Laura Kathleen Fric

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class proceeding against the defendant bank, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment due to the bank's practice of charging duplicative non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees on re-presented pre-authorized debits.

The motion for certification was brought with the defendant's consent.

The court applied the five-part test under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, common issues were raised, a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiff was adequate.

The court granted the certification order.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.

The Superior Court of Justice approved identical third-party funding agreements in four related class actions against major Canadian banks.

The actions allege that the banks charged duplicative non-sufficient funds fees on single dishonoured pre-authorized debits.

The court, applying Section 33.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, found the agreements to be fair and reasonable, noting the staged success fee was comparable to or more advantageous than the Class Proceedings Fund levy.

The court confirmed the agreements preserved plaintiff control over litigation, ensured the funder's financial capacity for adverse costs, and included appropriate confidentiality and deemed undertaking provisions.

The defendants took no position on the motions.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

The appellant sought to bring a Canadian class action against the respondent BP p.l.c. for securities misrepresentations.

His 2019 amended statement of claim, which introduced a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, was struck out by the motion judge as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

This appeal addressed four key issues: the elements of a "claim" for fraudulent misrepresentation under the Limitations Act, the appropriateness of the motion judge's factual findings regarding discoverability based on U.S. litigation, whether the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was a new claim or an alternative theory, and the propriety of deciding a limitations issue on a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the motion judge erred in his discoverability analysis and reliance on U.S. pleadings, the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was indeed a new, statute-barred claim, and the limitations issue was appropriately decided on a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion due to undisputed facts.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to state a reasonable cause of action and as an abuse of process.

The court struck out the fresh as amended statement of claim, finding that the claims (breach of privacy, trespass, conspiracy) were legally deficient, particularly due to absolute privilege for statements made in legal proceedings and a lack of material facts.

The court further found the action to be an abuse of process, largely driven by a non-lawyer, Gary Curtis, who had a history of vexatious litigation against the defendant.

Leave to amend the claim was denied, and the action was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the defendant due to the reprehensible conduct of the litigation.

The plaintiff sought to vary or set aside previous interlocutory orders made by Masters Short and Jolley, including orders setting aside a noting in default, refusing representation by a non-lawyer agent, and directing the Registrar not to note the defendant in default.

The plaintiff's motion was brought under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court found to be an improper use as the preconditions were not met and the time for appeal had expired.

The court also reviewed the merits of the plaintiff's grounds for challenging the orders and found no reviewable error by the Masters.

The motion was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The appellant sought to bring a class action against BP for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act.

The motion judge found that eleven of fourteen alleged misrepresentations were statute-barred under the three-year limitation period in section 138.14 of the Act.

The appellant argued that section 138.3(6), which permits the court to treat multiple misrepresentations as a single misrepresentation, should extend the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 138.3(6) does not modify the event-triggered limitation period and was enacted to limit, not expand, liability.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

An Ontario resident brought a proposed securities class action against a U.K. issuer alleging secondary market misrepresentation under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

The defendant moved to stay the action in part, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction over claims of investors who purchased securities on foreign exchanges and that the matter should proceed in U.S. or U.K. courts.

The court held that the statutory cause of action under s. 138.3 constitutes a statutory tort presumptively connected to Ontario where an Ontario investor is deemed to have relied on the misrepresentation.

The legislation did not restrict claims to purchases on Ontario exchanges, and the defendant failed to rebut the presumptive connecting factor.

The court further found the defendant did not establish that foreign courts were clearly more appropriate forums.

In a class proceeding concerning post‑retirement benefits, the defendant brought a motion to strike certain financial statements from affidavit evidence.

The issue was whether the employer’s 1994 and 1995 financial statements qualified as “additional common documents” because they were widely distributed to class members and respected post‑retirement benefits.

The court held that the statements were widely distributed because annual reports were regularly provided or made available to employees.

The court also interpreted the term “respecting” broadly, finding that financial statements referring to post‑retirement benefit liabilities satisfied the requirement.

The motion to strike the documents was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of an environmental class action on appeal, the successful defendant sought costs for the period from certification to the trial decision, payable from the Class Proceedings Fund administered by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The court held that the defendant was prima facie entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis under the general rule that costs follow the event.

However, under s.31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court considered that the proceeding raised novel legal issues concerning environmental mass torts and class proceedings and involved significant public interest, including access to justice and environmental concerns.

Balancing these factors with the defendant’s entitlement to compensation for substantial litigation expenses, the court reduced the costs award.

The defendant was awarded 50% of the otherwise assessed costs, payable from the Fund.

In a class proceeding costs dispute following the dismissal of environmental contamination claims, the defendant brought a motion to strike portions of affidavits filed by a third-party fund administrator opposing payment of costs from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The challenged affidavits contained opinion evidence from non‑expert witnesses asserting that the litigation raised issues of public interest.

The court applied the principles governing admissibility of lay opinion evidence from R. v. Graat, distinguishing between admissible opinion grounded in factual observations and inadmissible speculation or legal opinion.

While the court permitted most of the opinion evidence as permissible lay opinion supporting observations about the public interest and access to justice, it struck limited portions that lacked factual foundation or amounted to speculation.

Application for a final order approving a corporate plan of arrangement under s. 182 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The proposed transaction involved the acquisition and division of assets of the corporation among related entities, with shareholders receiving a combination of cash and shares.

The court reviewed the governing framework established in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, requiring that the transaction constitute an arrangement, comply with statutory and court-ordered procedures, be proposed in good faith, and be fair and reasonable.

Evidence showed overwhelming shareholder approval, provision of dissent rights, and oversight by an independent special committee with fairness advice.

The court concluded the arrangement had a valid business purpose and fairly balanced the interests of affected stakeholders.

In a proposed securities class action alleging misrepresentations in the primary and secondary markets, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendants to deliver statements of defence and requested that the certification motion be heard together with a leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The defendants opposed delivering defences before certification and sought a sequence of motions beginning with the leave motion, followed by Rule 21 motions and then certification.

The court held that pleadings should generally be completed before certification and that ordering the delivery of a statement of defence was not contrary to law or due process.

However, the court limited the requirement to defendants who filed affidavits under s. 138.8(2) of the Securities Act, while permitting other defendants to plead voluntarily without losing the ability to bring Rule 21 motions.

The court further ordered that the leave motion and certification motion be heard together to avoid delay, inefficiency, and serial appeals.

In a proposed consumer class proceeding, the defendant sought directions permitting a summary judgment motion to be heard before the certification motion and sought leave to file a sur‑reply pleading.

The court considered the case management discretion under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and the general principle that certification should normally be the first substantive motion.

The proposed summary judgment motion would not dispose of the entire proceeding and would likely delay certification and increase costs.

The court held that efficiency favored addressing certification first and declined to schedule the summary judgment motion or the proposed sur‑reply motion before certification.

The parties were directed to agree on a timetable leading to certification.