Meagan Williams

The plaintiffs, standardbred horse breeders, sued Ontario and the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG) for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation following the cancellation of the Slots at Racetrack Program (SARP).

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on liability.

The court held that the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (CLPA) retroactively extinguished the plaintiffs' tort claims because the cancellation of SARP was a policy decision made in good faith.

However, the court found that the 1998 Letter of Intent establishing SARP was a binding contract.

Applying the principled exception to the doctrine of privity, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the contract.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Ontario for breach of contract, finding that Ontario breached an implied term to provide reasonable notice of termination.

The action against OLG was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

In a voir dire during a trial regarding historical programs at a psychiatric facility, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Turrall.

The plaintiffs argued he lacked credibility because substantial portions of his report on the standard of care were copied verbatim from another expert's memo.

The court found the standard of care portion of the report unnecessary and excluded it, but qualified the expert to testify on causation issues regarding specific plaintiffs, as that portion of his report was based on his own review of medical records.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking out claims against Maureen Harvey (superintendent of Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre), John Doe, and Jane Doe.

The appellant sought damages for negligent investigation by Ontario Provincial Police officers and breach of duty of care by corrections officials during three years of custody.

The motion judge had struck the claims without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge failed to properly apply the generous reading standard for pleadings and set aside the striking order, allowing the appeal.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims arising from his detention at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre.

The court struck the claims against Her Majesty the Queen because the plaintiff failed to provide the mandatory 60-day notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, rendering the action a nullity.

The claims against the superintendent were struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action in her personal capacity, and the Ministry and detention centre were struck as improper parties.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to consolidate two related actions was granted.

The defendant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to stay an order dated August 4, 2017.

Following the Divisional Court's dismissal of Ontario's motion for leave to appeal on October 3, 2017, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion to stay as moot.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the disposition of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The applicant alleged discrimination with respect to contracts because of race, sex, gender identity, and reprisal, claiming that an employee of a third-party service provider made sexual advances toward him and that he was subsequently removed from an employment program.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the claims of discrimination based on race, sex, gender identity, and reprisal as speculative.

However, the Tribunal allowed the application to continue regarding the allegation that the respondent failed to properly address the complaint of sexual advances, finding a reasonable prospect that the respondent had a duty to investigate.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.

The applicants, owners of a designated heritage property, sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change to issue a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) for a wind farm project.

The applicants argued the Director failed to properly interpret the REA Regulation regarding cultural heritage and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness, the Director's decision to issue the REA was reasonable and balanced the statutory priorities, and the comprehensive procedural code in the REA Regulation fulfilled the duty of procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' multi-plaintiff action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the Oak Ridge psychiatric facility, alleged they were subjected to abusive human experimentation and torture by the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs had a free-standing claim for breach of fiduciary duty that was not subsumed by the expired limitation periods for medical malpractice or tort claims.

The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving issues of harm and damages for trial.