Peter K. Doody

A federal Crown corporation sought to quash a production order issued under the Criminal Code requiring disclosure of customer information.

The applicant argued that section 24.3 of the Export Development Act created a legal privilege protecting customer information from disclosure during criminal investigations, though it acknowledged an exception for prosecutions.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the term "privileged" in the statute referred to confidential information rather than a legal privilege, and that the exception for "prosecuting an offence" included prospective prosecutions and investigative stages when authorized by a judicial order.

The court held that the applicant must comply with the production order.

The applicant, Senator Michael Dennis Duffy, sought an order requiring the Clerk of the Senate to produce an internal audit report prepared by Jill Anne Joseph regarding Senate expense policies and Senator Duffy's expense claims.

The Senate claimed parliamentary privilege over the document.

The court upheld the Senate's claim of privilege, finding that the internal audit report, prepared by a Senate employee and presented to a Senate subcommittee in camera, fell within recognized categories of parliamentary privilege including freedom of speech, exclusive cognizance over parliamentary proceedings, control over internal affairs, and disciplinary authority over members.

The court rejected arguments that the privilege had been waived and distinguished the case from R. v. Chaytor, which addressed expense claims themselves rather than internal audit reports.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to stay or dismiss the respondent's defamation action on the basis of maintenance and champerty.

The appellant argued that the respondent's employer funding the litigation and the respondent's pledge to donate punitive damages to a university scholarship constituted maintenance and champerty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the funding arrangement was lawful.

The court also rejected the appellant's claims of bias and inadequate time for submissions.

Following dismissal of a champerty motion brought by the defendant seeking to stay a libel action as an abuse of process, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendant had argued that the plaintiff should not receive costs because her legal fees were funded by her employer, and that the affected party university had no entitlement to costs.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that third‑party funding does not preclude an award of costs and that the university, as an affected party under Rule 37.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was entitled to participate and recover costs.

Applying the Rule 57 factors, including complexity, extensive evidentiary record, and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court fixed partial indemnity costs in favour of both the plaintiff and the university.

Following dismissal of three motions for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions in ongoing civil litigation, the court addressed costs.

The responding parties sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the self‑represented defendant had engaged in vexatious litigation and judge‑shopping through numerous unmeritorious motions.

The court accepted that the volume of motions suggested abuse of process but concluded that some of the issues raised were novel and not entirely devoid of merit.

Substantial indemnity costs were therefore not warranted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded with a 15 percent reduction to reflect limited success by the defendant on certain procedural points and some duplication in the responding parties’ work.

A case management judge considered whether he had jurisdiction to award costs for a refusals motion previously heard by another judge who later recused himself before determining costs.

The court held that, having been appointed case management judge to address all outstanding issues, it had jurisdiction to fix costs for the earlier motion.

The affected participant sought partial indemnity costs after successfully defending refusals made by its representatives during examinations.

The court rejected arguments that costs should be denied due to alleged impecuniosity, duplication of counsel, or alleged misrepresentation.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis with a reduction from the amount claimed.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion for leave to appeal, the plaintiff and the University of Ottawa sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the defendant's motion was barred by res judicata and collateral attack, his conduct was not totally unreasonable or vexatious.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The court ordered the self-represented defendant to pay $5,500 plus HST and disbursements to the plaintiff, and $3,500 plus HST and disbursements to the University of Ottawa, noting some duplication of costs.

Following an unsuccessful motion by a non-party seeking intervener status in a civil action, the court determined costs.

The moving party argued that costs should not be awarded due to his status as an impecunious student.

The court held that alleged impecuniosity generally should not affect costs determinations and emphasized that the moving party had been warned costs would be sought if the motion proceeded.

The court also found that the moving party engaged in unreasonable conduct after the motion by sending emails attacking counsel and attempting to pressure the plaintiff to withdraw her claim for costs.

Costs were ordered payable to both opposing parties.

The appellant, Friends of Lansdowne Inc., appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law approving a public-private partnership for the redevelopment of Lansdowne Park.

The appellant argued the by-law provided an illegal bonus to the developer, breached procurement rules, and was passed in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the development plan, viewed as a whole, did not confer an obvious advantage or illegal bonus.

