Catherine M. Patterson

The appellant abandoned her appeal on the eve of the hearing after the respondents had delivered responding materials in an estate accounting dispute.

The court applied r. 61.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the respondents were entitled to their costs of the abandoned appeal.

The respondents' motion for leave to cross-appeal the application judge's discretionary costs award, seeking full indemnity costs, was denied because no reversible error was shown and the elevated scale was not justified.

The appellant was awarded costs of the cross-appeal motion, set off against the appeal costs, leaving a net amount payable to the respondents.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought disciplinary proceedings against the Member for professional misconduct.

The Member pleaded no contest to allegations that he drugged and sexually assaulted a former student at his home in 2002.

The Discipline Committee found the Member guilty of disgraceful, dishonourable, unprofessional, and unbecoming conduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered that the Member be reprimanded and that his Certificate of Qualification and Registration be immediately revoked, finding the conduct abhorrent and a gross violation of trust.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

The plaintiff Beechhill Capital Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment on a promissory note in the amount of $1,372,230.00 issued by the defendants.

The defendants acknowledged the debt but raised defences including lack of consideration, statute of limitations, oppression claims, and misrepresentation regarding the value of pledged HEXO shares.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the defences lacked merit.

The court determined that valuable consideration existed through antecedent debt and forbearance, the limitation period had not expired as the note was renewed, oppression was not a valid defence to a promissory note, and the alleged misrepresentations could not have induced the defendants to sign the note since the debt predated the note and the defendants had knowledge of the share dispositions.

The court found Bryan Lozon in contempt for failing to deliver three of four specific snowmobiles as required by a Court of Appeal order, concluding that he had tampered with VIN tags and delivered incomplete or incorrect items.

The decision reviews the factual background, the evidence regarding each snowmobile, and the legal test for contempt, ultimately finding that Bryan's explanations were not credible and that he had wilfully failed to comply with the order.

The plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a motion for partial summary judgment in an intellectual property dispute regarding the enforcement of a confidential settlement agreement.

The defendants opposed, arguing that the enforceability of the agreement's no-challenge clause raised unsettled public policy issues requiring a full trial record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment would likely increase costs, cause further delay, and was an inappropriate mechanism to resolve the complex legal and public interest issues surrounding the no-challenge clause.

The applicant sought judicial review of an appraisal award made under s. 128 of the Insurance Act following the destruction of her cottage by fire.

The umpire determined the replacement cost based on the respondent insurer's appraiser's estimate of the cottage's square footage, which relied on actual post-fire measurements, rather than the applicant's appraiser's reliance on a pre-purchase valuation report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the umpire's decision was reasonable and justified by the evidence, and awarded costs to the respondent.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action, primarily sounding in defamation, under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff (appellant) had not discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in his consideration of the respondents' defences to the defamation claims and in his weighing of the public interest in the expressions against the plaintiff's interest in proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the action had substantial merit and the respondents had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was permitted to proceed in its entirety.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of Minutes of Settlement signed by family members to resolve three lawsuits involving property and personal injury claims.

The lower court dismissed motions to enforce the settlement, finding a misunderstanding regarding specific equipment (a tractor and snowmobiles) based on subjective intentions.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in principle by relying on subjective evidence rather than an objective interpretation of the contract.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the Court clarified the terms for the tractor (correcting a typographical error) and snowmobiles, concluding that a valid agreement existed.

This endorsement addresses costs and damages following the dismissal of the plaintiff's anti-SLAPP action against several defendants.

The court applied the presumptive full indemnity costs rule under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act, finding no reason to depart from it given the retaliatory nature of the plaintiff's litigation and his failure to provide a costs outline for comparison.

The court fixed costs for each successful defendant, making minor reductions from the amounts claimed.

While damages were sought by two defendants under s. 137.1(9), only one was awarded, as the court found the other defendant's conduct contributed to her stress, making a damages award inappropriate.

The plaintiffs/appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Gorman J. dated June 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

At a discipline hearing, the member attempted to enter a plea of no contest pursuant to an agreement with the College.

However, the member made statements to the panel that raised concerns about the validity of the plea and the agreement.

