Lauren Marie Wilhelm

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual assault with choking, and common assault against his former intimate partner.

The complainant alleged two incidents of sexual assault and one incident of common assault.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be evasive, internally inconsistent, and contradicted by text messages exchanged between the parties.

The court also found a strong motive to fabricate due to ongoing family court proceedings regarding access to their child.

The accused's testimony was accepted as credible and reliable.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was sentenced after admitting guilt to possessing protonitazene, cocaine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, possessing proceeds of crime, possessing a semi-automatic handgun with accessible ammunition, and breaching two weapons prohibition orders.

The court treated protonitazene trafficking as falling at the highest end of gravity because of the drug’s extreme potency, unpredictability, and presentation as counterfeit oxycodone, and found the trafficking to be an upper-level commercial operation supported by large quantities of drugs and cash.

Despite remorse, family support, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and some limited mitigation for a Charter breach and an improper strip search, the court held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate given the accused’s related prior record and escalation in offending.

Applying totality, the court imposed a 15-year global sentence, then credited pre-sentence custody and the strip-search deduction, leaving 11 years, 7 months, and 2 days to serve.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault in the context of an intimate partner relationship, brought an application under sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to introduce text messages and evidence of an ongoing sexual relationship with the complainant.

The defence argued the evidence was necessary to challenge the complainant's police statement, which described the accused as controlling and the relationship as non-consensual or coerced.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative to the complainant's credibility and the fundamental coherence of the defence narrative, as it directly contradicted the complainant's description of the relationship.

The evidence was admitted subject to strict limitations to prevent twin-myth reasoning.

The accused was tried on an indictment for sexual assault arising from an allegation by a former intimate partner with whom he shared a child and residence after separation.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found material inconsistencies in the complainant’s account concerning the manner in which the assault allegedly began, her post-incident communications with the accused, and a new allegation first raised in cross-examination.

The court also considered the timing of disclosure in the context of contemporaneous family court litigation over parenting time, while expressly avoiding prohibited myths and stereotypes about sexual assault complainants.

The accused’s denial was accepted, and in any event the complainant’s evidence did not satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On a Charter warrant review, the applicant challenged a CDSA search warrant for a nine-acre rural property containing a dwelling and multiple outbuildings.

The court held that the corrected ITO supported a reasonable inference that a drug stash had been moved from an urban apartment-related location to the rural property, but did not provide sufficient precision to justify a search of every building on the property.

The warrant was therefore overbroad and the search infringed s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court nevertheless admitted the seized firearm, drugs, and related evidence because the police misconduct was not egregious, the privacy impact was moderate, and society’s interest in a trial on the merits was exceptionally strong.

The Crown appealed acquittals for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the respondent's state (asleep/awake) and provided insufficient reasons.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons deficient, failing to articulate findings of fact or explain how the evidence of the respondent's actions could be reconciled with the complainant's testimony about him being asleep.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

A young person, T.M., challenged the constitutionality of sections 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

These provisions limit the availability and duration of deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs) for offences involving serious bodily harm, making them unavailable for youth in such cases and capping their duration at six months.

The Crown sought to dismiss the application.

The court found that these provisions violate sections 15 (equality) and 7 (liberty and fundamental justice) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reasoned that the provisions deny young persons a benefit (a community-based custodial sentence option) that is available to similarly situated adults, thereby perpetuating the disadvantage arising from their diminished moral blameworthiness and forcing youth into potentially harsher custodial sentences.

The court declared the impugned sections invalid.

The respondent was acquitted of child luring, with the trial judge finding him reckless as to the complainants' ages but concluding recklessness was insufficient mens rea based on a misinterpretation of R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal clarified that recklessness as to age is sufficient mens rea for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code where the Crown proves an actual child complainant, distinguishing this from police sting operations.

However, as the trial judge did not make findings on the respondent's subjective intent to facilitate a secondary offence, the appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This endorsement addresses the adjournment of three criminal trials (R. v. Q., R. v. D.O., R. v. J.N.) scheduled to commence in the Superior Court of Justice in Milton.

The trials were adjourned due to recent findings of contamination and ongoing assessment of the courthouse building, rendering it unsafe for in-person proceedings.

The court emphasized that the health and safety of all participants, including potential jurors, litigants, lawyers, accused persons, and witnesses, was the overarching priority, necessitating the extraordinary step of adjourning matters until further notice.

A young person, M.W., was charged with murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a group attack.

The Crown's case relied heavily on video identification, comparing high-quality surveillance footage of the accused from his residence with a low-quality cellphone video of the attack.

