C. Hunter

Sentencing for historical child sexual offences, assault, and pointing a firearm arising from a grooming relationship between an adult in a position of trust and a 12-year-old complainant.

The court treated the devastating long-term impact on the complainant, abuse of trust, grooming, use of intoxicants, sexualized coercion, threats of violence, and the offender's similar prior record as major aggravating factors.

Although the offender had engaged in extensive counselling, demonstrated insight, remorse, and was assessed as presenting a relatively low risk of reoffending, the court held that contemporary sentencing principles for sexual violence against children required a penitentiary sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

A conditional sentence was found unavailable and, in any event, disproportionate.

A global sentence of five years' imprisonment was imposed with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

Barbara Kennedy pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for strangling her roommate, Terri Johnson, who was physically vulnerable.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust inherent in the roommate relationship, the killing in the victim's home, the inhumane disposal of the body, and initial concealment efforts.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and the offender's advanced age.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 14 to 15 years, while the defence sought the minimum of 10 years.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing principles.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision ordering a hospital to disclose a linen services contract and a memorandum summarizing its terms.

The applicant argued the records contained financial information supplied in confidence during a bid process, exempting them from disclosure under s. 17(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator reasonably concluded that the contract was the product of negotiations and the information was mutually generated, not supplied in confidence.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action requested a case conference to schedule dates for discovery and mediation after the defendant delayed proceedings due to internal HR turnover.

The court established a litigation timetable, ordering examinations for discovery to be completed by January 14, 2022, and mediation by February 4, 2022.

A class member, Loyd Mark Noel, brought a motion for permission to opt out of a class proceeding after the specified deadline had passed.

Mr. Noel had inadvertently missed the deadline despite having already commenced an individual lawsuit related to the same incident.

The motion was unopposed by both the class plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel.

The court granted permission, exercising its discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding that the inadvertent error and the existence of an individual action justified the late opt-out, with no adverse impact on the class proceeding.

This initial case conference for a proposed class action addressed the consolidation of two actions, the defendant Boeing Company's contemplation of a jurisdictional challenge, and the defendant Fly Jamaica Airways Ltd.'s apparent cessation of operations, with its insurer undertaking the defense.

A preservation notice was sent to Fly Jamaica.

The certification motion was scheduled for September 3, 2019.

The plaintiff condominium corporation moved to amend its statement of claim to add a claim for damages related to the repair and replacement of a transformer, alleging violations of environmental regulations and fraudulent concealment by a former director.

The motion was opposed by several defendants on the grounds that the new claim was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period and constituted an abuse of process due to a pending arbitration.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred as the limitation period began when its corporate solicitor received an order from Environment Canada in February 2014, putting it on notice of the damage, and that full quantification of damages was not required to start the clock.

The court also rejected the argument that a civil action was not an "appropriate means" to seek a remedy at that time.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that refused to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant's statement of defence.

The underlying action involved the recognition and enforcement of a $9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment.

The defendant pleaded defences of fraud, public policy, and lack of natural justice, alleging the foreign judgment was ghostwritten and obtained through bribery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the pleaded defences were recognized in law and not plainly and obviously bound to fail.

A.R. was charged on a ten-count indictment with three counts of assault, two counts of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and six counts of sexual assault, all in relation to his former spouse, L.R., their baby, C.R., and L.R.'s mother, J.S. The trial involved extensive testimony from the complainants and examination of text messages.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of L.R.'s evidence, citing issues with disclosure of text messages, timing of allegations, and perceived exaggeration.

The court carefully assessed the credibility of L.R. and J.S., finding their evidence credible and reliable despite some defence arguments.

The court found the accused guilty on all ten counts, concluding that the Crown proved the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The estate trustee sought clarification of a prior costs order arising from estate litigation between the trustee and a beneficiary.

The issue was whether the respondent beneficiary was required to pay the ordered costs to the trustee personally or in her representative capacity as estate trustee.

Applying the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, which generally follows ordinary civil costs principles unless public policy considerations apply, the court reaffirmed that the losing party must bear the costs personally.

The court concluded that the respondent beneficiary must pay the awarded costs directly to the applicant in her personal capacity.

The defendants were convicted of willfully evading compliance with the Retail Sales Tax Act by failing to collect, report, and remit retail sales tax totalling $240,866.42 over 54 reporting periods from August 1, 2004 to February 23, 2009.

The individual defendant, Eugena Hayward, was the sole director and operating mind of the corporate defendant.

The court found that the defendants had collected retail sales tax in trust for Ontario but failed to remit it, instead using the funds for personal benefit including dividend payments of $341,000 to Hayward.

The court imposed a custodial sentence and substantial fine on the individual defendant, reflecting the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

Following a prior decision staying the action on terms, the court determined the issue of costs arising from interlocutory motions on the Commercial List concerning enforcement of a foreign judgment and jurisdiction over the defendants.

The moving party defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs after obtaining a stay.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principle, as well as appellate guidance that costs should be fair and reasonable rather than a full indemnity of actual expenses.

Although the defendants obtained a stay, the court held that the substantive success on the motion was mixed, as the plaintiffs succeeded on the jurisdiction issue while failing on the asset‑exigibility argument.

Given the mixed success and the novelty of the jurisdiction and service ex juris issues, the court ordered that no costs be payable by any party.