under the CNA policy, as he never actually used company vehicles.

However, due to the OPCF-47 endorsement, CNA was still obligated to pay both mandatory and optional SABS benefits to Ekstein.

The court clarified that the OPCF-47 endorsement does not alter priority rules between insurers, entitling CNA to reimbursement from Chubb for the mandatory SABS benefits and associated administration costs.

The plaintiff, Anupam Dhar, was awarded damages of $365,000 after a motor vehicle accident trial.

This decision addresses the costs.

Dhar sought partial indemnity costs up to his Rule 49 offer ($350,000) and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as the judgment was more favourable.

The defendants, McGuinness, argued against Rule 49 consequences due to the complex liability apportionment (10% McGuinness, 90% unidentified motorist, but McGuinness 100% liable to Dhar due to insurance regulation).

The court found Dhar entitled to costs, applying Rule 49 consequences, but reduced the quantum of fees due to excessive time spent by plaintiff's counsel.

The court determined the appropriate interest payable on unpaid Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought interest under s. 46(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) (2% compounded monthly), while the defendant argued for pre-judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act (CJA) (4.5% simple annual).

The court found that the claim for SABS interest was implicitly pleaded or, in the alternative, an amendment to the Statement of Claim would be permitted.

The court further ruled that SABS interest would apply from March 30, 2006, recognizing an initial period (February 20, 2004, to March 15, 2006) where the plaintiff's own conduct (misleading disability certificate) justified the insurer's non-payment, during which CJA interest would apply.

The plaintiff, 688857 Ontario Limited, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully recovering $58,761 (plus interest, totaling approximately $66,000) in a fidelity insurance claim against Aviva Insurance Company of Canada.

The court determined it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have pursued the action under ordinary procedure, despite the recovery being below the Simplified Procedure threshold, due to the complexity of employee vs. independent contractor issues and bad faith claims.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs, finding no serious misconduct by the defendant, and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The final award was $196,609.08, significantly less than the plaintiff's claim of $240,563, after adjustments for trial inefficiencies, counsel rates, and proportionality.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision concerning the appellant's capacity to consent to treatment.

The court found the appeal moot because the appellant had been discharged from the hospital almost five years prior, had no further contact with the mental health system, and the issue of capacity is time-specific.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, concluding there was no live controversy, no practical effect on the parties' rights, no continuing adversarial relationship, and no special circumstances, including reputational concerns, to warrant the use of judicial resources.

The plaintiffs brought a motion mid-trial to withdraw admissions made in pleadings, responses to requests to admit, and an agreed statement of facts, and sought leave to rely on new documents, after discovering a significant factual mistake regarding the legal description of lands.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a mistrial.

The parties ultimately resolved their motions by consent order, which allowed the withdrawal of inadvertent admissions and declared a mistrial.

The presiding judge recused himself from hearing the new trial due to having formed views on the evidence.

Directions were provided for the future course of the proceedings, including efforts to agree on evidence use and a prompt new trial.

This endorsement addresses costs following a judgment where the plaintiff was largely successful.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff against Mushtaq Raja, Minaj Transport Inc., Maryat Investments Inc., and Direct Ex Logistics Inc. The decision to award substantial indemnity costs was based on Mushtaq Raja's fraudulent conduct prior to and during the litigation, and the defendants' unproven allegations of fraud against the plaintiff.

The court declined to award costs to Munaza Raja and Janish Raja, despite their successful dismissal from the action, due to their minor roles and the lack of separate costs incurred on their behalf.

Specific cost amounts were determined for each paying defendant, with minor adjustments for Maryat Investments Inc. and Direct Ex Logistics Inc.

The plaintiff, Darren Noddle, a self-represented litigant in a civil negligence action against his former doctor and the provincial government, brought a motion seeking an order for publicly-funded counsel.

He alleged that a prescribed drug, Aldara, caused him significant harm, including cognitive impairment and vision problems, which affected his ability to represent himself.

The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that the plaintiff's Charter rights were not engaged in a civil action and that he failed to meet the established legal tests for publicly-funded counsel or an advance costs award.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that civil actions for personal injury do not engage section 7 Charter rights, and the plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria for an advance costs award, particularly regarding the absence of other realistic funding options and a prima facie meritorious case of public importance.

The applicant, Mr. Su, brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to set aside a consent order that dismissed his property claims against the estate of Gab Yi Lam, alleging fraud or newly discovered facts regarding the estate's assets.

The court found that Mr. Su had access to information revealing the lack of estate assets prior to agreeing to the consent order.

Any misleading information about the estate's value was provided after the consent order was made and was subsequently corrected.

The court concluded that Mr. Su failed to prove fraud or demonstrate any after-acquired facts that would warrant setting aside the consent order.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant Economical Insurance Group brought a motion to dismiss or stay the plaintiff Luciano Molinaro's action due to his repeated non-compliance with court orders and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, had failed to provide undertakings, attend mediations and pre-trial conferences, and pay costs.

The court, while acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status, emphasized the need for fair process and efficient use of court time.

The action was stayed on terms, vacating the scheduled trial date, with the plaintiff given an opportunity to comply with specific conditions (payment of costs, disclosure of information, undertaking to attend future conferences) to have the stay removed.

Failure to comply by September 30, 2017, would allow the defendant to seek dismissal without notice.

Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company (Lindsay) appealed an arbitration decision that found its commercial umbrella liability policy covered Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) benefits for an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident.

The court, reviewing for reasonableness, found the arbitrator erred in interpreting the definition of 'automobile' within the Umbrella policy.

However, the court concluded that the ATV was covered under Farmers' standard Ontario Automobile Policy (OAP) via the 'Newly Acquired Automobiles' provision, due to the Umbrella policy's effect on the OAP's prerequisite that the insurer insure all automobiles owned by the insured.

Consequently, Farmers' appeal was dismissed, and the Minister of Finance's cross-appeal was allowed, affirming Farmers as the priority insurer responsible for SABS benefits.