Raajan Aery

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following the dismissal of a motion for intervention by Gregory John Monforton, the former lawyer for the plaintiffs, in a complex civil action.

The court reviews the governing legal principles for costs in Ontario, including the discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies them to the facts.

The court finds that the three sets of responding parties—CP Rail, Andrew Williams, and the Corporation of the Town of Lakeshore—are each entitled to their own costs, rejects the argument that only one set of costs should be awarded, and reduces the amount claimed by CP Rail for preparation of its factum as excessive.

The court fixes costs in the amounts of $40,553.48 to CP Rail, $16,276.61 to Andrew Williams, and $20,110.95 to Lakeshore, all payable by the proposed intervenor.

A proposed intervenor, a former lawyer for the plaintiffs, sought leave to intervene in a motion concerning the interpretation of a settlement agreement.

The intervenor argued he might be adversely affected by the outcome due to a potential professional negligence claim.

The court found that while the intervenor met the "adversely affected" criterion under Rule 13.01(1)(b), his intervention was not warranted.

The court determined that the proposed evidence was subject to solicitor-client and settlement privilege, which had not been waived, thus preventing a useful contribution.

Furthermore, the intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice to the existing parties, particularly the minor plaintiffs, in a private dispute.

The motion for intervention was dismissed.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.