The court found that while the accused was clearly identifiable in the surveillance video, the clothing in the cellphone video only resembled, but could not definitively be identified as, the clothing worn by the accused.

Other circumstantial evidence, such as phone calls and post-attack behaviour, was deemed insufficient to corroborate participation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges due to the Crown's failure to prove identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, a young person identified as M.W., applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable delay in bringing the case to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 20.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, specifically identifying periods attributable to the defence.

It found that the defence's rejection of earlier trial dates without providing alternative availability constituted defence-caused delay.

After subtracting 9 months and 16 days of defence-caused delay, the net delay was calculated at 11 months and 3 days, which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

The court further determined that the defence failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings or that the case markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements, as required for delays below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The Defence brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, which permits warrantless searches of vehicles and occupants for unlawfully stored cannabis, violates ss. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it is unreasonable and overbroad.

The Crown contended the provision is constitutional, citing public safety and the regulatory nature of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 12(3) does not infringe either section of the Charter, is reasonable, and is justified by its regulatory purpose and the exigencies of vehicle searches.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference charges at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge's reasons for acquittal were inadequate and that the judge applied a higher degree of scrutiny to the Crown's evidence than to the respondent's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the legal requirement of adequacy, explaining the factual and credibility determinations and the basis for reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the Crown failed to meet the high burden of showing that the credibility determinations were the result of a legally erroneous application of different standards of scrutiny, upholding the deference owed to the trial judge on credibility issues.

The accused, G.M., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his granddaughter, S.M., for incidents occurring between 2014 and 2019.

The court assessed S.M.'s credibility and the reliability of her testimony, particularly regarding inconsistencies and delayed/incremental disclosure of abuse.

The court found G.M. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for one incident (the November 2019 basement incident) but acquitted him on two other alleged incidents (patio and bedroom incidents) due to insufficient reliability of the evidence.

The conviction for sexual assault was conditionally stayed under R. v. Kienapple.

The accused, C.I., was charged with criminal harassment, multiple counts of sexual assault (including with a weapon), and assault against his former intimate partner, M.P. The court dismissed the criminal harassment charge, finding that M.P.'s fear of reconciliation was not the type of fear intended by the legislation.

However, the court found C.I. guilty on all other counts of sexual assault and assault, largely based on M.P.'s credible testimony, corroborated by other witnesses and C.I.'s own inconsistent statements and admissions.

The judge rejected the defence's arguments regarding M.P.'s credibility and reliability, including the "spectre of motive to fabricate."

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving a child.

At trial, the evidence of the complainant and the appellant was diametrically opposed.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating that the two versions could not both be true and rejecting the appellant's evidence based on her acceptance of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by treating the case as a credibility contest rather than assessing whether the evidence as a whole raised a reasonable doubt, and by misapplying the principles for rejecting an accused's evidence.

The complainant, A., sought certiorari to quash a trial judge's decision regarding the admissibility of her sexual history evidence under s.276 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault trial.

The trial judge had admitted certain prior sexual activity as relevant to the accused's belief in communicated consent, while prohibiting its use for propensity reasoning.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no error of law going to jurisdiction and exercising its discretion to refuse interlocutory review, emphasizing the need to minimize delay in criminal trials and the non-final nature of the ruling at that stage.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and prohibition to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, which held that recent amendments to the Criminal Code limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively.

The Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction to grant prerogative relief because the lower court's statutory interpretation resulted in a jurisdictional error.

The Court held that the preliminary inquiry is a statutory procedure that does not confer substantive rights.

Therefore, the amendments were purely procedural and applied retrospectively.

The application was allowed, the lower court's order was quashed, and prohibition was granted.

The Crown applied to vacate preliminary inquiries scheduled for thirteen accused persons, seeking to apply amendments to section 535 of the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) retrospectively.

These amendments, which came into force on September 19, 2019, restricted the availability of preliminary inquiries to a reduced class of offences.

The accused had elected to proceed to trial in the Superior Court with a request for a preliminary inquiry prior to the amendments coming into force.

The court considered whether the amendments applied retrospectively to strip the accused of their vested right to a preliminary inquiry.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the amendments do not apply retrospectively to accused persons who had already requested a preliminary inquiry before the amendments came into force.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a roadside breath demand.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis that the police officer failed to make the demand 'forthwith' after forming reasonable suspicion, due to an eight-minute delay.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by conflating the requirement for a prompt demand with the requirement for an immediate response, and by invalidating the demand despite finding that the accused's own belligerent behavior caused the delay.

A conviction was entered and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.