Stephen T. Bale

Cattle farmers sought leave to proceed with claims against the Crown and Animal Welfare Services officers for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, abuse of process, intentional interference with economic relations, and defamation arising from the removal of approximately half their herd.

The court granted leave for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, and abuse of process, finding sufficient evidence of bad faith and recklessness based on the Animal Care Review Board's findings that the removal process failed to comply with statutory standards and was not necessary to relieve animal distress.

Leave was denied for intentional interference with economic relations due to inadequate pleading, and leave was not required for defamation.

This is an estate administration matter concerning the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a property held in the estate of Waltraud Tyll.

The applicant, Norbert Tyll, sought payment to himself and his brother Ruediger of their one-third interests in the net proceeds of sale of the family home at 840 Shadrach Drive in Newmarket.

The respondent, Wolfgang Tyll, opposed the payments.

The court determined that Norbert and Ruediger were entitled to receive their interests pursuant to section 36 of the Substitute Decisions Act, as the property had been disposed of by Wolfgang while acting as attorney for property during Waltraud's incapacity.

The court granted the requested payments, subject to adjustments for costs and prior withdrawals from the estate.

The defendant Lijun Fang moved to dismiss the action under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 on the grounds that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff claimed damages arising from the sale of a farm and disposition of proceeds, alleging that as a 50% beneficial owner, he suffered losses due to Fang's mismanagement as farm manager.

The court partially granted the motion, striking certain claims but allowing others to proceed with amendments.

The court found that the plaintiff had standing to sue despite being a partner rather than a corporation, and that claims for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages were not plain and obvious failures.

Michael Miller was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He pleaded guilty to impaired operation and admitted possession of fentanyl, but denied possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial focused on whether the Crown could prove the trafficking purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable doubt as to the purpose of trafficking and convicted Miller of the lesser included offence of possession of fentanyl.

The appellant, J. Michael Evans, appealed the refusal of building and septic permits for Harry Island in the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The court found that Evans failed to establish a legal nonconforming residential use of the boathouse on Harry Island, as there was no evidence of actual residential use or intention to continue such use since the 1920s or 1930s.

The court also held that the chief building official did not have discretion under the zoning bylaw to deem the undersized island to conform.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the septic permit, finding that compliance with the Building Code superseded the municipal bylaw’s setback requirement.

The court considered a motion by LLF Lawyers LLP to dismiss the action against them on the basis that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that confidential information was disclosed by an LLF employee to her spouse, who then defamed the plaintiff.

The court found that the statement of claim, as supplemented by particulars, disclosed a cause of action in favour of Michael Kelsey against LLF Lawyers LLP, and dismissed the motion as against him.

The action by The House Consulting Group Inc. was dismissed for not pleading a lawyer-client relationship or disclosure of its confidential information.

The court sentenced Anden Alexander, convicted by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, unauthorized possession of a firearm in a vehicle, and flight from a peace officer.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the offence and the offender, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and canvassed the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less 92 days, to be served in the community, followed by two years' probation, and made ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, forfeiture, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The decision concerns a dispute over the return of a deposit following the termination of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a property, in the context of a receivership and subsequent refinancing.

The court orders the return of the deposit to 2557905 Ontario Inc., with interest only from the date the deposit was placed in an interest-bearing account, and denies the listing broker's request for costs from the deposit.

This decision concerns consolidated applications regarding a failed assignment agreement for a pre-construction condominium unit.

The assignees (Trinh) sought the return of their deposit, arguing the agreement was null and void due to the assignor's (2627641 Ontario Inc.) failure to obtain the vendor's consent within the stipulated time.

The assignor counter-argued that the assignees breached the agreement by failing to pay a final deposit, which they claimed was a prerequisite for vendor consent.

The court found that the assignees were not required to pay the final deposit without the vendor's acceptance of the assignment and that the assignor failed to provide clear information regarding uncapped development charges, which was a condition for the assignees.

The court concluded that the assignment agreement became null and void due to the assignor's failure to secure vendor approval, entitling the assignees to the return of their deposit and costs.

This decision addresses costs arising from an application to appoint an arbitrator in a dispute over a new home purchase agreement.

The applicants, purchasers, sought an arbitrator after alleging the vendor (respondent) breached the agreement and they terminated it.

The respondent initially opposed arbitration but later agreed after the applicants' termination notice.

