Christopher P. Thompson

The Crown brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence action.

The plaintiffs, hog farmers, alleged the Crown's 2007-2008 financial assistance program was negligently designed because it used outdated 2000-2004 sales data, resulting in insufficient payments.

The central issues were whether the program's design decision was a policy or operational decision (policy decisions are immune from negligence liability) and whether the claim was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The court found the design decision was a core policy decision, immune from liability, and alternatively, that the plaintiffs' claim was statute-barred as they had sufficient knowledge of their claim in 2008, not 2014 as they argued.

The Crown's motion for summary dismissal was allowed without costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard appeals regarding a flooded access road.

The Township of Georgian Bluffs and the Ministry of Transportation appealed a lower court decision that found the road public, obligated the Township to maintain it, and ordered the Ministry to restore culverts and indemnify the Township.

The Crown's appeal was allowed due to procedural unfairness, as no relief was sought against the Ministry in the original application.

The Township's appeal was dismissed, affirming the public nature of the road based on historical statute labour and common law dedication and acceptance, and upholding its obligation to restore the road.

This appeal concerned a proposed class action by inmates and their families against Bell Canada and the Ontario government regarding allegedly unreasonable and unconscionable collect call rates from correctional facilities.

The motion judge had dismissed claims for an ultra vires tax and a Telecommunications Act breach, and permanently stayed other claims (unjust enrichment, consumer protection, unconscionable contracts, breach of fiduciary duty), deferring to the CRTC's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the ultra vires tax claim, finding the commissions paid to Ontario were proprietary/contractual charges, not taxes.

However, the Court substituted the permanent stay with a temporary stay for the remaining claims.

This was to allow the CRTC to first determine whether it had forborne from regulating these specific rates and, if not, to adjudicate their reasonableness, ensuring access to justice for the appellants if the CRTC declined jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of prisoners and their families, alleging that Bell Canada and Ontario charged unconscionable rates for collect calls from provincial correctional facilities.

The plaintiffs sought certification, while the defendants brought cross-motions to stay the action, arguing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice struck the plaintiffs' claims for an ultra vires tax and breach of the Telecommunications Act, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court permanently stayed the remaining claims, concluding that the pith and substance of the dispute concerned telecommunications rates, which fall squarely within the specialized jurisdiction and remedial authority of the CRTC.

The appellant, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc., appealed an order striking its claim for misfeasance in public office against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ) without leave to amend.

Catalyst alleged HMQ improperly caused its removal as a participant in the Pan Am Athletes’ Village Project.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding that Catalyst's pleadings, despite being extensive, lacked sufficient material facts to plausibly support the required element of bad faith or unlawful conduct for the tort of misfeasance in public office.

The court reiterated that bald allegations of bad faith are insufficient without factual underpinning.

In a proposed class action regarding the rates charged for collect calls made by prisoners in Ontario correctional facilities, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of an affidavit sworn by an employee of the defendant telecommunications company.

The plaintiffs argued the affiant was improperly giving expert opinion evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the affiant was providing factual evidence regarding the regulatory framework and the operation of the telephone system, not expert opinion.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

The Crown moved to strike out the plaintiff's Second Amended Claim for misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff alleged the Crown unlawfully directed Infrastructure Ontario to exclude it from participating in the financing of a public tendering project.

The court found that the Crown was entitled to make decisions adverse to the plaintiff's interests in a public tendering process, and the pleadings did not plausibly support a conclusion that the Crown acted for an improper purpose or in bad faith.

The claim was struck out without leave to amend.

The court also held that, alternatively, the plaintiff would have required leave to proceed under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The plaintiff, Catalyst Capital Group Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out several of its claims against Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership (DKD), Infrastructure Ontario (IO), and the Crown.

The claims arose from Catalyst's exclusion from financing the 2015 Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating Catalyst's claims against DKD for breach of a funding term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit.

However, the court upheld the striking of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims against IO and the Crown, the public law duty claim against IO and the Crown, and the misrepresentation claim against the Crown, finding them either statute-barred, lacking direct benefit, or precluded by statutory immunity.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for an admitted debt of $164,451.82.

The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that a representative of the plaintiff conspired with a third-party livestock dealer to exert undue influence and duress, forcing the defendant to sell his livestock and ruining his business.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and dismissed the counterclaim, finding it was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and lacked sufficient evidence to establish the tort of civil conspiracy.

Electricity ratepayers brought an action seeking damages and declaratory relief concerning the sale of shares in Hydro One, alleging that the Premier and Ministers acted in bad faith to reward political donors and obtain further donations to the Ontario Liberal Party.

The motion judge struck out the claim under Rule 21, finding it was not justiciable as it concerned core policy and the pleadings were inadequate to support an inference of bad faith.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in assessing the facts in isolation, misconstruing material facts, and failing to accept pleaded facts as true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' allegations were insufficient to plead bad faith and that accepting such a pleading would undermine the immunity afforded to core policy decisions.

The plaintiffs, Hydro One ratepayers, brought an action for misfeasance in public office against the Premier and Ministers of Finance and Energy regarding the privatization of Hydro One.

They alleged the sale was motivated by improper purposes to reward Liberal Party benefactors.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding the decision to sell Hydro One shares was a core policy decision authorized by the Electricity Act, 1998, and thus immune from judicial review in a civil tort action absent bad faith, which was not adequately pleaded.

The Crown sought indemnification for reasonable defence costs from the respondent pursuant to a prior declaration.

The respondent argued that because the Crown used salaried in-house counsel, its costs were purely notional and it suffered no actual loss.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Crown incurs real costs for salaried lawyers, analogous to the statutory recognition in section 131(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the nine factors from Cohen v. Kealey and Blaney, the court fixed the reasonable defence costs at $30,000 plus disbursements, and awarded $4,000 for the costs of the application.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and a novel 'public law claim', without leave to amend.

Claims for breach of an oral agreement and misfeasance in public office were struck with leave to amend.

Claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and the Crown agency were allowed to stand.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The action arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against the Crown, without leave to amend.

The claim for breach of an oral agreement was struck with leave to amend to provide better particulars.

The claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and Infrastructure Ontario were allowed to proceed.

The applicant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, sought a declaration that the respondent, Turn-Key Construction Inc., had a contractual duty to defend Ontario in an action commenced by a third party, G. Prezio Electric Limited.

The underlying action arose from Turn-Key's subcontractor severing a major electrical power line during contract performance, leading Ontario to engage Prezio for emergency repairs.

The court found that the indemnity clause in the commercial contract between Ontario and Turn-Key created a duty to defend, as the third-party claim was "based upon, occasioned by or attributable to" the subcontractor's actions.

The application was granted, and Turn-Key was ordered to pay Ontario's defence costs.

The plaintiff alleged that the provincial government induced a breach of his employment contract and intentionally interfered with his economic relations after revoking his security clearance to access the government licensing database used at a private motor vehicle licensing office.

The revocation followed a security screening that revealed past associations with outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The court held that the government’s decision was part of a general security screening policy designed to protect sensitive government databases and was not directed at causing a breach of the plaintiff’s employment contract.

The evidence did not establish the requisite intention to induce breach of contract, nor did it show the use of unlawful means necessary to support the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff’s action was dismissed.