Johanne N. Morissette

The applicant health unit sought to relocate its headquarters by entering into a new lease.

The respondent County, which was the applicant's current landlord and an unsuccessful bidder for the new location, refused to consent to the lease under s. 52(3) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act.

The court determined that a lease constitutes 'holding real property' under the Act, thus requiring municipal consent.

However, the court set aside the County's refusal, finding it was made in bad faith and with a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the County's direct financial interest in keeping the applicant as a tenant.

The applicant sought a determination of the respondent's income for child support and section 7 expenses.

The respondent, a sole shareholder of two corporations, claimed an income of $34,000 while declaring expenses of $86,000.

The court found the respondent's financial disclosure unreliable and that he was underreporting his income by charging personal expenses to his corporations.

Relying on sections 19, 22, and 23 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court imputed the respondent's annual income at $86,000.

The respondent was ordered to pay ongoing child support based on the imputed income and $5,641 in net arrears for child support, section 7 expenses, and erroneously claimed child tax benefits.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages for breach of a verbal contract regarding the extraction of aggregate from their gravel pit.

The defendants argued the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and the doctrine of laches, asserting a 30-day payment term triggered the limitation period years prior.

The court rejected this defence, finding the agreement was for payment 'when paid,' creating a running balance.

The court granted judgment for the unpaid extractions against the corporate defendant but refused to pierce the corporate veil to hold the individual director personally liable.

A small set-off was granted for the defendants' counterclaim.

The accused was scheduled for a Charter application regarding voluntariness, but the provided Laotian interpreter was not accredited.

Noting the fundamental rights conferred by section 14 of the Charter and the pressures of trial delays, the court adjourned the application to the start of the trial and directed the administration of justice to ensure a properly accredited interpreter is made available.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court medical negligence action.

He argued that the deputy judge erred by presiding over a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02 after having presided over a settlement conference in the same matter, relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Hussain regarding summary judgment motions.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that a Rule 12.02 motion is not analogous to a summary judgment motion and that the Small Claims Court Rules grant broad powers to dismiss unmeritorious claims, particularly where the appellant failed to provide required expert reports.

The applicant, charged with production of marijuana and possession of oxycodone, brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 9 challenging the validity of a search warrant and his subsequent arrest.

The search warrant was based on a detailed tip from a named informant who had dated the applicant.

The applicant argued the police failed to sufficiently corroborate the tip before obtaining the warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding the detailed, first-hand information provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant without the need for further surveillance, and that the arrest was lawful.

The plaintiffs moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to enforce a prior trial judgment's prohibition against the defendants debiting defence costs from participating accounts.

The defendants had allocated 50% of legal costs to these accounts prior to the judgment without seeking leave.

The court found that the prohibition order, which enjoined the defendants from debiting "any costs or expenses incurred... in the defence of these actions" applied retrospectively to all costs, whenever incurred, and was not merely prospective.

The court rejected the defendants' functus officio argument, affirming its jurisdiction under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to carry its orders into operation.

The defendants were ordered to move for leave to charge the previously allocated legal costs.

The appellants, Family and Children’s Services Niagara and Heidi Payne, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claims.

The original motion argued no reasonable cause of action and no duty of care owed by FACS to the parents.

The court dismissed the leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which appropriately distinguished the facts from precedents where parents were under investigation or children were in care.

The court emphasized the high threshold for granting leave to appeal and the caution required in striking claims.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and misapplied W(D) principles, leading to an unreasonable verdict, particularly regarding the officer's lack of specific notes on the refusal.

The Crown contended the trial judge properly assessed credibility and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellate court found the trial judge's assessment of credibility reasonable, noting that the officer was extensively cross-examined.

The court affirmed that the mens rea for the offence is knowledge or awareness of the prohibited act, and the verdict was reasonable given the appellant's failure to produce a sample after four attempts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a physician, sued the defendant, also a physician, for physical and sexual assault.

The defendant alleged a prior consensual sexual affair and that the plaintiff's allegations were fabricated due to hospital privilege issues.

The court found the defendant's late disclosure of the alleged affair undermined his credibility.

Based on consistent plaintiff testimony, corroborating witnesses, DNA evidence from a rug matching the defendant's DNA from a mug, and an adverse inference drawn from the defendant's refusal to provide a DNA sample, the court found the sexual assault occurred.

The court awarded $175,000 in non-pecuniary damages and $25,000 in punitive damages, finding the assault was a material contributing factor to the plaintiff's psychological injury.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in an action alleging excessive force by police officers.

The plaintiff argued that because the Woodstock Police Services Board is funded by the municipality, the action constitutes relief against a municipality, which precludes a jury trial under section 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Police Services Board maintains independence from the municipality and that an action against the Board is not equivalent to an action against the municipality.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs after successfully defending a motion brought by the respondent, who was unsuccessful in obtaining enlarged access and whose conduct caused the litigation.

