Cassandra Martins Goncalves Demelo

On a pre-trial Charter application, the moving party sought exclusion of statements and physical evidence seized from a BMW, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9 and 10(b).

The court found a psychological detention, breaches of counsel and silence rights, and an unreasonable search in the manner police compelled production of a key fob.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the moving party’s verbal and non-verbal statements, including the key-fob handover.

The court admitted the drugs, firearm, ammunition, and related physical evidence because they were independently discoverable under a valid vehicle warrant.

The application was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and extortion, raising two grounds: (1) whether the application judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay following a mistrial, and (2) whether the Crown's improper question about child pornography rendered the retrial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that mistrials do not reset the Jordan clock but must be assessed within the Jordan framework as potential discrete exceptional circumstances.

The mistrial in this case was found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from a shared misunderstanding of law regarding the materiality of dates in the indictment.

The Crown's improper question was adequately remedied by timely and forceful corrective instructions from the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a four-day trial, the offender was convicted of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The assault involved forced vaginal penetration of the complainant, a trusted friend, without consent or a condom.

At sentencing, the Crown sought four years imprisonment while the defence sought three years.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of three years and six months, reduced by pre-trial custody credits and bail condition credits to a net term of three years.

The court balanced mitigating factors including the offender's role as a father, courses completed in custody, and personal losses, against aggravating factors including the breach of friendship, exposure to disease, and the serious nature of forced penetration.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, a 10-year firearms prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a non-communication order with the complainant.

The accused, James Scott Gallan, brought an application under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of certain records (videos and text messages from the complainant's phone) in his sexual assault trial.

The Crown objected, arguing an application was necessary despite the complainant's prior consent to police obtaining the information.

The court ruled that the complainant's consent to police disclosure did not waive the need for a s. 278.93 admissibility application, rejecting the reasoning in R. v. Martiuk.

The court then proceeded to rule on the admissibility of specific messages, admitting some relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate, while excluding others deemed to have high privacy interest and marginal probative value, such as those related to the complainant's mental health or irrelevant content.

The appellant, Terrance Nahmabin, appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) for various offences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found procedural deficiencies in the original NCRMD proceedings, including an improper plea, lack of inquiry into the appellant's understanding of the NCRMD consequences despite his expressed distress, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge explaining the application of s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the strict requirement for procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the serious liberty deprivations involved.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD finding was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action, primarily sounding in defamation, under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff (appellant) had not discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in his consideration of the respondents' defences to the defamation claims and in his weighing of the public interest in the expressions against the plaintiff's interest in proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the action had substantial merit and the respondents had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was permitted to proceed in its entirety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable due to forensic evidence contradicting the complainant's account and that the trial judge erred in sentencing by attempting to reconstruct the jury's path to conviction and providing insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's fact-finding for sentencing to be independent and sufficiently reasoned.

Jade Boucetta pleaded guilty to voyeurism and distributing intimate images without consent.

The victim, K.E., was intoxicated and unaware of the recording.

The video, showing sexual intercourse, was sent to a Snapchat group.

The incident had a severe and lasting impact on the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability and the devastating impact, and mitigating factors, such as the accused's guilty plea, youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and rehabilitative efforts.

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, including electronic monitoring, community service, and social media restrictions, finding it could meet the sentencing principles given the specific circumstances and absence of certain aggravating factors found in other cases.

The accused, Michael Wilford, was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The first count involved choking during consensual sexual intercourse, and the second involved non-consensual sexual activity while the complainant was feigning sleep.

The court applied principles of reasonable doubt and consent, including the "honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent" defence.

The court found the accused guilty of the first count, concluding that the choking was a sexual assault and that the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

For the second count, the court found the complainant's testimony lacked credibility and believed the accused's denial, resulting in an acquittal.

This endorsement addresses costs and damages following the dismissal of the plaintiff's anti-SLAPP action against several defendants.

The court applied the presumptive full indemnity costs rule under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act, finding no reason to depart from it given the retaliatory nature of the plaintiff's litigation and his failure to provide a costs outline for comparison.

The court fixed costs for each successful defendant, making minor reductions from the amounts claimed.

While damages were sought by two defendants under s. 137.1(9), only one was awarded, as the court found the other defendant's conduct contributed to her stress, making a damages award inappropriate.

The accused, Federico Jimenez-Martinez, was charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after driving into Canada with 18 kg of cocaine hidden in a spare tire.

He claimed duress due to threats from Mexican cartels.

The court acquitted him on the importation charge, finding insufficient evidence of intent to enter Canada.

However, the court found him guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, rejecting his duress defence.

The judge found the accused's account of being forced to transport the drugs unreasonable and concluded he was a knowing participant in a drug conspiracy, not acting under compulsion.

The appellant, J.G., appealed his conviction for sexual interference offences related to his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding reliability, conflated reliability and credibility, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence on the core issue of the offence, despite minor inconsistencies regarding peripheral details, especially given the complainant's age at the time of the events.

Mason Ireland pleaded guilty to robbery.

The court considered sentencing principles, Gladue factors due to his Indigenous heritage, enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody during COVID-19, credit for stringent bail conditions, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the unrecovered stolen jewelry.

The court imposed a 4.5-year custodial sentence, with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, and a fine of $162,500 in lieu of forfeiture.

The defendant, Nafi Selmanovski, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against a complainant who was under 16 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant and another former employee.

The defendant did not testify.

The court found numerous material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, both internal and external, which undermined credibility and reliability.

The court also noted a potential motive for fabrication by the complainant, who faced criminal charges involving police at the time of reporting.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order on the secondary ground.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan, including a full-time surety due to COVID-19 related layoff and a different electronic monitoring system, and argued that the pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found no error in the original decision and determined that the proposed plan, even with COVID-19 considerations, did not amount to a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant release, particularly given the applicant's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Adam Dabrowski, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing material changes in circumstances: the COVID-19 pandemic and his sister's availability as a residential surety.

The court found that the sister's availability was not a material change, as it represented a change in legal strategy rather than new circumstances.

However, the court accepted the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change, triggering a de novo hearing.

Despite this, the proposed release plan, which included the sister as surety and house arrest, was deemed insufficient to address primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, particularly given the applicant's history of breaching bail, credibility issues, and the surety's limited capacity for supervision.

The application for release was dismissed.

The Crown brought applications to quash preliminary inquiry requests made by defendants before new provisions limiting preliminary inquiries came into effect on September 19, 2019.

The new provisions restrict preliminary inquiries to cases where the maximum penalty is at least 14 years imprisonment.

The defendants faced indictable offences with maximum penalties less than 14 years.

The court considered whether the new section 535 of the Criminal Code applied retrospectively to eliminate jurisdiction over previously valid preliminary inquiry requests.

The Crown argued the amendments were purely procedural and applied retrospectively.

The defence argued the court retained jurisdiction over validly requested inquiries.

The court found itself bound by a Superior Court decision granting the Crown's certiorari application in a related case and allowed the Crown's applications, finding the defendants' preliminary inquiry requests to be of no force and effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction on several offences, including unlawful confinement, assault, uttering death threats, mischief, and breaches of probation, stemming from two incidents in March and April 2016.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination of the complainant regarding a prior domestic altercation on the basis of the collateral fact rule or relevance, and whether the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did not err in limiting cross-examination, as the collateral fact rule was not engaged and the questioning was deemed to be of too slight significance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, noting that the trial judge was alive to inconsistencies and provided reasons for finding the complainant credible, and that the core of her allegations remained intact.

The appeal was dismissed.