After giving the member an opportunity to speak with counsel, the member maintained his position.

On its own motion, the panel declined to accept the Statement of Uncontested Facts and Plea of No Contest, and adjourned the matter to be heard as a contested hearing before a newly constituted panel.

The plaintiff corporation brought an action for solicitor negligence against the defendant lawyer and his firm, alleging they owed and breached duties to the plaintiff in relation to a 2010 real estate transaction, causing the plaintiff to lose financing it had extended.

The transaction involved mortgage fraud perpetrated by the purchaser and his partner.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant lawyer did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, either through a solicitor-client relationship or as an exceptional duty to a non-client third party, as there was no retainer, no instructions, and no reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the lawyer.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

A former director and investor brought a motion for summary judgment alleging negligent misrepresentation by corporate directors, the chief financial officer, and an engineering consultant arising from a private placement investment that later became worthless after the corporation entered receivership.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentations concerning reserve reports, a bank borrowing base notice, and the intended use of proceeds of the financing.

The court held that many alleged representations were made to the plaintiff in his capacity as a director rather than as an investor, raising significant duty of care issues and rendering reliance problematic.

The court also found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether misrepresentations occurred, whether they were negligent, and whether reliance was established.

In addition, most claims were found to be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court heard multiple motions in a long-running dispute over a real estate transaction and mortgage discharge.

The third party sought summary judgment dismissing claims against it as statute-barred and disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their pleadings and summary judgment dismissing parts of the defendant's counterclaim.

The defendant sought leave to amend his defence to plead equitable setoff.

The court granted the motions for leave to amend pleadings, finding them tenable in law.

However, the court dismissed the motions for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the expiry of limitation periods, discoverability, and the third party claim for contribution and indemnity.

In corporate litigation involving a tavern business, the plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their statement of claim and for an order compelling a further and better affidavit of documents and production prior to examinations for discovery.

The defendants brought a cross‑motion for leave to amend their defence and counterclaim.

The court held that allegations in a statement of claim generally do not constitute “admissions” within the meaning of Rule 51.05 and therefore the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments were governed by Rule 26.01.

Leave to amend was granted subject to minor clarifying revisions and payment of limited “costs thrown away,” rendering the defendants’ motion moot.

On the production motion, the court criticized both parties for failing to comply with Rule 29.1 discovery planning obligations and ordered limited additional production while refusing broader relief without prejudice pending a discovery plan and examinations.

Multiple motions were brought in related commercial proceedings seeking security for costs and leave to amend pleadings.

The defendants sought security for costs against an individual plaintiff on the basis that the action was allegedly frivolous and vexatious and that the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario.

The court held that the claim was not clearly devoid of merit and there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff lacked assets, so security was refused.

In separate corporate actions, the moving parties also sought security for costs against a corporate plaintiff, but the court found their evidence of financial insufficiency was speculative and failed to meet the Rule 56.01 threshold.

However, leave to amend the statements of defence to challenge the validity of an assignment of claims and to plead reliance on legal advice was granted, as no prejudice would result.

Following a successful motion declaring that a commercial lease had been validly renewed, the receiver of a pharmacy business and the senior secured creditor sought recovery of their legal costs from the landlord.

The court considered objections that counsel time was excessive and that only one counsel should have participated, as well as a challenge to computerized legal research as a recoverable disbursement.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the preparation time and participation of separate counsel were reasonable given the high financial stakes of the litigation.

Computerized legal research was also found to be a proper disbursement.

Costs were fixed at reduced amounts but substantially in favour of the successful parties.

The appellants, who acted as real estate agents in the sale of a property for a dental office, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable in negligence after the purchaser discovered the property lacked the required parking spaces.

The trial judge apportioned 20% liability to each agent, 10% to the vendor, and 50% to the purchaser's lawyer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the vendor should bear more fault due to receiving the financial benefit of the sale, claimed unjust enrichment against the vendor, and argued the limitation period had expired based on the purchaser's lawyer's imputed knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that benefit received is not a freestanding consideration for apportionment under the Negligence Act, the agents suffered no deprivation to support unjust enrichment, and the trial judge did not err in his discoverability analysis.