Alissa K. Mitchell

The applicant sought an order for the partition and sale of the former matrimonial home, which the parties owned as joint tenants.

The respondent, who continued to reside in the property, failed to attend the hearing or provide evidence despite receiving notice.

The court found the applicant had a prima facie right to a sale under the Partition Act and that no exceptional circumstances existed to refuse the order.

The application was granted, the cross-application was dismissed, and the property was ordered to be sold.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) at the upcoming sexual assault trial.

The complainant suffers from severe depression and PTSD, and testified that facing the accused in court would cause extreme anxiety and impair the ability to testify coherently.

The court found that the Crown met the threshold, as permitting the use of CCTV would facilitate a full and candid account of the events and serve the proper administration of justice.

The application was granted.

Terry Roberts brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Michael Cowie's motion and application for directions regarding a will challenge, arguing they were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that a will challenge is not a 'claim' for the purposes of the Act, as probate proceedings are in rem and do not seek to remedy an injury, loss, or damage caused by an act or omission.

The court also found that a notice of objection and a motion for directions are not 'proceedings' under the Act.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial decision awarding the respondent $15,270 in Charter damages for breaches of his s. 10(b) rights during a police detention.

The respondent had previously been granted a stay of criminal proceedings for the same breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the Ward test for Charter damages.

The Court held that the stay of proceedings adequately served the functions of vindication and deterrence, and that an award of damages was not an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances.

The Crown brought a voir dire application to admit a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, argued the statement was involuntary due to an atmosphere of oppression and lack of an operating mind, and sought its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights because police delayed charging him with unrelated undercover offences to protect an ongoing investigation.

The Superior Court of Justice found the statement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the accused understood his rights and jeopardy.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breach as the police acted in good faith under a judicially authorized investigative plan, and held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The applicants sought to exclude firearms and drug-related evidence, arguing that initial warrantless searches of their residence and subsequent searches conducted under warrants violated their section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the broad "clearing search" of the entire residence, and a second search of a bedroom for firearms, were unreasonable.

It also determined that the subsequently issued search warrants were invalid because they relied on unlawfully obtained information and failed to meet *Lavallee* guidelines for law office searches.

Consequently, the court granted the applications, excluding all challenged evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the Charter breaches and their significant impact on the applicants' privacy interests, which outweighed the public interest in adjudication on the merits.

This ruling addresses a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose, argued that the total delay of 33 months and 16 days exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct and exceptional circumstances.

The court analyzed the procedural chronology, attributing 120 days of delay to the defence, primarily due to counsel's availability for the preliminary inquiry and a delay in responding to a pretrial invitation.

With this defence delay deducted, the net delay fell to 29 months and 2 days, below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the onus shifted to the applicant to prove the delay was unreasonable, which they did not attempt.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendants brought an ex parte request under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff failed to respond to two notices from the Registrar regarding the court's consideration of dismissal.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim, issued April 26, 2024, arose on March 15, 2020, when the defendants defaulted on lease payments.

As such, the claim was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, and was therefore dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants requested the court to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01(1), arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, statute-barred, and improperly commenced in the Superior Court.

The court, acting on this ex parte request, issued a notice to the plaintiff.

As the plaintiff failed to file submissions, the court directed a fresh notice be issued and stayed the action pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, pending the outcome of the Rule 2.1 hearing.

The Trustee in bankruptcy sought to set aside alleged transfers at undervalue made by the bankrupt to his estranged spouse and two sons in the two years prior to bankruptcy.

The court found the payments made in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy to be transfers at undervalue, as the respondents failed to provide compelling corroborating evidence for an alleged oral separation agreement.

However, the court found the bankrupt was not insolvent at the time of the payments made in the second year prior to bankruptcy, thus those transfers were not set aside.

The applicant, Tiffani Martin, sought to exclude evidence (fentanyl, cocaine, and hashish) seized from her purse, arguing violations of her ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary prolonged investigative detention, arbitrary arrest for possession of a restricted weapon without reasonable and probable grounds, delayed notification and facilitation of the right to counsel, and an unlawful search of her purse (not incidental to arrest nor a lawful inventory search).

Applying the R. v. Grant factors for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the police misconduct outweighed society's interest in admitting the reliable evidence.

Consequently, the drug evidence was excluded, which is anticipated to lead to the applicant's acquittal on the drug trafficking charges.

The defendant, Evan Beedawia, was sentenced after being found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The court considered statutory aggravating factors, including the death of one person and serious injury to another, the offender being remunerated, and operating a large commercial vehicle.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal or driving record, youthfulness, strong family support, and genuine remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence but found that a penitentiary term was not required due to the lower moral blameworthiness of the conduct, which was characterized by acts of omission and negligence rather than intentional acts.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day was imposed, followed by three years of probation, along with a seven-year driving prohibition and other ancillary orders.

The defendant, a commercial truck driver, was found guilty of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and bodily harm after failing to stop at a controlled intersection, resulting in the death of a 4-year-old child and serious injury to her mother.

The court found that the defendant's decision to maintain a high speed despite darkness, fog, fatigue, and distraction, and his failure to brake, constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent commercial driver.

The tenants brought a motion to quash the landlord's appeal of an interim order by the Landlord and Tenant Board that required the landlord to return possession of their residential units following an illegal lockout.

The landlord had refused the tenants access to their units after a minor fire, despite a city order permitting access.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the Board's order was interlocutory and therefore not subject to appeal.

The court also held that the landlord's appeal was an abuse of process intended to delay proceedings and subvert the tenants' presumptive right to occupy their homes.

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a left-turning pickup truck while crossing an intersection at night.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury.

The plaintiff sued the driver, the municipality, and the municipality's electrical contractor, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair due to missing streetlights on the median.

The court found the driver 100% liable for failing to ensure the turn could be made safely.

The claims against the municipality and contractor were dismissed, as the intersection had sufficient illumination from other sources and was deemed in a state of repair under the Minimum Maintenance Standards.

Damages of approximately $2 million were awarded against the driver.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) that required the defendants to sever and reconvey a 7-acre parcel of a 56-acre property back to the plaintiff for nominal consideration.

The defendants argued that the terms were ambiguous and subject to ongoing negotiations.

The court found the APS terms clear and unambiguous, applied the parol evidence rule to exclude the defendants' evidence of subjective intentions, and granted summary judgment for specific performance, noting the unique nature of the property.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured shoulder after slipping on broken glass near a donation bin located on municipal property.

The bin was owned by the defendant, who had placed it there without the city's permission.

The defendant was noted in default.

The court found that the defendant exercised sufficient control over the bin and surrounding area to be considered an 'occupier' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court awarded the plaintiff general damages, past and future income loss, and special damages, but dismissed her son's Family Law Act claim due to a lack of admissible evidence.

The defendant, Bayer Inc., brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim in a product liability action concerning an allegedly defective contraceptive device.

The court found that the claim consisted of bare allegations and conclusory statements without pleading the necessary material facts to support a cause of action in negligence.

The motion was granted, and the statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend, as the court was not persuaded that the foundational deficiencies could be cured.

The applicants, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of several search warrants and production orders that stemmed from a homicide investigation.

At a preliminary stage, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiants and investigating officers, arguing that the police intentionally misled the authorizing justice by elevating one applicant to a 'suspect' without new evidence to secure a wiretap authorization.

The court granted leave to cross-examine three officers regarding the change in the applicant's suspect status, finding it could assist in determining whether police conduct subverted the preauthorization process, but denied leave to cross-examine a fourth officer whose warrants were subject only to a facial validity review.

The plaintiff brought an action for professional negligence against her former lawyers regarding their handling of a civil action.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment and to strike the claim as an abuse of process.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions due to credibility issues and the need for expert evidence.

The court also dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the action was not a collateral attack on the assessment officer's costs decision, nor did the plaintiff's abandoned appeal of the underlying judgment preclude her from bringing a civil action for solicitor negligence.