The Court also held that any breach of procurement policies was a technical irregularity that did not vitiate the by-law, and the appellant failed to establish bad faith by the City Council.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for a share of profits made by the respondent from the purchase and resale of a recreational property.

At trial, the appellant claimed an agreement to jointly purchase and market the property, which the trial judge rejected.

On appeal, the appellant argued breach of fiduciary duty and sought 100% of the profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that breach of fiduciary duty was not pleaded at trial, the record did not support an agency or fiduciary relationship, and the appellant had repudiated his agreement to purchase the property before the respondent resold it.

The Crown appealed a declaration that the process for setting the remuneration of Case Management Masters violated the constitutional principle of judicial independence.

The respondents cross-appealed, seeking a broader remedy than a simple declaration of invalidity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that linking the Masters' salaries in perpetuity to a specific civil service classification without an independent commission violated the requirement for an independent, effective, and objective process.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as a simple declaration of invalidity was the appropriate remedy.

The suspension of the declaration of invalidity was extended for 12 months.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and inducing breach of contract arising from the peremptory removal of the respondent from a military aerospace consulting project.

The Court of Appeal clarified the elements of intentional interference with economic relations and inducing breach of contract, adopting the House of Lords' approach in OBG v. Allan.

The court held that unlawful means for intentional interference must be directed at a third party and not directly actionable by the plaintiff.

While the trial judge erred in using defamation directly actionable by the plaintiff as unlawful means, the court upheld liability based on a conspiracy against a third party and breach of contract.

The court also confirmed that inducing breach of contract requires an actual breach, not mere frustration.

The appeal was dismissed and the damages awards were upheld.

The City of Kingston operated a municipal dump site from which toxic leachate migrated into the Cataraqui River.

The Crown and a private citizen laid charges under s. 36(3) of the Fisheries Act.

The trial judge convicted the City and its Director of Environmental Services, but the summary conviction appeal judge ordered a new trial, applying the test from R. v. Inco Ltd. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the Inco test applies to the Ontario Water Resources Act, not the Fisheries Act.

Under the Fisheries Act, the Crown need only prove that the substance added to the water is deleterious, not that the receiving water itself was rendered deleterious.

The employer, Great Blue Heron Gaming Company, and the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation brought motions to stay a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) pending judicial review.

The OLRB had determined that the Ontario Labour Relations Act applied to the employer's casino operations on the reserve, rejecting the First Nation's argument that its own Labour Code applied pursuant to aboriginal rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the stay motions, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing collective bargaining to proceed for the 800 employees who had voted for union representation over a year prior.

The appellant, having been successful in obtaining the dismissal of the motion by the Attorney General to quash the stated case, in obtaining leave to appeal, and on the appeal itself, sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant payable by the Attorney General on a partial indemnity basis.

Recognizing that the central issue was addressed three times and was not unduly complex, the court fixed a global amount of $18,000 for fees and $5,000 for disbursements.

The Ontario Energy Board stated a case to the Divisional Court regarding the applicability of O. Reg. 365/00 to applications under s. 92 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998.

The Divisional Court quashed the stated case, finding the Board was functus officio, had not made necessary findings of fact, and lacked jurisdiction to ask if a regulation is valid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 32(1) allows the Board to state a case even if not tied to a pending application, does not strictly require prior findings of fact, and permits questions regarding the boundaries of the Board's jurisdiction.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was nominated for a British peerage.

The Prime Minister of Canada intervened and advised the Queen not to confer the honour, citing Canadian policy against titular honours.

The appellant sued the Prime Minister for abuse of power and negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the Prime Minister was exercising the Crown prerogative relating to honours, which is not justiciable and therefore beyond the review of the courts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, four Ford dealerships, appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding against Ford Motor Company of Canada.

The motions judge had found that all certification criteria were met except the preferable procedure requirement, concluding that an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) would be more efficient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 14.05(3)(d) application would not resolve the common issues for the entire class, as Ford refused to be bound by the result for non-parties.

The Court concluded that only a class proceeding would bind the class and avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.