Caleb J. Edwards

This is a continued certification motion in a class action alleging that the defendant misused class members' data by making it available to third parties without consent.

The court declined to certify the proceeding on multiple grounds: the proposed class definition was not workable, as it required individual inquiries to develop a Master Class List and was both under-inclusive and over-inclusive; the nominal damages issue could not be certified as a common issue because individual issues were woven into its determination; the proceeding was not the preferable procedure given the absence of evidence of compensable loss and the availability of regulatory proceedings; and the litigation plan was unworkable given the size of the class and the numerous individual inquiries required.

The defendant was awarded costs of $500,000 all-inclusive.

The court approved a class action settlement regarding balcony guardrail failures at the Matrix Towers in Toronto, which led to residents being deprived of balcony access for up to 3.5 years.

The settlement provides a lump sum per unit, regardless of unit size, and includes approval of class counsel fees and disbursements but denies honoraria for the representative plaintiffs.

The decision reviews the risks of litigation, the fairness of the settlement, comparator cases, and the legal standards for settlement approval, counsel fees, and honoraria.

The plaintiffs in a class action sought to certify additional common issues.

The Landlord Defendants brought a preliminary motion to prevent this, arguing that a previous "Further Certification Order" (FCO) was a final certification order, or alternatively, that the plaintiffs required leave under s. 8(3) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, which should be denied.

The court dismissed the preliminary motion, finding no objective agreement that the FCO was a final certification order and that, consequently, no leave under s. 8(3) was required as the proposed motion was a continuation of the certification process, not an amendment to a final order.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.

The Superior Court of Justice approved a pre-certification settlement in a proposed class action, which resulted in the dismissal of the case without costs.

The court found it prudent to approve the settlement given the unusual timing during a mid-certification motion adjournment.

The decision highlighted that the settlement was in the best interests of the putative class, as the plaintiffs' chances of success were slim, and it did not prejudice class members, who retained the ability to pursue individual actions.

This is a motion for approval of a class action settlement concerning incidents of glass falling from balconies at Festival Tower, a condominium in Toronto.

The representative plaintiffs sought court approval for the settlement agreement, appointment of a claims administrator, approval of the distribution program, and approval of counsel fees and disbursements.

The court granted the orders sought, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, despite the comparatively minor loss of balcony use compared to similar cases.

The court considered the risks of litigation, including novel claims for loss of use and enjoyment, and the challenges in establishing liability and aggregate damages.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action sought a mid-certification motion adjournment to introduce new expert evidence, arguing a gap in their existing evidence regarding the class members' stake in the litigation.

The defendants opposed, characterizing the request as a fundamental re-conceptualization of the claim.

The court granted the adjournment, finding that the proposed new evidence would indeed necessitate a significant re-do of the case, including potential amendments to pleadings and common issues, and possibly a redefinition of the class.

Due to the substantial prejudice caused to the defendants by this shift, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay costs thrown away.

The appellant, Sarfraz Malik, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied his motion to amend his statement of claim to add Family Law Act (FLA) s. 61 claims for losses arising from injuries to his children, more than four years after the accident.

The Superior Court judge had reversed a Master's decision, finding that s. 61 FLA claims constitute a distinct statutory cause of action, subject to the Limitations Act, and not merely a claim for additional damages within an existing negligence action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a s. 61 FLA claim is a separate statutory cause of action that was statute-barred in this case, thereby dismissing the appeal.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an urgent injunction to halt renovations by the respondent unit owners, citing concerns about the proper conduct of renovations and the presence of third-party tradespeople during the global COVID-19 pandemic, particularly given the building's senior resident population.

The court scheduled an urgent telephone case conference for the same day to discuss the injunction's scheduling and consider temporary orders pending the motion hearing.

Bell Canada brought an application seeking declarations, an injunction, and a mandatory order against Cloudwifi Inc. and Gary Kenning for allegedly wrongful access and use of Bell's telecommunications equipment and breach of a prior settlement agreement.

Cloudwifi responded with a motion to dismiss or stay Bell's application, asserting the CRTC's exclusive jurisdiction, and a cross-application seeking declarations and damages against Bell.

The court dismissed Cloudwifi's motion to stay as moot due to a prior CRTC decision.

It found that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the regulatory aspects of equipment access, but the court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged breach of the settlement agreement.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Bell's application, finding no breach of the settlement agreement and declining to issue declarations on regulatory matters.

Cloudwifi's cross-application was also dismissed, as it was conditional on the motion's outcome and involved claims better suited for an action.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing personal and corporate guarantees of a loan agreement.

The loan agreement specified interest rates of 2.5% per 30 days pre-maturity and an additional 0.416% per 30 days post-maturity, but lacked an express statement of the yearly equivalent rate.

The appellants argued the Interest Act limited recoverable interest to 5% per annum.

The motion judge found the appellants were bound by a forbearance agreement and a subsequent court-ordered agreement in which the borrower waived any Interest Act defences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, finding the appellants, as directing minds of the borrower, were bound by the borrower's waiver of Interest Act arguments.

The defendants brought a motion to stay an action for payment on written guarantees, arguing that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter or, alternatively, that Alberta was the more appropriate forum (forum non conveniens).

The guarantees contained a choice of law and forum selection clause designating Ontario.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction based on the contracts being made in Ontario (acceptance by email) and that the defendants, as sophisticated business parties, failed to demonstrate "strong cause" to override the forum selection clause.

The court rejected arguments of uneven bargaining power and public policy concerns, distinguishing consumer protection cases.

Centoco Holdings Limited and KS Centoco Ltd. ("Centoco") brought two motions.

The first sought to compel Magna International Inc. ("Magna") to produce its CEO, Donald Walker, for examination for discovery in a winding-up action, arguing he was instrumental in a key business decision.

The second motion sought to compel Magna to answer refused questions and produce documents related to its airbag business and "Directed Source Mark-Ups" in the main action, and questions regarding additional documents produced post-discovery.

The court granted both motions, finding Centoco had a prima facie right to examine Walker and that the requested information on the airbag business and additional documents was relevant.

The court directed counsel to narrow the scope of document production to avoid trial adjournment and adjourned the request for a further affidavit of documents.

The applicant, The Scoular Company, sought to enforce Letters Rogatory from a U.S. District Court against the respondents, who were former employees and associated entities of a third party in the U.S. litigation.

The primary issues were whether the respondents' costs for complying with the discovery requests should be capped at $20,000 and whether they should receive costs for responding to the enforcement application.

The court found that the respondents were not "strangers to the litigation" due to their indemnification agreements with a party in the foreign action and their cooperation.

Consequently, the court imposed a $20,000 cap on the costs for complying with the Letters Rogatory and denied the respondents their costs for the enforcement application, as the applicant was wholly successful.