Peter C. Card

The applicant, Dawn McKenzie, acting as Power of Attorney for Property for Raymond Morgan, sought court approval to sell the Springdale property.

This property was subject to a life leasehold interest in favour of the respondent, Wendy Morgan, as per Mr. Morgan's will.

The applicant argued the sale was necessary to cover Mr. Morgan's caregiving fees and debts.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's financial assessments were unreliable and that other options for liquidity had not been adequately explored.

The court also expressed concerns about the applicant's management of Mr. Morgan's care and his isolation from other family members.

The lawyer of record for the corporate defendant, Golden Environmental Services Inc., moved to be removed from the record.

Concurrently, the corporation's sole shareholder sought leave under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to represent the corporation.

The court dismissed the shareholder's motion, finding insufficient evidence that the corporation could not afford legal counsel and noting that the remaining issue regarding alleged negligent remediation was complex.

The lawyer's motion to be removed was adjourned for 30 days to allow the corporation to retain new counsel or satisfy the current retainer.

The appellant challenged his late brother's will but later abandoned the claim.

The respondents (estate trustees) obtained summary judgment on a counterclaim for damages representing CRA interest and penalties incurred by the estate due to the litigation delay, or alternatively, as an award of costs.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, holding that commencing litigation is not an actionable wrong unless it meets the strict test for the tort of abuse of civil process, which was neither pleaded nor proved.

The court also held that estate administration expenses, such as CRA penalties, cannot be awarded as legal costs.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' counterclaim, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the defendants' conduct to be egregious, noting they unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings by incorporating voluminous irrelevant material and re-litigating previously decided issues.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial indemnity costs of $23,147.35 against the personal and corporate defendants.

Claims for costs against a non-party and opposing counsel personally were dismissed.

The accused was charged with breaching a restraining order under section 127 of the Criminal Code by communicating indirectly with the protected person through a third party.

The accused sent text messages to an intermediary stating "you should tell Beverly that I pose no threat to her" in the context of arranging access to his children.

The court found that while the communication technically violated the order, the de minimis principle applied, as the conduct was so trivial and trifling as to raise no abiding concern to public or community interest.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding a loan.

The respondent had provided evidence of the loan, an amortization schedule, and a record of payments.

The appellants admitted to the loan but claimed they made additional payments by cash and cheque, which were unsupported by receipts.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge carefully analyzed the evidence and correctly concluded that the appellants failed to put their best foot forward.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce a second mortgage and obtain payment of funds paid into court following a power of sale.

The defendants alleged the mortgage had been fully paid through a combination of cheque and cash payments, relying primarily on internal payment spreadsheets and hearsay evidence from a bookkeeper.

The court held that the defendants failed to provide reliable proof of payment and that their evidence consisted largely of unsupported assertions.

Applying the summary judgment framework following Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Judgment was granted for the outstanding mortgage balance with interest and the plaintiff was declared entitled to surplus sale proceeds subject to set-offs.

A third party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order refusing summary judgment that would have dismissed a counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court reviewed the test under Rule 62.02(4) for leave to appeal interlocutory orders to the Divisional Court.

Although aspects of the motion judge’s reasoning raised issues open to debate, the order itself was supported by independent grounds, including triable issues relating to equitable set‑off and discoverability.

The court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and that the proposed appeal did not raise issues of broader public importance warranting appellate intervention.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The court heard multiple motions in a long-running dispute over a real estate transaction and mortgage discharge.

The third party sought summary judgment dismissing claims against it as statute-barred and disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their pleadings and summary judgment dismissing parts of the defendant's counterclaim.

The defendant sought leave to amend his defence to plead equitable setoff.

The court granted the motions for leave to amend pleadings, finding them tenable in law.

However, the court dismissed the motions for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the expiry of limitation periods, discoverability, and the third party claim for contribution and indemnity.