Victoria Li Wan Yang

The defendants brought a motion to stay the Ontario class action as an abuse of process due to overlapping class proceedings in British Columbia and Québec.

The plaintiffs sought certification of the Ontario action.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, finding that the Ontario action was not a carbon copy of the others and offered a broader class definition and potential remedies, thus not offending principles of comity or amounting to an abuse of process.

The court also found that a class proceeding in Ontario was the preferable procedure for resolving the common issues, despite the parallel proceedings, and certified the action.

The plaintiffs' request to amend their claim to add a new statutory cause of action under New Brunswick legislation was denied.

During a class action trial involving cosmetic surgery patients and allegations related to social media consent forms, the defendants called a witness and sought to qualify him as an expert in eDiscovery document collection and retention.

The plaintiffs objected on the basis that the witness lacked independence and impartiality, having blindly followed counsel's instructions and failed to ensure compliance with PHIPA.

The court ruled that the proposed evidence was factual in nature rather than expert opinion, as the witness was simply explaining the steps he took and the data he extracted from electronic medical records.

Since the evidence was factual and not presumptively inadmissible opinion evidence, the court did not need to address the impartiality objections, but noted that cross-examination on those issues could be relevant to the weight of the evidence.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following the dismissal of a motion for intervention by Gregory John Monforton, the former lawyer for the plaintiffs, in a complex civil action.

The court reviews the governing legal principles for costs in Ontario, including the discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies them to the facts.

The court finds that the three sets of responding parties—CP Rail, Andrew Williams, and the Corporation of the Town of Lakeshore—are each entitled to their own costs, rejects the argument that only one set of costs should be awarded, and reduces the amount claimed by CP Rail for preparation of its factum as excessive.

The court fixes costs in the amounts of $40,553.48 to CP Rail, $16,276.61 to Andrew Williams, and $20,110.95 to Lakeshore, all payable by the proposed intervenor.

This is a costs endorsement following a 12-day jury trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

The Plaintiff, Kyriaki Moustakis, was awarded $55,252.61 in net damages and sought substantial indemnity costs, having beaten her Rule 49 offer to settle.

The Defendant, Reynaldo Agbuya, opposed the quantum of costs and sought costs thrown away due to a late amendment by the Plaintiff.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $378,000 in costs (partial indemnity to the offer date, substantial thereafter) and $3,252.79 in prejudgment interest.

The Defendant was awarded $10,000 in full indemnity costs for the costs thrown away.

The court found the Plaintiff's choice of ordinary procedure reasonable, rejected arguments of "trial by ambush" and ATE insurance influence, and disallowed costs for focus groups.

The defendant was charged with careless driving causing death and bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act following a collision with a semi-trailer.

The court heard both the trial on the merits and a Charter s. 11(b) delay motion.

The court found the defendant not guilty of careless driving, concluding that the collision was due to an unexpected and insufficiently warned-of hazard (a dark, slow-moving semi-trailer blocking the lane at night with inadequate reflective markings and no hazard lights), rather than the defendant's lack of due care.

Although the court found a Charter s. 11(b) breach due to prosecutorial delay, the motion was dismissed as moot given the acquittal.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

Liability was admitted, and a jury awarded damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, and future income loss.

The court then heard the defendant's threshold motion, which argued the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary loss.

The court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important mental or psychological function, thus allowing her claim for non-pecuniary damages to proceed.

The defendants in a proposed national class action regarding baby powder and ovarian cancer requested that their motion to dismiss or stay the action for delay or abuse of process be heard before the plaintiffs' certification motion.

The defendants argued that the Ontario action was duplicative of parallel class actions in other provinces and had languished for over five years.

The court applied the Cannon factors and determined that the stay/dismissal motion should be heard simultaneously with the certification motion, as doing so would promote judicial economy and allow the court to better assess the preferable procedure and multi-jurisdictional issues.

The Monitor sought court advice and directions regarding a proposed extension of an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) closing date and alleged material breaches of confidentiality obligations by the purchaser, Lagasco Inc., in a Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

The court authorized the Monitor to agree to a final three-week extension of the APA, noting the purchaser's good faith in dealing with unexpected financing issues, but expressed serious concerns about the confidentiality breaches.

The court directed the Monitor to ensure the extension was without prejudice to rights arising from these breaches and to prepare for a potential resumption of the sales process if the APA failed to close.

The applicant health unit sought to relocate its headquarters by entering into a new lease.

The respondent County, which was the applicant's current landlord and an unsuccessful bidder for the new location, refused to consent to the lease under s. 52(3) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act.

The court determined that a lease constitutes 'holding real property' under the Act, thus requiring municipal consent.

However, the court set aside the County's refusal, finding it was made in bad faith and with a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the County's direct financial interest in keeping the applicant as a tenant.