J. Levy

The offender, Michael Johnson, pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired operation causing death, two counts of dangerous operation causing death, one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm, and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm.

These charges stemmed from a high-speed collision (161 km/h in a 50 km/h zone) while impaired (BAC 1.5-2x legal limit) that resulted in the deaths of two pedestrians and serious injury to a third.

The defence argued that the offender's suicidal ideation at the time of the collision should be a mitigating factor, while the Crown argued it was an aggravating factor due to the foreseeable risk to public safety.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be significant, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The court concluded that driving recklessly with suicidal intent on a public street constitutes an aggravating factor.

A sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, adhering to pseudolegal sovereign citizen beliefs, attended a utility company with accomplices intending to 'arrest' the CEO and seize the company's assets.

He was charged with conspiracy to kidnap and obstructing a peace officer after providing police with a fictitious name and diplomatic identification.

The court acquitted the accused of obstructing police, finding he honestly believed his assumed name and lacked the requisite mens rea.

However, the court convicted him of conspiracy to kidnap, rejecting his claim of lawful authority and finding he actively planned and directed others to confine the CEO.

Prior to the commencement of a trial for sexual offences, the accused brought a constitutional challenge regarding the repeal of s. 634 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the repealing legislation should not apply retrospectively.

The court ruled that the accused was entitled to peremptory challenges.

The court subsequently noted that its decision was in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which was released shortly after the trial concluded.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a six-year-old child.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the child complainant, whose allegations were disclosed to her mother following a "good touch/bad touch" discussion initiated by the mother in the context of a highly toxic and volatile relationship between the mother and accused.

The court found significant credibility and reliability concerns regarding the child's testimony, including internal and external inconsistencies, susceptibility to leading questions, and the problematic circumstances of the initial disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a verdict of not guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a six-year-old child.

The sole evidence of the allegations came from the child's testimony.

The accused brought an application under the Edgar exception to admit his videotaped statement to police made upon arrest, arguing it demonstrated his immediate reaction to the accusation rather than the truth of the statement.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the three-part Edgar test: whether the accused testified, whether the statement was made upon arrest or first accusation, and whether the statement was spontaneous.

The court found all three requirements satisfied and admitted the statement for the limited purpose of demonstrating the accused's reaction to the charges and his consistency with trial testimony.

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 43.5 months.

After deducting 5.5 months of defence waiver and 6 months for exceptional circumstances (Crown illness and underestimation of trial time), the net delay was 32 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer readings of 123 mg and 110 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven that the breath samples were received directly into an approved instrument as required by section 258(1)(c)(iii).

The Crown tendered the Intoxilyzer printout and testimony from the breath technician but failed to establish the actual process by which the samples were obtained.

The court found that the Crown had not proven this essential precondition beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charge.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought production of third-party police records from the Toronto Police Service concerning five individuals for an alternate suspects application.

The Crown opposed, arguing a lack of likely relevance.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor test, finding the applicant met the threshold for likely relevance.

After an in camera inspection, the court ordered the production of relevant and redacted excerpts from two police occurrence reports related to two of the five individuals, subject to strict conditions, while denying production for the others.

Media organizations sought certiorari to review and set aside a decision refusing access to a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to obtain search warrants in a large criminal investigation.

The Crown argued that disclosure was prohibited by s. 193 of the Criminal Code because the ITO contained references to non-consensual wiretap interceptions.

The court held that s. 193 is an offence-creating provision and does not govern public access to court materials; instead, access to a sealed ITO is governed by s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code informed by the Dagenais/Mentuck test and the open court principle.

Alternatively, even if s. 193 applied, the disclosure fell within the exception in s. 193(2)(a) because an ITO constitutes evidence given in a criminal proceeding.

The prior order denying access was set aside and the applicants were permitted to proceed with their application to vary or terminate the sealing order.

The applicants brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of wiretap authorizations and related investigative orders obtained during an organized crime investigation into drug importation through Toronto Pearson International Airport.

They alleged that a police officer deliberately misled judicial officers through fraudulent or misleading statements and omissions in affidavits supporting production orders, dialled number recorder warrants, and the wiretap authorization.

The court reviewed allegations of misstatements, non‑disclosure, and conflation of information and applied the Garofoli framework, including excision and amplification of affidavit material where appropriate.

The court concluded that the inaccuracies were innocent errors rather than deliberate fraud and that, after correcting the affidavit, sufficient grounds remained to justify the authorization.

As a result, no Charter breach under s. 8 was established and the wiretap evidence remained admissible.

The accused was charged with break and enter and commit robbery with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, possession of a firearm while subject to a weapons prohibition order, and three counts of breach of probation.

The Crown proceeded by indictment and the accused elected trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed a robbery.

While the complainant's testimony contained significant inconsistencies regarding the details of the alleged robbery, the court found the accused guilty of break and enter and commit assault, uttering threats, and breaching two probation orders.

The court dismissed the robbery charges due to insufficient evidence and credibility concerns with the complainant's account.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 2 years, 5 months and 15 days in custody with a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) for ten years.

The National Parole Board imposed conditions including a prohibition on entering establishments where the primary source of income is derived from the sale of alcohol, and a requirement to reside at an approved community-based residential facility.

The accused was charged with breaching both conditions by entering an off-track betting establishment in the basement of a tavern and by failing to abide by residence rules.

The court dismissed the first charge but found the accused guilty on the second charge, holding that the tavern must be considered as a single entity where the primary source of income is derived from alcohol sales.