William D. Black

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following a balloon angioplasty procedure that resulted in a ruptured thoracic aorta.

The patient survived but suffered paraplegia and cognitive deficits, eventually passing away years later.

The court found that the interventional cardiologist and vascular surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to consult with a cardiac surgeon and by transferring the patient to the coronary care unit instead of directly to the operating room after an interim endovascular repair.

The court concluded that this delay in obtaining open cardiac surgery caused the patient's neurological injuries.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs for an agreed-upon amount of damages.

The respondent's husband died during a follow-up angiogram as part of a clinical trial.

The respondent sued the principal investigator, Dr. Strauss, for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The jury found breach of standard of care but no causation in negligence.

The trial judge found breach of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and awarded damages, stating causation was removed from the analysis in the fiduciary context.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by not examining causation in the fiduciary context.

The Court found no causal link between the alleged fiduciary breach and the loss, relying on the jury's finding on causation in the negligence claim, as the claims were based on substantially the same conduct.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action sought to adduce opinion evidence from two treating cardiac surgeons as participant experts.

The defendants brought a motion to exclude portions of the proposed evidence of one of the surgeons, arguing it went beyond the scope permitted by Westerhof and that the surgeon lacked impartiality and specific expertise.

The court allowed the motion in part, excluding opinions on the standard of care prior to the surgeon's involvement and on whether earlier surgery would have changed the outcome, as these were not based on his observation or participation.

However, the court permitted the surgeon to opine on matters arising directly from his involvement, holding that concerns about his partiality should go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The defendants, BNT Canada, L.P., BNT Canada GP, Inc., and Bechtel Power Corporation (collectively "Bechtel"), brought a motion to transfer the action from Walkerton (Central West Region) to the Toronto Region under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Bruce Power L.P. and Bruce Power Inc. (collectively "Bruce Power"), opposed the motion.

The court applied a holistic approach to the factors enumerated in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b), finding that the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and the court, along with advantages for securing a just, expeditious, and least expensive determination, and the availability of judges and court facilities, favored Toronto.

The court concluded that Bechtel had met the onus of demonstrating that Toronto was "significantly better" and that the transfer was in the interest of justice.

The motion to transfer the action to Toronto was granted.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from an unsuccessful and untimely motion brought by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing a litigation guardian for her mother, Ida Rubin.

The court found Ms. Werner's proposed motion to be an obstructionist tactic, lacking merit, and brought in breach of a scheduling order.

Due to Ms. Werner's reprehensible litigation conduct, the court awarded full indemnity costs against her to the applicant and litigation guardian.

Additionally, costs were awarded to other parties (Morris Rubin and The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company) from the estate, with these amounts to be allocated solely to Ms. Werner's share.

Joseph Pernica, litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, sought a case conference regarding his status amidst upcoming motions.

The endorsement addresses a purported motion by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing Pernica as litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, arguing Pernica exceeded his mandate by obtaining Ida Rubin's banking records and challenging Ida Rubin's capacity.

The court declined to schedule Ms. Werner's motion, finding she lacked standing under Rules 59.06 and 7.06(1)(b).

The court affirmed Pernica's role as litigation guardian and provided specific directions for any future motion by Ida Rubin herself to remove the litigation guardian, emphasizing the need for transparency, personal affidavit, and attendance in open court for cross-examination due to the risk of abuse in ex parte proceedings.

The court also declined to stay the case, emphasizing the need for information sharing for mediation and a mechanism for fund distribution.

The plaintiff, Karen Stirrett, sought damages for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against three defendant doctors following the death of her spouse, David Stirrett, after an angiogram performed as part of the STREAM medical research study.

A jury found Dr. Strauss negligent but that his negligence was not causative of the death.

The court, sitting without a jury for the equitable claim, found that Dr. Strauss, as the principal investigator, owed and breached a fiduciary duty to David Stirrett by failing to disclose critical changes to the study protocol, funding, and participant numbers, which would have influenced David Stirrett's informed consent.

The court held that causation is not a requirement for recovery in breach of fiduciary duty.

Judgment was awarded in favour of the plaintiff against Dr. Strauss, while the actions against Dr. Cheema and Dr. Sheth were dismissed.

This is a trial management endorsement following a Court of Appeal decision that vacated a partial summary judgment and remitted the matter for a full trial.

The court addresses the plaintiffs' request for bifurcation (liability first, then damages) and the defendants' preference for a combined trial.

Given the age of the plaintiffs and the historical nature of the claims (1966-1983), the court emphasizes the need for expedition while ensuring procedural fairness.

The court orders a hybrid trial, combining affidavit evidence with necessary viva voce testimony, scheduled for 6 weeks, covering liability issues, with damages to be determined later.

The trial is scheduled for May-June 2019, despite scheduling conflicts for some defence counsel, prioritizing the need for a firm trial date.

The plaintiffs sought costs for undertakings and refusals motions brought against several defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $6,800 in costs against five defendant physicians who failed to answer undertakings until after the motion was served.

However, the court awarded costs of $3,257.64 to another defendant physician who was successful on the single refusal argued and had answered undertakings promptly.

No costs were awarded against two other defendants who resolved their issues prior to the hearing.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' multi-plaintiff action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the Oak Ridge psychiatric facility, alleged they were subjected to abusive human experimentation and torture by the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs had a free-standing claim for breach of fiduciary duty that was not subsumed by the expired limitation periods for medical malpractice or tort claims.

The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving issues of harm and damages for trial.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was successful, the court considered costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on a settlement offer, which the court rejected.

Applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $22,500, in accordance with the parties' prior agreement on the quantum for partial indemnity costs.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal or a stay of an Ontario action arising from a landslide at a Costa Rican gold mine, arguing that Costa Rica or Colorado was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The court applied the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and Breeden v. Black.

While the moving defendants established certain connections between the dispute and the proposed foreign forums, they provided little evidence regarding the characteristics of those forums or how litigation there would be fairer or more efficient.

The court held that merely identifying geographical connections and residence locations was insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating that an alternative forum was clearly more appropriate.

As the evidentiary record did not establish that either Colorado or Costa Rica was better positioned to resolve the dispute, the motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant cardiologist following the sudden death of a 36-year-old man who collapsed after completing a half-marathon.

The deceased had severe aortic stenosis.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant failed to properly advise the deceased against strenuous exercise.

The court ruled that hearsay statements by the deceased regarding the doctor's advice were inadmissible for lack of threshold reliability.

The court accepted the defendant's evidence that he had advised the deceased against distance running and warned him of the risk of sudden death.

The court found the defendant met the standard of care and dismissed the action.

An Ontario mining company sued numerous foreign engineering firms and engineers for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract following a landslide that closed a gold mine in Costa Rica.

The moving defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

Applying the framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court considered whether presumptive connecting factors established a real and substantial connection with Ontario.

The court held that neither alleged reliance on advice in Ontario, damages suffered in Ontario, nor business connections through related companies established sufficient jurisdictional ties.

Any connection to Ontario was tenuous, as the engineering services, alleged wrongdoing, and resulting physical damage occurred primarily in Costa Rica and the United States.

The court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and therefore declined to assume jurisdiction over the moving defendants.