C. Stephen Glithero

The applicant brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel for her upcoming trials on charges of impaired driving and multiple domestic assault-related offences.

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked the financial ability to retain counsel, leaving trial fairness as the sole issue.

The court assessed the applicant's education, work history as a business analyst, and self-presentation, concluding she was highly capable of self-representing.

The court also found the charges were not legally or factually complex.

The application for state-funded counsel and the alternative request for the appointment of amicus curiae were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for forcible confinement and sexual assault against his estranged wife.

He argued that the Crown failed to disclose the complainant's Sexual Assault Examination Kit (SAEK), that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessments.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the undisclosed SAEK contained evidence that could have undermined the complainant's credibility and supported the appellant's defence.

The court also found that trial counsel was ineffective in proceeding without the SAEK and that the trial judge engaged in circular reasoning when assessing credibility.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of prohibition to prevent a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice from proceeding with his criminal trial remotely via video conference, and an order to quash the ruling that ordered the trial to proceed remotely.

The applicant argued that there was no jurisdiction to order a remote trial or compel a complainant to testify remotely without consent or application.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications, holding that the trial judge had jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order remote participation for the Crown, expert witness, and complainant.

The court clarified that while an accused's remote participation requires their consent, errors in exercising jurisdiction are reviewable by appeal, not by extraordinary remedies like prohibition or certiorari, unless they amount to a jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel for a young person charged with second degree murder, alleging a conflict of interest because counsel also represented a Crown witness on unrelated charges.

The witness had given a confusing police statement suggesting the accused might be involved, but later testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no direct communication with the accused.

Both the accused and the witness provided informed waivers consenting to the representation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no realistic risk of adversity in interest and noting that independent counsel could cross-examine the witness if necessary.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder and arson, applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the applicant drove the perpetrators to meet the victim, witnessed the kidnapping, and later assisted in burning the victim's vehicle and hiding the perpetrators.

The court found the proposed release plan involving the applicant's brother and sister-in-law as sureties was weak.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to discharge his onus on the primary (flight risk), secondary (substantial likelihood of re-offending), and tertiary (confidence in the administration of justice) grounds under s. 515(10).

The Crown applied for a temporary publication ban on portions of an agreed statement of fact and bail synopsis relating to an adult accused who pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The ban was sought to protect the fair trial rights of a young person co-accused who was scheduled to be tried for second-degree murder at a later date.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and concluded that a broad ban was not necessary, as alternative measures like jury instructions and the passage of time would mitigate prejudice.

However, a limited ban was granted for evidence that could identify the young person or would be presumptively inadmissible at their trial.

This is an application for a s.520 review of a detention order.

The applicant sought bail, relying on material changes in circumstances including the COVID-19 pandemic, the withdrawal of some charges, and the availability of electronic monitoring.

The court conducted an open review but dismissed the application, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable and the release plan insufficient to address the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, especially given the applicant's extensive criminal record.

The applicant sought a s.520 review of a detention order made on secondary grounds.

The court found several material changes in circumstances since the original show cause hearing, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a new release plan involving residence with his daughter, and the withdrawal of one of the charges.

The court also expressed reservations about the adequacy of the reasons for the initial detention order.

Applying principles favouring release, the court granted the bail review and ordered the applicant's release on specific conditions, emphasizing the importance of proportionality of pre-trial detention, especially given potential trial delays due to the pandemic.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, following a charge of uttering threats.

The applicant argued the detaining justice erred in law and presented new evidence, including the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on trial delays and detention conditions, and the subsequent withdrawal of a "fail to appear" charge.

The court found no errors in law by the detaining justice regarding reverse onus or public safety grounds.

While acknowledging the impact of COVID-19 and the withdrawn charge as new evidence, the court ultimately dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to present a particularized plan for release, which was crucial given his history of violence, harassment, and prior bail breaches.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a further application supported by an appropriate release plan.

Prior to the commencement of a trial for sexual offences, the accused brought a constitutional challenge regarding the repeal of s. 634 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the repealing legislation should not apply retrospectively.

The court ruled that the accused was entitled to peremptory challenges.

The court subsequently noted that its decision was in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which was released shortly after the trial concluded.

The appellant contractor appealed a decision declaring its construction lien expired.

The motions judge had found that the respondent owner's notice of termination triggered the 45-day deadline for the appellant to file its claim for lien, equating termination with 'abandonment' under the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that abandonment requires the contractor to abandon the contract, and an owner's unilateral termination does not automatically constitute abandonment by the contractor.

The claim for lien was therefore registered in time.

The appellant challenged his late brother's will but later abandoned the claim.

The respondents (estate trustees) obtained summary judgment on a counterclaim for damages representing CRA interest and penalties incurred by the estate due to the litigation delay, or alternatively, as an award of costs.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, holding that commencing litigation is not an actionable wrong unless it meets the strict test for the tort of abuse of civil process, which was neither pleaded nor proved.

The court also held that estate administration expenses, such as CRA penalties, cannot be awarded as legal costs.

The appellant contractor appealed a decision declaring its construction lien expired.

The motions judge had found that the owner's notice of termination constituted 'abandonment' of the contract under s. 31(2) of the Construction Lien Act, triggering the 45-day period to register a lien.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that abandonment requires the contractor to abandon the contract, either subjectively or objectively.

A unilateral termination notice by the owner does not force abandonment by the contractor, especially where the contractor remains ready, willing, and able to complete the work and settlement discussions are ongoing.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 99(2) and s. 99(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court declined to hold a full hearing on s. 99(2)(a), ruling that prior declarations of constitutional invalidity by judges of coordinate jurisdiction rendered the provision of no force and effect, and it would be inappropriate to reconsider whether those decisions were plainly wrong.

The challenge to s. 99(3) was dismissed as moot because the applicant was not being sentenced for an offence under that section.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles determining the easterly and westerly boundary lines of his property and dismissing his request for costs.

The appellant argued the Deputy Director erred by rejecting surveyor evidence that a cedar hedge and a frame structure established the boundaries through possession.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Deputy Director reasonably concluded there was insufficient evidence to relate the physical occupation back to the original survey.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to one of the respondents.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court reviewed the respondent's bill of costs, which had been omitted from consideration in the original decision.

Although the bill of costs was reasonable, the court maintained its original decision to make no order as to costs because the respondent's delay in retaining counsel necessitated an adjournment and caused the appellant unnecessary additional expense.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing her application for compensation for belongings allegedly removed by her landlords.

The Board found that the tenant failed to prove her damages and failed to mitigate her losses by refusing to retrieve her belongings, which were still on the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not err in declining to address the landlords' alleged unlawful entry or in not compelling the landlords to testify, as the tenant's failure to prove damages was fatal to her claim.

The Court also held that the Board's conclusion on mitigation was an unappealable finding of fact.

The parties appeared before the Divisional Court and requested an adjournment of an appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board concerning a $15,000 damages claim.

Citing proportionality and the inefficient use of judicial resources, the court proposed deciding the appeal on a written record rather than reconvening for oral argument.

The parties consented, and the court issued a procedural order setting a schedule for the exchange of written materials and costs submissions.

The moving party sought to review a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had declined to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

The moving party argued they were caught by surprise by the nature of the motion below.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to review, finding that this argument was not raised below, the record did not support it, no fresh evidence was adduced, and the single judge made no palpable or overriding error.

Furthermore, the motion to review was itself brought out of time.

The appellant appealed an order regarding a charging order under the Solicitors Act to the Divisional Court, arguing the monetary value was under $50,000.

The Divisional Court held that a charging order is a final order and the appellant failed to prove the value was under $50,000, as the garnishments exceeded $200,000.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.