Stephen T. Bale

The applicant developer sought oppression relief under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998 to compel a condominium corporation to sign a resort access licence agreement for shared amenities in a resort-style development.

The court held that the applicant was a successor declarant with standing and that the condominium corporation remained obliged under its declaration to enter into a licence agreement, notwithstanding its attempted declaration amendment and arguments based on s. 112.

However, the court found that the refusal to sign the specific agreement tendered was not oppressive because the proposed terms left fees, rules, closures, and future charges substantially within the developer's unilateral control.

The proper course, if terms cannot be agreed, is mediation and arbitration under s. 132.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff without notice.

The plaintiff had previously agreed to set aside the noting in default upon payment of costs, but proceeded to obtain default judgment without informing the court of these discussions or notifying the defendant.

The court granted the motion, finding the defendant had an arguable defence of inflated invoices and that the plaintiff's failure to make full and fair disclosure on a without-notice motion warranted setting aside the judgment.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs.

The applicant, a secondary-school teacher, sought judicial review of Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions dismissing his reprisal application under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The OLRB had dismissed the application as a collateral attack and abuse of process because the applicant had already elected to pursue the same matters through grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the OLRB did not breach procedural fairness and reasonably concluded that the second application was an impermissible attempt to relitigate matters already determined.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of C.M. Smith dated December 10, 2025.

After being advised that the Court of Appeal determined the underlying order was a final order, the Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered no costs.

Following a jury trial, the offender was sentenced for two sexual assault convictions arising from repeated coerced intercourse within an intimate partner relationship, after the extortion count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court held that the offender had absconded before the sentence hearing by leaving Canada immediately after conviction and misleading the pre-sentence report writer, permitting sentencing to proceed in his absence under s. 475 of the Criminal Code.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for serious sexual assault, the court treated as aggravating the intimate partner context, the use of intimate images and threats to compel compliance, the victim's vulnerability, and the devastating psychological consequences.

A penitentiary sentence of seven years on one count and four years concurrent on the other was imposed, together with DNA, lifetime weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that barred her application for statutory accident benefits based on res judicata.

The Tribunal had previously determined her injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The appellant argued the insurer failed to provide proper notice under s. 38(9) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and that new medical evidence warranted waiving res judicata.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the insurer had previously provided the required notice and was not obligated to issue repeated notices.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's finding that the proposed fresh evidence could have been obtained earlier and did not justify waiving res judicata.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs, which had the effect of lifting the stay of the Board's orders.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision dated December 19, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outlines were filed, the court declined to award costs of the motion.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As agreed by the parties, costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by a Small Claims Court deputy judge regarding document production and costs.

The underlying action involved a rental car company suing the insurer after coverage was denied for a rental car accident due to the insured's failure to cooperate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances, excess of jurisdiction, or denial of natural justice that would warrant intervention in a Small Claims Court interlocutory order.

The matter was directed to proceed to trial where the trial judge would determine the admissibility of the subpoenaed documents.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court interlocutory order that required it to pay the proceeds of a vehicle sale into court as a condition of an adjournment.

The Divisional Court declined to grant relief, finding that the applicant's conduct in seeking judicial review was an unnecessary step that delayed the resolution of the underlying motion on its merits.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the total amount of $8,522.

Cattle farmers sought leave to proceed with claims against the Crown and Animal Welfare Services officers for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, abuse of process, intentional interference with economic relations, and defamation arising from the removal of approximately half their herd.

The court granted leave for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, and abuse of process, finding sufficient evidence of bad faith and recklessness based on the Animal Care Review Board's findings that the removal process failed to comply with statutory standards and was not necessary to relieve animal distress.

Leave was denied for intentional interference with economic relations due to inadequate pleading, and leave was not required for defamation.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Committee of Adjustment granting his neighbour's applications for consent to sever and minor variances.

The applicant, an adjacent property owner, argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the Committee's reasons were inadequate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the judicial review, as third parties have no statutory right of appeal under the Planning Act.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant was afforded the requisite low level of procedural fairness and that the Committee's reasons were adequate.

This is an estate administration matter concerning the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a property held in the estate of Waltraud Tyll.

The applicant, Norbert Tyll, sought payment to himself and his brother Ruediger of their one-third interests in the net proceeds of sale of the family home at 840 Shadrach Drive in Newmarket.

The respondent, Wolfgang Tyll, opposed the payments.

The court determined that Norbert and Ruediger were entitled to receive their interests pursuant to section 36 of the Substitute Decisions Act, as the property had been disposed of by Wolfgang while acting as attorney for property during Waltraud's incapacity.

The court granted the requested payments, subject to adjustments for costs and prior withdrawals from the estate.

The defendant Lijun Fang moved to dismiss the action under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 on the grounds that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff claimed damages arising from the sale of a farm and disposition of proceeds, alleging that as a 50% beneficial owner, he suffered losses due to Fang's mismanagement as farm manager.

The court partially granted the motion, striking certain claims but allowing others to proceed with amendments.

The court found that the plaintiff had standing to sue despite being a partner rather than a corporation, and that claims for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages were not plain and obvious failures.

The insureds were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident.

They had standard accident benefits with Economical and optional enhanced benefits with Heartland.

Due to an innocent mistake and incorrect advice, they submitted their initial application for benefits to Economical instead of Heartland.

Heartland denied their subsequent claim for optional benefits, arguing the insureds had elected to claim from Economical.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal initially granted the insureds relief from forfeiture, but this was overturned on reconsideration.

On appeal, the Divisional Court restored the initial LAT decision, holding that the LAT has jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act, and that the insureds were entitled to withdraw their mistaken application and apply to Heartland.

Michael Miller was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He pleaded guilty to impaired operation and admitted possession of fentanyl, but denied possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial focused on whether the Crown could prove the trafficking purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable doubt as to the purpose of trafficking and convicted Miller of the lesser included offence of possession of fentanyl.

The applicants applied to the Normal Farm Practice Protection Board regarding disturbances from the respondents' farm.

The Board dismissed the application and awarded costs against the applicants.

The applicants requested a review of the costs order only.

A vice-chair granted the review based on a reasonable apprehension of bias and ordered a new costs hearing.

Both parties appealed to the Divisional Court.

The respondents appealed the finding of bias, while the applicants argued the dismissal of the application should also have been overturned.

The Divisional Court quashed the respondents' appeal, finding the vice-chair's order was interlocutory.

The Court dismissed the applicants' appeal, holding the vice-chair did not err by only deciding the specific issue raised in the request for review.