The court had previously ruled in favor of the applicants' choice of arbitrator but reserved on costs.

This decision awards costs to the respondent for the period prior to the applicants' termination notice, finding that the arbitration clause, which related to termination disputes, was not triggered until actual termination occurred.

The court found the applicants' interpretation of the arbitration agreement did not justify enhanced costs, and awarded a net amount of $7,500 in costs to the respondent.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation after a farmhouse on a property purchased from the defendants was destroyed by fire before closing.

The court found no contractual obligation for the defendants to insure the property, rebuild the farmhouse, or abate the purchase price, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wile v. Cook.

The misrepresentation claim lacked sufficient particulars as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The statement of claim was struck out, but with leave to amend.

The plaintiff corporation alleged it was defrauded by its former principal, Zaza, who caused it to loan funds to another corporation he controlled, which then distributed the funds to family and friends before bankruptcy.

The defendants (excluding the bankrupt corporation) moved for judgment dismissing the action, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin until January 6, 2021, when Susan Barrett took control of the plaintiff corporation.

Prior to that date, the plaintiff corporation had no officers or directors whose knowledge could be attributed to it, and thus it was not capable of discovering the claim or exercising reasonable diligence.

The action involved alleged breaches of agreements.

The defendants moved to dismiss or permanently stay the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction and on forum non conveniens grounds, and to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff cross-moved for default judgment.

The court set aside the noting in default for most defendants and service for two, staying the action against those two.

However, the court found jurisdiction over the main defendants based on presumptive connecting factors and a valid forum selection clause, dismissing their motion to stay.

The court largely upheld the statement of claim, striking only two paragraphs, but ordered the plaintiff to add the contracting corporation as a proper plaintiff, staying the action until then.

The plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, settled with the at-fault driver and then claimed the balance of her damages from her underinsured motorist protection insurer, Coseco Insurance Company.

Coseco moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed Coseco's motion, finding that earlier communications from the plaintiff's counsel were merely notice of an intended claim, not a "demand for indemnification" that would trigger the limitation period.

The limitation period was held to have commenced only after a formal request for indemnification with full particulars was submitted.

This decision addresses the defendants' requests for damages and full indemnity costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation actions under anti-SLAPP provisions (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The court dismissed the damages claim, finding no bad faith or improper purpose by the plaintiff, and that alleged harm was not directly caused by the proceedings.

However, the court awarded full indemnity costs to the defendants, Matthew Bergman ($50,000) and Gregory Swain ($11,690.56), as statutorily presumed.

The plaintiff, Drew Reid, brought a motion seeking to quash the enforcement of Ganaraska Credit Union Ltd.'s mortgage, an accounting and return of personal possessions, and a finding of contempt against the defendants for allegedly defying a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) lien.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mortgage sale was not a "fire sale" and was for fair value, the CRA lien did not claim priority over the mortgages, and the plaintiff's attempts to stay enforcement lacked merit, especially as the property had already been sold.

The court also clarified that a CRA lien is not a court order for the purposes of a contempt finding.

Edward Pengelly applied for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his security re-classification and transfer to a medium-security institution.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a preliminary motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the Federal Court was the sole remedy.

The court dismissed the Attorney General's jurisdictional challenge, affirming the Superior Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus applications in the prison context, distinguishing the case from precedents concerning mootness or challenges to conditions of detention rather than the lawfulness of detention itself.

The plaintiffs, mortgagees, brought a motion seeking an order to compel the defendants, mortgagors, to deliver a statement of defence despite a provincial emergency order suspending procedural timelines.

The mortgage was in default, and evidence indicated significant property deterioration and tax arrears.

The defendants did not respond to the motion.

The court exercised its discretion to override the suspension, finding no evidence from the defendants to justify further delay or contradict the plaintiffs' claims of wasting security.

The motion was granted, ordering the defendants to file a statement of defence within 20 days.

The defendant Certas brought a motion seeking an order for the Ontario Provincial Police and the Ministry of the Attorney General to produce records related to a motor vehicle accident investigation.

The OPP did not oppose the motion, provided privacy interests were protected.

However, the Crown Law Office (Civil), representing the Ministry, did not respond, leading the court to question the efficacy of service.

The court clarified that during the Covid-19 emergency, service on the Crown for civil proceedings must be effected by email to a specific address.

The motion was not decided on its merits but was effectively stalled pending proper service on the Crown.