Steven Leonard Shrybman

The applicants, an advocacy coalition and an individual, sought judicial review of the Minister of Long-Term Care's decision to grant a conditional undertaking to issue a licence for a new 320-bed long-term care home to Southbridge Care Homes.

The applicants argued the decision was unreasonable given the operator's poor record during the COVID-19 pandemic and alleged procedural unfairness during public consultations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicants lacked public interest standing as the coalition was an unincorporated association without legal capacity and the individual lacked a genuine interest.

In the alternative, the court held the Minister's decision was reasonable and the consultation process was procedurally fair.

The Advocacy Centre for the Elderly challenged the constitutionality of Bill 7, which allows hospitals to transition alternate level of care patients to long-term care homes without their consent.

The applicants argued the legislation violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by forcing patients to move or pay a daily fee.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no violation of Charter rights.

The court concluded that the legislation is a constitutional measure designed to manage scarce hospital resources.

Electricity ratepayers brought an action seeking damages and declaratory relief concerning the sale of shares in Hydro One, alleging that the Premier and Ministers acted in bad faith to reward political donors and obtain further donations to the Ontario Liberal Party.

The motion judge struck out the claim under Rule 21, finding it was not justiciable as it concerned core policy and the pleadings were inadequate to support an inference of bad faith.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in assessing the facts in isolation, misconstruing material facts, and failing to accept pleaded facts as true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' allegations were insufficient to plead bad faith and that accepting such a pleading would undermine the immunity afforded to core policy decisions.

The plaintiffs, Hydro One ratepayers, brought an action for misfeasance in public office against the Premier and Ministers of Finance and Energy regarding the privatization of Hydro One.

They alleged the sale was motivated by improper purposes to reward Liberal Party benefactors.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding the decision to sell Hydro One shares was a core policy decision authorized by the Electricity Act, 1998, and thus immune from judicial review in a civil tort action absent bad faith, which was not adequately pleaded.

The appellants appealed a decision.

At the hearing, an alleged conflict was raised.

The Divisional Court was unable to ascertain the facts respecting the alleged conflict on the record.

As a result, the appeal was adjourned to be heard on a later date with a newly constituted panel due to scheduling exigencies.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

Public interest organizations and individual electors sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a provision of the Fair Elections Act that prohibited the Chief Electoral Officer from authorizing the Voter Information Card as proof of identity or residence for voting in a federal election.

The applicants alleged the provision infringed the right to vote under s.3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and risked disenfranchising certain groups.

The court held the challenge raised a serious issue and that disenfranchisement could constitute irreparable harm.

However, binding appellate authority establishes a rule against granting interlocutory relief that effectively suspends electoral legislation immediately before an election.

Applying that principle, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the legislation to remain in force pending a full constitutional hearing.

The applicants sought urgent scheduling of an interlocutory injunction motion in a constitutional challenge to amendments under the Fair Elections Act affecting federal voting procedures, including voter information cards and vouching.

The court held that requests for expedition must balance procedural fairness, potential irreparable harm, and the practicality of a timetable for the parties and the court.

Given the complexity of the Charter issues and the extensive social science and expert evidence, the court declined the very early hearing date sought by the applicants but ordered an expedited case-managed schedule culminating in a two-day motion hearing in July 2015.

The appellant, Friends of Lansdowne Inc., appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law approving a public-private partnership for the redevelopment of Lansdowne Park.

The appellant argued the by-law provided an illegal bonus to the developer, breached procurement rules, and was passed in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the development plan, viewed as a whole, did not confer an obvious advantage or illegal bonus.

The Court also held that any breach of procurement policies was a technical irregularity that did not vitiate the by-law, and the appellant failed to establish bad faith by the City Council.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's approvals regarding the privatization of hospital facilities.

A non-party, THICC, asserted that certain documents in the Minister's record were confidential.

A Master heard a motion regarding the content of the record and ruled the documents should be publicly filed.

THICC appealed, arguing the Master lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that while a Master does not have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory motion in a judicial review application, a judge may refer an interlocutory issue to a Master acting as a referee.

The Court found that the case management judge had directed such a reference and that the Master made no reversible error in applying the Sierra Club test to deny the sealing order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the investor-state arbitration mechanism in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing it violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, judicial independence, the rule of law, and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that NAFTA tribunals do not exercise powers analogous to those of superior courts at Confederation, nor do they remove core jurisdiction from domestic courts.

The court also held that the tribunals do not violate judicial independence or the rule of law, and that the Charter challenge was premature as it was based on speculative harm rather than a specific tribunal decision.

The applicants sought an interim order restraining the Minister of Health from approving plans for the involvement of for-profit corporations in the design or operation of two hospitals, pending the adjournment of their application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the projects would breach the Public Hospitals Act, and failed to show irreparable harm if the interim order was not granted.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring that the sale of Hydro One shares by the Crown contravened s. 48(1) of the Electricity Act.

Before the appeal was heard, the government withdrew the public offering and enacted new legislation repealing s. 48(1) and expressly authorizing the sale of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the legal and factual foundation of the dispute had disappeared and that the circumstances did not justify an exception to the general rule against hearing moot appeals.

The complainant union alleged that the employer terminated six employees contrary to the Labour Relations Act after they engaged in union organizing.

The employer claimed the terminations were the result of a prior business decision to contract out the work.

The union argued that findings of fact from a prior dismissed unlawful lockout application were res judicata.

The Board held that the prior findings were not binding because they were not necessary to the ultimate dismissal of that application.

However, on the evidence, the Board found that the decision to contract out was crystallized only after the employer learned of the union activity, and was therefore motivated at least in part by anti-union animus.

The Board ordered the employees reinstated with compensation.