Jeremy Keith Carnegie

The court sentenced Clay Kuzio for dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death, following a fatal high-speed collision.

The court reviewed the tragic circumstances, the impact on the victim’s family, the offender’s background, and the relevant sentencing principles.

After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a 42-month custodial sentence and a driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the need for a proportionate, individualized sentence.

Jamie Gibson applied to strike his guilty plea to one count of possessing child pornography, arguing it was not informed or voluntary, made on the spur of the moment, and under pressure from former counsel.

The court found his evidence inconsistent and untruthful regarding the voluntariness and timing of the plea.

The court accepted the evidence of his former counsel, Ms. Bracken, and found that the plea was valid, voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, meeting the requirements of section 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

The application to strike the guilty plea was dismissed.

The defendant, Ayanle Aden, was charged with multiple firearm and breach of recognizance offences following a shooting incident in London, Ontario.

The central issue was the identity of the shooter, as eyewitness accounts were inconsistent and unreliable.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's discarded cell phone (registered to him), a backpack matching one he was seen with previously, and a hoodie found near the scene containing his DNA and gunshot residue.

The court found that the totality of circumstantial evidence established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence of self-defence was also considered for the charge of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger lives but was rejected due to an insufficient evidentiary basis to assess the reasonableness and proportionality of the defendant's actions.

Aden was found guilty on most counts.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to obstruct justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

After his common-law spouse discovered embarrassing videos on an external hard drive and threatened to report alleged child pornography to police, the accused removed his laptop from their shared residence and reformatted it, deleting all prior data.

The Crown alleged this constituted an attempt to obstruct justice.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused wilfully intended to obstruct the course of justice, as there were plausible alternative inferences supported by the evidence, including that the accused reformatted the laptop to avoid further embarrassment and conflict rather than to obstruct a police investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with second-degree murder of Dakoda Martin and aggravated assault of Andre Williams.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for aggravated assault and manslaughter but argued there was no evidence of subjective foresight of death required for second-degree murder.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including the location and nature of the fatal chest wound, the depth of penetration, and evidence of a deliberate stabbing to a vulnerable area while the victim lay on the ground, could reasonably support an inference that the accused knew the bodily harm would likely cause death.

The accused was committed to stand trial on second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

Two defendants appealed convictions for driving while under suspension.

Both claimed they did not receive notice of suspension from the Ministry of Transportation.

The trial justices of the peace convicted both defendants despite not rejecting their testimony that they did not receive notice.

The appellate court held that where a defendant testifies credibly that they did not know of the suspension and did not receive notice, it will seldom be the case that they fail to meet the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities unless the justice of the peace rejects their evidence or provides cogent reasons for doing so.

The court emphasized that administrative efficiency cannot override the protection of the morally innocent from conviction.

This corrigendum amends a prior ruling dated February 13, 2017, in a criminal proceeding.

It specifically corrects paragraph 23, which detailed trial scheduling and counsel availability for a s. 11(b) Charter application, and paragraph 71 ix., which addressed the calculation of institutional delay attributable to the preliminary hearing judge's reserved decision.

The applicants, Stephen Jurkus and Leslie Lonsbary, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in bringing their criminal matter to trial.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court calculated the total delay at 1,178 days (39.3 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances or case complexity.

The court also found the delay unreasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering factors such as prolonged disclosure, institutional delays, the Crown's joint prosecution decision, and significant prejudice to the accused.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The appellant, Ahmed Saghier, appealed his convictions and sentence on four counts of assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, the timing of reporting, the admission of hospital records, and the sufficiency of reasons.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider a conditional sentence.

The Superior Court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her decision to admit hospital records.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that her sentencing discretion was properly exercised, as the imposed sentence was within the acceptable range for domestic violence cases involving multiple injuries.

The defendant, M.P., was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse, while the defendant claimed consent.

The court considered the conflicting testimonies of the complainant, Ms. H., and the defendant, M.P., as well as a third witness, Ms. D.S. The judge noted numerous significant inconsistencies in the Crown witnesses' accounts across multiple interviews and hearings, and found the defendant's testimony problematic due to admitted lies and internal inconsistencies.

Ultimately, the court found that the totality of the conflicting evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with eight counts arising from an incident involving his ex-partner: assault, forcible entry, uttering threats of death, possession of a weapon, mischief, criminal harassment, and two breaches of recognizance.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of the complainant.

The central issue was whether the Crown had established the identity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge found that identity was proven through the complainant's repeated references to the accused by name, corroborated by the existence of a bail order acknowledging the accused's relationship to the complainant and the residence in question.

The judge acquitted on counts three (death threat), six (criminal harassment), and seven (residence breach) due to insufficient evidence, but convicted on counts one (assault), two (forcible entry), four (weapon possession), five (mischief), and eight (curfew breach).

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

While employed as a Service Canada Benefits Officer with access to the Service Canada computer system, the accused fraudulently created employment insurance claims for himself and 13 other individuals over a 20-month period, resulting in total losses of $306,221 to the Government of Canada and $7,903.33 to CIBC.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 months in federal penitentiary, along with restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture for the full amount of losses, with default imprisonment terms specified.