Anne Davenport

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following the dismissal of a motion for intervention by Gregory John Monforton, the former lawyer for the plaintiffs, in a complex civil action.

The court reviews the governing legal principles for costs in Ontario, including the discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies them to the facts.

The court finds that the three sets of responding parties—CP Rail, Andrew Williams, and the Corporation of the Town of Lakeshore—are each entitled to their own costs, rejects the argument that only one set of costs should be awarded, and reduces the amount claimed by CP Rail for preparation of its factum as excessive.

The court fixes costs in the amounts of $40,553.48 to CP Rail, $16,276.61 to Andrew Williams, and $20,110.95 to Lakeshore, all payable by the proposed intervenor.

The defendants moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to attend a psychological assessment and for leave to serve the resulting report after the expert report deadline, in the context of a personal injury action arising from a 2017 motor vehicle collision.

The court granted the motion, finding that both parties bore responsibility for the lack of an expert report schedule and that fairness required the defendants be permitted to respond to the plaintiff’s psychological claims.

The court also granted leave for late service of the report, provided it was served by April 4, 2025, and encouraged the parties to resolve costs.

A proposed intervenor, a former lawyer for the plaintiffs, sought leave to intervene in a motion concerning the interpretation of a settlement agreement.

The intervenor argued he might be adversely affected by the outcome due to a potential professional negligence claim.

The court found that while the intervenor met the "adversely affected" criterion under Rule 13.01(1)(b), his intervention was not warranted.

The court determined that the proposed evidence was subject to solicitor-client and settlement privilege, which had not been waived, thus preventing a useful contribution.

Furthermore, the intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice to the existing parties, particularly the minor plaintiffs, in a private dispute.

The motion for intervention was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add 17 individual employees of a long-term care home as defendants in a personal injury action.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike the pleadings against the individual employees, arguing the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against them personally.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to add the defendants, finding no non-compensable prejudice or abuse of process.

However, the court also granted the defendants' cross-motion to strike the pleadings against the individual employees because the statement of claim lumped them together without specifying the material facts of each individual's alleged negligence.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend the pleadings to cure the deficiencies.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs argued that the anticipated expert evidence was too complex for a jury and that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause undue delay.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, adopting a 'wait and see' approach, noting that the trial was not scheduled until September 2021 and the trial judge retains discretion to strike the jury if necessary.

The court considered costs following a jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages and prejudgment interest.

The defendants argued they were the successful parties and sought costs under Rule 49.10, claiming their offer to settle (inclusive of an OHIP subrogated claim) was more favourable than the judgment.

The court found the defendants' offer uncertain regarding the OHIP claim, thus not triggering Rule 49.10.

While the plaintiff was the successful party in proving negligence and damages, there was divided success as the defendants prevailed on a major causation issue.

Considering the plaintiff's unreasonable settlement expectations and the divided success, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

Following a three-week jury trial in a personal injury action, the plaintiff was awarded $241,740 in damages.

Prior to trial, the defendants had served an offer to settle for $375,000 plus costs.

Because the jury award was less favourable than the defendants' offer, the defendants sought costs from the date of the offer pursuant to Rule 49.10.

The plaintiff argued that her impecuniosity should relieve her from paying the defendants' costs, as it would effectively offset her damages award.

The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to deviate from the normal costs rules.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer, and the defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs thereafter.

This personal injury action involved a motion by the plaintiffs to appoint a litigation guardian for Elisabeth Reddecopp, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident and found to lack capacity to instruct counsel.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking a further capacity assessment, cross-examination of the initial assessor, and other relief.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, appointing Elisabeth's father, Heinrich, as litigation guardian, finding him presumptively appropriate and without an adverse interest that would preclude his appointment.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act and the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 to order a further capacity assessment, and that there was no basis to compel cross-examination of the initial assessor or order a second assessment given its comprehensiveness and lack of bias.