P. Boushy

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a committal order made by a preliminary inquiry judge.

The preliminary inquiry judge had admitted the complainant's written statement under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code and denied the applicant's request to cross-examine the complainant under s. 540(9).

The Superior Court found that while the admission of the statement was an evidentiary error, it was not jurisdictional.

However, the blanket denial of cross-examination on the sole piece of evidence forming the Crown's case amounted to a breach of natural justice and a jurisdictional error.

The certiorari application was granted, and the matter was remitted for a new preliminary inquiry.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault for digitally penetrating a 12-year-old child while he was employed as her babysitter.

The Crown sought a 3-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offence and the profound impact on the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to 18 months' imprisonment for sexual interference, stayed the sexual assault charge under the Kienapple principle, and imposed ancillary orders including a 15-year prohibition order and a 20-year sex offender registry order.

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction on three counts of sexual interference involving three child victims whom he abused while acting as a caregiver.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives under the Criminal Code and applied the Supreme Court's guidance that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase and reflect the full cumulative gravity of repeated abuse, breach of trust, vulnerability, and lasting harm.

Aggravating factors included multiple victims, lengthy and repeated abuse, the offender's position of trust, and one victim's developmental delay; mitigating factors included advanced age, lack of criminal record, work history, and family responsibilities.

The court imposed seven years' imprisonment concurrent on all counts, together with DNA, firearms, no-contact and attendance prohibitions, and lifetime sex offender registration.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing an unarmed victim in the chest with a combat knife outside a nightclub.

The Crown sought 14 years of parole ineligibility, while amicus for the self-represented offender sought the minimum 10 years, which was also recommended by the majority of the jury.

The court considered the offender's minimal criminal record, positive employment history, and expressions of remorse, balancing these against the gravity of bringing a hidden combat knife to a social gathering.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at the minimum 10 years.

Prior to the commencement of a trial for sexual offences, the accused brought a constitutional challenge regarding the repeal of s. 634 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the repealing legislation should not apply retrospectively.

The court ruled that the accused was entitled to peremptory challenges.

The court subsequently noted that its decision was in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which was released shortly after the trial concluded.

The accused was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of robbery arising from a late‑night stabbing outside a convenience store.

During closing submissions, the Crown sought convictions for aggravated assault as included offences.

The Crown relied primarily on in‑dock identifications by two victims and an eyewitness, along with a co‑accused’s video statement and circumstantial evidence allegedly linking the accused to the driver.

The court found significant discrepancies in the eyewitness descriptions and emphasized the well‑recognized frailties of first‑time in‑court identification, particularly where prior photo line‑ups failed to produce identifications.

Finding the identification evidence unreliable and the remaining evidence insufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused.

During a trial for attempted murder and robbery, the Crown applied to admit two prior statements of a recanting co-accused for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The first statement was an Agreed Statement of Facts from the co-accused's guilty plea, and the second was a video-taped police interview.

The court dismissed the application regarding the Agreed Statement of Facts, finding it lacked threshold reliability as the co-accused had not personally assented to it and pleaded guilty solely to be released.

However, the court granted the application to admit the video-taped interview, finding that the ability to observe demeanour, the availability of cross-examination, and corroborating evidence established threshold reliability.