Alan John Lenczner

The plaintiff moved for settlement approval, certification for settlement purposes, and fee approval in a class action for secondary market misrepresentation against Nobilis Health Corp. The proposed settlement involved abandoning the appeal of a previously dismissed certification motion and dismissing the action against Nobilis, which was effectively judgment-proof.

The court approved the settlement, finding it in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel's additional fee request of $100,000 and a cy-près distribution of the remaining trust funds to the Class Proceedings Fund, but declined to award an honourarium to the representative plaintiff.

The parties disagreed on whether the judge should sign an order dismissing the plaintiff's prior certification and leave motions, or wait for the plaintiff's "motion for reconsideration." The plaintiff argued that signing the order might render the court functus officio, potentially precluding the reconsideration motion.

The defendant argued that the pronouncement of judgment was final and the order should be issued without delay.

The court decided to sign the order, issuing a fiat for its issuance and entry, clarifying that this decision did not determine the functus officio or abuse of process issues, which would be addressed in the context of the plaintiff's omnibus reconsideration motion.

Nobilis Health Corp. sought costs after successfully defending a class action certification motion and leave application brought by Vince Cappelli.

Nobilis requested $200,000 in partial indemnity fees and $311,696.39 in disbursements, primarily for three expert reports.

Cappelli did not oppose the fees but challenged the disbursements as excessive and duplicative.

The court found the expert evidence necessary and critical, despite some overlap, and deemed the disbursements fair and reasonable given the litigation risk.

Costs were awarded to Nobilis as requested, with the Class Proceedings Fund ultimately responsible for payment.

The plaintiff sought leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act to bring a statutory cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation against the defendant corporation, and to certify the action as a class proceeding.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant made material misrepresentations in its financial statements, which were later restated.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the plaintiff had no reasonable possibility of success because the specific misrepresentations pleaded were not material to a reasonable investor, and the alleged corrective disclosure did not relate to the pleaded misrepresentations.

Consequently, the certification motion was also dismissed.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for breach of confidence and tortious interference with economic interests.

The court found no evidentiary foundation for the breach of confidence claim, noting that alleged confidential information (unsubmitted patent applications, supplier identities) was either not sufficiently identified, publicly available, or not misused by the defendant.

The tortious interference claim failed due to the absence of a third party.

The motion was granted, and the action dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision certifying a bargaining unit for construction labourers.

The applicants argued the OLRB erred by excluding post-application date evidence regarding the composition of the bargaining unit and by finding that the two individuals working on the application date were their employees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OLRB reasonably applied the statutory framework and its established policy of determining bargaining rights based on the date of application, and reasonably concluded the individuals were employees of the applicants.

The plaintiff in a proposed securities class action moved for certification for settlement purposes, approval of a partial settlement with the auditor defendant, dismissal of the action against individual defendants, and approval of class counsel fees.

The action alleged misrepresentations in the corporate defendant's financial statements.

The court approved the $1 million (USD) settlement with the auditor, finding it fair and reasonable, particularly given the statutory liability limits for experts.

The court also approved the dismissal against the individual defendants and class counsel's fee request of 30% of the settlement funds plus disbursements.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

The Municipality of Port Hope was wholly successful on appeal and cross-appeal.

The applicants sought to avoid a costs award by arguing the matter was brought in a representative capacity on a matter of public interest involving novel legal issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the applicants acted to vindicate private financial interests and that the issues lacked significant societal impact.

The court awarded costs to the Municipality in the agreed-upon sum of $93,319.11, all inclusive.

The applicant sought to enforce an agreement between Canada and three municipalities regarding the storage of low-level radioactive waste.

The applicant alleged that the municipality had misused income earned on a $10 million payment by failing to apply it exclusively to defray lower-tier municipal taxes for ratepayers of the former Hope Township.

The application judge found that Schedule 8 of the agreement created a non-charitable purpose trust and that the municipality had breached its trustee duties.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the agreement was a contract and did not create a trust over the payment or the fund.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that refused to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant's statement of defence.

The underlying action involved the recognition and enforcement of a $9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment.

The defendant pleaded defences of fraud, public policy, and lack of natural justice, alleging the foreign judgment was ghostwritten and obtained through bribery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the pleaded defences were recognized in law and not plainly and obviously bound to fail.

The applicants sought to remove the respondent from his position as mayor due to alleged conflicts of interest, but their applications were dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the respondent's request for costs.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, totaling $78,298.93, to be paid by the applicants.

Kelly Darnley was ordered to pay $66,298.93 and Charles Bristoll $12,000.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs, finding the applicants' conduct not reprehensible, but noted their broad and unsupported allegations unnecessarily increased complexity.

David W. Fickel sought leave to appeal from a motion judge's order that stayed the execution of a summary judgment for payment on a promissory note, pending the final resolution of the main action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to Fickel on the promissory note but stayed its execution due to the interconnectedness of the claims arising from the same share purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant a stay under Rule 20.08, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

The plaintiffs moved to add Chevron Canada Capital Company (CCCC) as a party defendant to their action seeking to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was not legally tenable and disclosed no cause of action against CCCC, as the court had previously ruled that Chevron Canada's corporate veil could not be pierced.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction over CCCC, a Nova Scotia company with no assets or operations in Ontario, and noted that Rule 17.02(o) regarding necessary parties had been repealed.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a US$9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against Chevron Canada, arguing it was a separate legal entity not liable for the judgment.

The plaintiffs argued Chevron Canada's assets were exigible under the Execution Act or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against Chevron Canada, finding the Execution Act does not override corporate separateness and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil absent allegations of wrongdoing by the subsidiary.

The plaintiffs also moved to strike Chevron's statement of defence.

The court struck defences relating to retroactive legislation and international law, but permitted defences alleging the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, bribery, and a denial of natural justice to proceed to trial.

The applicants sought declarations that the respondent, the mayor of Caledon, contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on land development matters in which he allegedly had a pecuniary interest.

The court found no evidence that the respondent had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the matters voted upon, noting that his property was located several kilometers away from the developments and any potential development of his land was decades in the future.

Both applications were dismissed.

Following a successful application declaring a municipal fund to be a purpose trust and finding the respondent municipality in breach of its obligations as trustee, the applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicant championed the cause of other ratepayers and that the litigation arose partly due to uncertainty surrounding the agreement.

The court awarded the applicant full indemnity costs of $89,319.11, ordering the respondent to pay $53,319.11 on a partial indemnity scale, with the balance of $36,000 to be recovered from the trust fund.

Following a successful appeal regarding the apportionment of damages, the court determined the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The third parties were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $50,000 to the appellants and $75,000 to the respondents.

The appellants were ordered to pay $30,000 in partial indemnity costs to the respondents, as the respondents were required to address all issues initially raised by the appellants.