Lisa Marie Defoe

The court considered pre-trial applications by Althea Christopher and Tianna Smith to exclude evidence in a prosecution for unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm while occupying a motor vehicle.

The applications were based on alleged breaches of Charter rights, including unreasonable search and seizure, and failures to comply with statutory reporting requirements.

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle's interior, which led to the discovery of a spent bullet casing, violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the Crown subsequently withdrew the charges, ending the proceeding.

Joseph Moss was sentenced for multiple internet child exploitation offences, including making, distributing, and possessing child pornography, and making sexually explicit material available to and luring a 12-year-old victim (R.B.) from the Philippines.

The court found Mr. Moss engaged in systematic grooming of R.B., linking financial support to sexual acts.

Despite a guilty plea, the court found no remorse and a high risk of reoffending due to his entrenched cognitive distortions.

The judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, noting the severe harm caused by such offences and the transnational nature of the exploitation.

Mr. Moss received a total sentence of 7 years imprisonment, along with a no-contact order, DNA order, lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration, and a restrictive lifetime s.161 order.

The court also clarified that child exploitation is a serious criminal offence globally, including in the Philippines, contrary to the offender's belief.

Jade Boucetta pleaded guilty to voyeurism and distributing intimate images without consent.

The victim, K.E., was intoxicated and unaware of the recording.

The video, showing sexual intercourse, was sent to a Snapchat group.

The incident had a severe and lasting impact on the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability and the devastating impact, and mitigating factors, such as the accused's guilty plea, youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and rehabilitative efforts.

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, including electronic monitoring, community service, and social media restrictions, finding it could meet the sentencing principles given the specific circumstances and absence of certain aggravating factors found in other cases.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a biology scientist from the Centre of Forensic Sciences to testify remotely by videoconference due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the Crown had not met its onus.

The court dismissed the application, finding no specific health concerns for the witness and concluding that the jury would benefit from hearing the highly technical evidence in person.

Gary Green pleaded guilty to multiple criminal offences including mischief, break and enter, theft, weapons possession, robbery, dangerous driving, flight from police, driving while disqualified, and breach of recognizance.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, alongside significant mitigating Gladue factors due to the offender's Aboriginal status and difficult upbringing.

Despite the Crown seeking 8-10 years, the court imposed a sentence of time served plus one day, effectively crediting 3.5 years for pre-sentence custody, along with a two-year probation period and ancillary orders, emphasizing rehabilitation and the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

The accused was involved in a lengthy police pursuit while driving stolen vehicles, resulting in collisions with several police cruisers.

He pled guilty to numerous offences including dangerous driving, theft, and break and enter.

For the remaining charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon against the officers, the central issue was intent.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court believed the accused's testimony that he was merely trying to escape and did not intentionally target the officers or their vehicles, resulting in acquittals on the contested charges.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, assault, and choking, sought disclosure of the complainant's counselling records beyond what was initially consented to.

The applicant argued that inadvertent prior disclosure by the Crown negated the complainant's expectation of privacy and rendered the Criminal Code's s. 278 regime inapplicable.

The court rejected this argument, affirming that an accused cannot bypass the s. 278 procedure due to Crown negligence.

The court found the applicant's request for production was based on speculation and did not meet the threshold for likely relevance or necessity for full answer and defence, as required by s. 278.3(4) and established jurisprudence.

The application was dismissed.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement arising from a prolonged and exceptionally violent intimate-partner attack in the victim’s home.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, treated the guilty plea as mitigating, and found multiple aggravating factors including extreme violence, prolonged confinement, breach of trust, and the offender’s lengthy criminal record.

Rejecting the defence submission that a three-year starting point for a major sexual assault applied, the court held that the offender’s record and poor character materially increased moral blameworthiness.

A sentence of 8 years on forcible confinement, less enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, together with concurrent terms on the other counts and ancillary orders, was imposed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, and driving over 80 causing death and bodily harm, following a fatal intersection collision.

The court found that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol and that his blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit, rejecting defence arguments regarding the maintenance and operation of the breathalyzer instrument.

However, the court acquitted the accused of the charges relating to causing death and bodily harm, finding that the collision was caused by the other driver proceeding into the intersection when it was unsafe to do so.

The accused was convicted of the lesser included offence of impaired driving, with the over 80 charge stayed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, impaired operation causing bodily harm, and related offences under the Criminal Code involving blood alcohol levels exceeding the legal limit.

The defence conceded impairment and excess blood alcohol but challenged causation, arguing the Crown failed to establish the accused's conduct was a significant contributing factor to the death and injuries.

The court applied the test for committal and the causation standard from R. v. Smithers, finding sufficient evidence that the accused's impairment was a contributing cause more than de minimis.

The court committed the accused to trial on all counts as charged, except on two counts where committal was ordered on lesser included offences.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge to the summary conviction provisions of sections 151 and 152 of the Criminal Code, arguing that mandatory minimum jail sentences of 14 days violate the right to trial by jury under section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of minors.

The court dismissed the application, holding that section 11(f) protects the right to jury trial only where the maximum punishment for an offence is imprisonment for five years or more, and that mandatory minimum sentences do not trigger this protection.