Chantelle Anna Blom

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against Ontario for the early cancellation of the Basic Income Pilot Program.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the certification judge erred by engaging in a merits-based analysis of the breach of contract claim rather than applying the 'plain and obvious' test under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the negligence, breach of undertaking, and Charter s. 7 claims, finding that the government's decision to cancel the program was a core policy decision immune from negligence liability and that the Charter claim failed to plead the requisite principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

The plaintiffs moved to certify a class action against the Government of Ontario for damages resulting from the early termination of the Ontario Basic Income Pilot project.

The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, breach of undertaking, negligence, breach of public law duty, and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the certification motion, finding it plain and obvious that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the relationship was not contractual, the government's decision to cancel the program was a core policy decision protected by common law and statutory immunity, and there is no constitutional right to the continuation of a government program.

The applicant retirement home sought an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Sheriff to enforce a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order against a resident with severe physical disabilities.

The Sheriff had refused to enforce the order due to health and safety concerns and the lack of a safe alternative location for the resident.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Sheriff has a mandatory statutory duty to enforce eviction orders and that the balance of convenience favoured enforcement, given the resident's failure to cooperate in finding alternative accommodations.

The Sheriff was given a delayed deadline to carry out the eviction.

The applicant, Sunrise North Senior Living Ltd., brought an urgent application for judicial review seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of the Regional Municipality of York to evict a respondent, Rohan Salmon, pursuant to Landlord and Tenant Board eviction orders.

The urgency was predicated on the Sheriff's position that the eviction order would expire on June 1, 2019, a point disputed by Sunrise.

The court, without deciding the expiry issue, renewed the eviction orders for one year to eliminate urgency and transferred the judicial review application to the Divisional Court for a full hearing.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash the Ontario government's decision to cancel the basic income pilot project.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the cancellation was a core policy decision regarding the allocation of public funds and was therefore not subject to judicial review.

The Court found that the applicants had no legitimate expectation to be consulted on funding decisions, and that quashing the decision would impermissibly require the court to compel the government to continue funding the program.

The defendant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to stay an order dated August 4, 2017.

Following the Divisional Court's dismissal of Ontario's motion for leave to appeal on October 3, 2017, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion to stay as moot.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the disposition of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $132,992.26 after successfully opposing the defendants' motions to quash summonses.

The defendants argued that costs should be reserved to the disposition of upcoming summary judgment motions, or alternatively that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court found that the plaintiffs' costs outline did not sufficiently delineate the time spent on the motions to quash versus other related motions.

Due to the lack of required facts and detailed submissions, the court reserved the costs of the motions to quash to the hearing of the motions for summary judgment.

The Attorney General appealed a Superior Court decision that appointed two amici to assist on an appeal challenging the trial judge's appointment of amici in a complex family law custody and access case.

The appeal judge imposed a stay of proceedings conditional on the Attorney General negotiating a mutually acceptable rate of compensation with the appointed amici.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, finding that Criminal Lawyers' Association does not impose an obligation on the Attorney General to negotiate rates with court-appointed amici, and that a stay is only appropriate where amicus assistance is truly essential and no other qualified counsel can be found.

The court set aside the stay and remitted the matter for the appointment of one amicus from counsel willing to accept legal aid rates.

The defendants, Ontario and OLG, brought motions to quash summonses to witness served by the plaintiffs on 13 non-parties, including former and current Cabinet ministers, in advance of pending summary judgment motions.

The plaintiffs sought to examine these witnesses under Rule 39.03 regarding the cancellation of the Slots at Race Tracks Program (SARP).

The court held that the defendants had standing to challenge the summonses and that the plaintiffs had met the low threshold of showing the proposed witnesses might have relevant evidence.

The court rejected arguments that the examinations were an abuse of process or barred by Cabinet confidentiality at this stage.

However, the court quashed the summonses served on Premier Kathleen Wynne and Minister Ted McMeekin on the basis of parliamentary privilege, as they were sitting members of the legislature.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ) sought an order to enforce an agreement between counsel to delay examinations under Rule 39.03 pending a motion to quash summonses, or alternatively, to stay the summonses.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test for a stay, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the quashing of summonses and the standing of HMQ/OLG to quash summonses for unrepresented witnesses.

The court determined that proceeding with examinations would cause irreparable harm to HMQ's legal interests by rendering the motion to quash moot.

The balance of convenience favoured HMQ, and the motion to stay the summonses was granted.

The appellant daycare appealed a Notice of Proposal to refuse to renew its licence under the Day Nurseries Act and the Child Care and Early Years Act, 2014.