The respondent, who was self-represented, requested no costs.

The court awarded the applicant $8,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding that the applicant was entitled to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and lack of credibility regarding his financial circumstances and adherence to court orders.

The applicants sought declaratory relief to deny a bonus provision to the respondent, arguing it was criminal, unconscionable, or ultra vires.

The court found a bonus was owing but accepted the applicants' expert opinion on its quantum, significantly reducing the amount claimed by the respondent.

Both parties sought costs.

The court considered contractual full indemnity costs versus partial indemnity, noting the divided success and the absence of settlement offers.

Ultimately, the court ordered no costs, with each party bearing their own, and denied interest on the judgment.

The plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer that metastasized to her bones.

She brought a medical malpractice action against her radiologist and general surgeon, alleging their negligence caused a nine-month delay in diagnosis.

The court found both doctors breached their respective standards of care: the radiologist failed to order further imaging for suspicious microcalcifications, and the surgeon failed to properly investigate discordant biopsy results or follow up on the original lump.

The court concluded that but for the delay, the plaintiff's cancer would have been diagnosed at Stage I and cured.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for pain and suffering, income loss, and Family Law Act claims.

This endorsement addresses the approval of class counsel fees, plaintiffs' costs, defendants' costs, and the Law Foundation of Ontario's levy following a decade-long class action concerning the legality of Par account transactions (PATs) by London Life and Great-West Life.

The court approved class counsel fees of $16.4 million, found the plaintiffs entitled to $4 million in partial indemnity costs from the defendants, and denied the defendants' claim for costs.

It also determined that the Law Foundation of Ontario was entitled to a levy of $1,520,346.50 (repayment of disbursements) plus 10% of the net monetary award ($4,030,000), totaling $5,550,346.50, to be paid from the participating accounts.

The court clarified that a "monetary award" for the purposes of the Class Proceedings Act and the Law Society Act includes funds paid to the benefit of class members through participating accounts, even if not directly distributed to individuals.

The applicants sought a declaratory order that a bonus payment clause in a 2011 loan agreement with the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) was unenforceable, arguing it contravened section 347 of the Criminal Code, was unconscionable, or was ultra vires to BDC's statutory objects.

The court dismissed all these arguments, finding the interest rate was not criminal, the transaction was not unconscionable given the applicants' sophistication, and the bonus provision was within BDC's powers.

However, the court ruled on the calculation of "net proceeds" for the bonus, allowing deductions for certified indebtedness, income taxes, and accounting fees, significantly reducing the bonus amount payable to the respondent.

The appellant contractor appealed an arbitrator's decision which found that its letters to the respondent subcontractor did not constitute a 'claim made in writing' under their construction contract.

The arbitrator had distinguished between provisions requiring 'written notice of a claim' and 'claims made in writing', declining to apply established jurisprudence.

The Superior Court of Justice found this distinction to be an error of law.

Applying the established test, the court held that the appellant's correspondence did constitute an unsettled claim made in writing, thereby preserving its right of set-off.

The arbitrator's decision was set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

This protracted litigation involved a family dispute over a commercial property, with plaintiffs (minority shareholders and creditors) alleging oppression and conspiracy against defendants (majority shareholders, directors, and related entities).

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants engaged in self-dealing and unlawful acts to deprive them of their beneficial ownership and profits.

The court dismissed both the oppression and conspiracy claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their reasonable expectations were violated or that an unlawful conspiracy occurred.

The court noted the plaintiffs' own conduct demonstrated a lack of regard for the corporation's welfare and a failure to protect their interests.

A counterclaim by one of the defendants was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions entered after a single trial on Criminal Code charges and Highway Traffic Act charges arising from the same incident, arguing that simultaneous proceedings on separate criminal and provincial informations were impermissible and rendered the trial a nullity.

The court held that the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction to hear both matters together where the fact nexus was the same, the joint proceeding served the interests of justice, and no prejudice was shown from procedural differences between the regimes.

On sentence, the court granted leave to appeal and held that the sentencing judge failed to give effect to a factual finding that the dangerous driving was triggered by panic.

The suspended sentence for dangerous driving was set aside and replaced with a discharge.

The defendant employer moved for summary judgment seeking to strike portions of the reply, bar amendment of the statement of claim, and dismiss the action on the basis that the reply advanced a new wrongful dismissal cause of action outside the limitation period.

The court applied the broader, factually-oriented and purposive approach to whether a pleading asserts a new cause of action, focusing on whether the original statement of claim gave notice of the factual matrix.

The court held that the claim for loss of disability benefits arising from termination was already grounded in the pleaded employment relationship, termination, disability, and alleged breach of the employment contract.

The reply merely answered the defence allegation of termination for misconduct and did not take the employer by surprise.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed.