Geoff Snow

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) at the upcoming sexual assault trial.

The complainant suffers from severe depression and PTSD, and testified that facing the accused in court would cause extreme anxiety and impair the ability to testify coherently.

The court found that the Crown met the threshold, as permitting the use of CCTV would facilitate a full and candid account of the events and serve the proper administration of justice.

The application was granted.

The court considered pre-trial applications by Althea Christopher and Tianna Smith to exclude evidence in a prosecution for unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm while occupying a motor vehicle.

The applications were based on alleged breaches of Charter rights, including unreasonable search and seizure, and failures to comply with statutory reporting requirements.

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle's interior, which led to the discovery of a spent bullet casing, violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the Crown subsequently withdrew the charges, ending the proceeding.

The Crown sought to admit the defendant's video and audio-recorded statement as voluntary.

The defendant brought a cross-application alleging a breach of his s. 10(a) Charter rights, seeking exclusion of the statement.

The court found the statement voluntary but concluded that the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were infringed because he was not given a full opportunity to engage with counsel after it became apparent he was confused about the extent of his jeopardy.

Applying the Grant factors, the court excluded the statement, finding the breach significant and not critical to the Crown's case.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application seeking a declaration that text messages between himself and the complainant were not 'records' under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The messages primarily involved the complainant asking the accused for money to purchase a property and expressing frustration.

Applying the framework from R. v. J.J., the court found that the messages did not contain highly sensitive personal information going to the complainant's biographical core.

The application was granted, and the court declared the text messages were not records.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code seeking an order to allow the complainant to testify at trial by closed-circuit television (CCTV).

The accused opposed the application.

The court considered the factors under s. 486.2(3) and found that the complainant, a mature and articulate adult without disabilities, was capable of providing a full and candid account of the allegations in open court.

The court noted that the complainant had previously participated in family court proceedings with the accused in the same courtroom without incident.

The application was dismissed, with the court noting that pauses or breaks would be available to the complainant if needed during her testimony.

The applicants, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of several search warrants and production orders that stemmed from a homicide investigation.

At a preliminary stage, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiants and investigating officers, arguing that the police intentionally misled the authorizing justice by elevating one applicant to a 'suspect' without new evidence to secure a wiretap authorization.

The court granted leave to cross-examine three officers regarding the change in the applicant's suspect status, finding it could assist in determining whether police conduct subverted the preauthorization process, but denied leave to cross-examine a fourth officer whose warrants were subject only to a facial validity review.

The accused, A.A., brought an application for a stay of criminal charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time, citing the R. v. Jordan framework.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial end was 28.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court analyzed periods of delay attributable to the defence's inefficiency and indifference (12.5 months) and recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance not attributable to the Crown.

Deducting defence delay, the net delay was 16.3 months, which, even with a margin of error, was deemed permissible considering the pandemic's impact.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicants, charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The anticipated trial date was 45 months after the charges were laid, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including communal delay for counsel unavailability, and exceptional circumstances delay arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, an unavailable witness, and the assigned judge's illness.

After deductions, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Jeremiah Andre Reed, was charged with attempted murder (stabbing Grant Douglas) and breach of a probation order (possessing a weapon).

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony, which the court found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies and a criminal record, due to strong corroborating evidence and the complainant's direct involvement in the events.

The court found the identification of the accused to be highly reliable given the complainant's prior acquaintance with him and the circumstances of the attack and subsequent pursuit.

Direct evidence of the accused's intent to kill was found in his own words.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, charged with child pornography and luring offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing a 24.6-month delay to trial.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the vast majority of the delay was caused by the Crown's lack of diligence in providing critical disclosure, not the pandemic.

As the net delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling and no exceptional circumstances mitigated the Crown's disclosure failures, the court found the delay unreasonable and stayed the charges.

The applicant, charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was calculated at 48 months.

The court deducted 19 months and 21 days of defence delay, primarily attributed to a late adjournment caused by defence counsel's failure to notice a potential s. 276 issue in the disclosure.

The resulting net delay of 28 months and 9 days fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional event that justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with break and enter, assault, arson, uttering threats, and damage to property following a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification of the two complainants and a corroborating witness.

The court found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to the fleeting nature of the observations, the stressful circumstances, the influence of marijuana, and the fact that the witnesses had collaborated on a collective narrative before speaking to police.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt as to identity and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The applicant, facing trial for sexual assault, brought a pre-trial motion seeking to exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection, despite their repeal by Bill C-75.

The applicant argued that a previous Superior Court decision declaring the repeal unconstitutional was binding, or alternatively, that the repeal operated prospectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding that coordinate court decisions are not binding, the previous decision was plainly wrong, and the procedural amendments operate retrospectively.

The new jury selection provisions apply to the applicant's trial.

The defendant sought a bail review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

He was charged with robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and failing to comply with release conditions.

The defendant proposed a new release plan including his mother as surety for a higher amount, residing at her home, GPS monitoring, and drug counselling.

The court found that the new evidence, including GPS monitoring, constituted a material relevant change in circumstances, triggering a review.

However, the court ultimately found that the defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, given his serious criminal record, long-standing drug addiction, past breaches, and the escalating nature of his criminal activity.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to publishing intimate images of his former partner without her consent, contrary to s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code.

He created a fake Facebook profile in her name and shared the images with her family, friends, and co-workers.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a 9-12 month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence but found that a conditional sentence would not endanger the community and would not disrupt the offender's rehabilitation.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence, followed by 3 years of probation, along with a 20-year internet restriction order.

Johan Thiessen was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, noting the serious nature and high value of the drugs involved.

Despite the accused's lack of criminal record and strong community support, his role as a facilitator by allowing his home to be used as a "stash house" demonstrated reckless disregard.

Balancing these factors against the 6-year sentences received by the main orchestrators of the trafficking scheme, the court imposed a sentence of 4.5 years incarceration, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

During a criminal trial for manslaughter and aggravated assault, the Crown sought to call an expert witness in reply to the defence's expert on bloodstain analysis.

The defence opposed this, arguing it was not proper reply evidence and would cause trial unfairness if allowed as part of the Crown's case due to late disclosure.

The court ruled that the Crown could not call the expert in reply, as the evidence was foreseeable and based on existing facts.

However, the court permitted the Crown to call the expert as part of its case, provided the defence was given a brief adjournment to prepare for cross-examination and consult with their own expert, and with the option to recall previous witnesses.

The applicant was convicted of possessing methamphetamine, hydromorphone, and cannabis marijuana while an inmate at the Elgin Middlesex Detention Center.

The central issue concerned missing video surveillance recordings of common areas within the facility.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 7 rights based on an unreasonable pre-charge delay and the loss of evidence.

The court found that the applicant's section 7 Charter rights were violated due to the negligent investigative approach and failure to preserve evidence, but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a significant sentence reduction as an alternative remedy.

The accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the voluntariness of a videotaped police statement, seeking leave to cross-examine the affiant on a wiretap affidavit, and alleging that an intercepted private communication breached s. 8 of the Charter and should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court held the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the claim that the statement was induced by promises concerning the accused's brother.

Relying on appellate authority, the court refused leave to cross-examine the affiant on whether the accused was a primary or secondary known person because the distinction had no legal significance.

The court further held there was an ample basis for the authorization and no s. 8 breach, and in any event would not have excluded the evidence under the Grant framework.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.