Over a three-year period, the daycare had a history of numerous non-compliances and operated under several provisional and conditional licences.

The Tribunal found that the cumulative impact of the ongoing failure to comply with regulatory requirements provided reasonable grounds to believe the daycare would not be operated in accordance with the law.

The appeal was dismissed and the Director was directed to carry out the proposal to refuse to renew the licence.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's class action, the court addressed costs.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ) sought costs on a partial indemnity basis totaling $779,405.70.

The plaintiff argued for no costs or a significant reduction, citing novel points of law and public interest under s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court found that the complex legal issues initially raised were not ultimately pursued, rendering s. 31 inapplicable.

However, the court disallowed HMQ's costs for an unsuccessful summary judgment motion, granting the plaintiff a credit of $216,550.

Ultimately, HMQ was awarded costs fixed at $470,810 for fees and $92,045.70 for disbursements, for a total of $562,855.70.

The representative plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of private issuers who operate ServiceOntario outlets, alleging that Ontario breached its duty of good faith and acted unreasonably in exercising its unilateral discretion to set their compensation.

The plaintiff argued that the compensation was inadequate and failed to keep pace with expenses.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence of dishonesty or bad faith by Ontario.

The court held that the duty of good faith applies to the performance of the contract, not to ensuring a commercially reasonable outcome, and that Ontario's compensation decisions were not commercially unreasonable in any event.

The alternative claim for unjust enrichment was also dismissed as the contract constituted a juristic reason for the enrichment.

During a lengthy and complex family law trial involving international access, child support, and allegations of domestic violence and parental alienation, the trial judge appointed counsel as amici curiae to assist the court after both parents became effectively self‑represented.

The Attorney General objected to the appointments and appealed, arguing the court exceeded its jurisdiction and improperly required the province to fund counsel acting primarily for the parties.

On the appeal motion, the court determined that independent responding submissions were necessary because the parties lacked resources to participate.

The court therefore appointed the same amici to respond to the appeal and directed them to file materials and make oral submissions.

The court also commented on principles governing remuneration of amici and encouraged the Attorney General and counsel to agree on reasonable compensation.

This is the first known case in Canada wherein a trial judge in a family law proceeding appointed amicus curiae to represent both litigant parents and to assist the court on issues impacting the best interests of children.

The Attorney General brought a motion to set aside the amicus orders, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and misapprehended the law of amicus curiae.

The trial judge appointed amicus for the mother due to her emotional instability, pattern of dismissing counsel, and inability to self-represent in a complex, high-conflict family law matter.

The trial judge subsequently appointed amicus for the father when his counsel sought to withdraw due to unpaid accounts and inability to continue.

The court dismissed the Attorney General's motion, finding the trial judge had jurisdiction to make the orders in the exceptional and unusual circumstances of the case.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on multiple grounds after her claim for Ontario Disability Support Program benefits was denied.

The Tribunal ordered a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations challenging the Social Benefits Tribunal's decisions on the basis of adjudicative immunity.

The remaining allegations, including claims of bribery and discriminatory comments by a government employee, were dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant failed to provide particulars linking the alleged actions to Code grounds, and the employee in question did not work for the respondent tribunal.

In this certified class action, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing claims by private issuers of motor vehicle licences and registrations alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from compensation fixed by the province.

The plaintiff informally sought summary judgment on issues including commercially reasonable compensation, good faith, and the anti-fettering doctrine.

Applying the post-Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court held that the action raised numerous genuine, novel, and profound issues at the intersection of private and public law that should be determined at trial.

The court emphasized the need for a full evidentiary record, party vindication, and appellate review.

Both the motion and the informal cross-request for summary judgment were dismissed, with costs in the cause.

The defendants moved for a stay of an action concerning approximately $35 million in reserve funds retained from Casino Rama revenues.

The plaintiff alleged that maintaining the reserves breached limits imposed under a later revenue-sharing agreement, while the defendants argued the dispute arose under an earlier agreement that required arbitration.

The court considered the competence-competence principle and jurisprudence directing courts to defer to arbitration where it is arguable that a dispute falls within an arbitration clause.

Because the dispute arguably arose under the earlier contract incorporating arbitration provisions, the court held that the matter should proceed to arbitration.

The action was therefore stayed pending determination by an arbitrator of whether the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement.

The defendant appealed an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

In his reasons, the motion judge stated that the plaintiff had established a prima facie duty of care, but the formal order simply dismissed the motion without invoking Rule 20.04(4) to make a binding determination of law.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's finding was not binding on the trial judge and the order was interlocutory, not final.

The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.