Jennifer Goulin

The accused was sentenced after admitting guilt to possessing protonitazene, cocaine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, possessing proceeds of crime, possessing a semi-automatic handgun with accessible ammunition, and breaching two weapons prohibition orders.

The court treated protonitazene trafficking as falling at the highest end of gravity because of the drug’s extreme potency, unpredictability, and presentation as counterfeit oxycodone, and found the trafficking to be an upper-level commercial operation supported by large quantities of drugs and cash.

Despite remorse, family support, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and some limited mitigation for a Charter breach and an improper strip search, the court held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate given the accused’s related prior record and escalation in offending.

Applying totality, the court imposed a 15-year global sentence, then credited pre-sentence custody and the strip-search deduction, leaving 11 years, 7 months, and 2 days to serve.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his estranged wife, whom he stabbed to death in a park.

The court found the accused's statements to police voluntary and admissible.

The evidence, including videos the accused took of the victim dying and sent to others, overwhelmingly proved he committed the stabbing with the intent to kill.

The court further found the murder was planned and deliberate, based on the accused's jealousy motive, his bringing of a knife to the meeting, and a threat he made the night before.

The accused was found guilty of first-degree murder.

On a Charter warrant review, the applicant challenged a CDSA search warrant for a nine-acre rural property containing a dwelling and multiple outbuildings.

The court held that the corrected ITO supported a reasonable inference that a drug stash had been moved from an urban apartment-related location to the rural property, but did not provide sufficient precision to justify a search of every building on the property.

The warrant was therefore overbroad and the search infringed s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court nevertheless admitted the seized firearm, drugs, and related evidence because the police misconduct was not egregious, the privacy impact was moderate, and society’s interest in a trial on the merits was exceptionally strong.

This decision concerns the trial of Tamaal Japp and Moses Tesfay for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Uchenna Achioso.

The court reviews the evidence, including agreed statements of fact, expert testimony, and the credibility of key witnesses.

The main issues are the identity of the accused and the extent of their criminal liability.

The court finds both accused guilty of manslaughter, not murder, concluding that while they participated in an unlawful act leading to death, the evidence does not establish the intent or planning required for murder.

Ali Hilal was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault and sexual interference with his stepdaughter, M.W., from age 9 to 13.

The offences involved multiple incidents, including vaginal intercourse, and occurred over four years, intensifying during pandemic restrictions.

The victim suffered severe long-term emotional and psychological impact, including estrangement from her mother and younger siblings.

The Crown sought 8-10 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 5-7 years, acknowledging ancillary orders.

The court imposed an eight-year term of imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and ordered various ancillary measures including DNA order, SOIRA registration for 20 years, a 10-year s. 161 order, and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The accused, Timothy Cormier, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault in relation to the stabbing of his sister.

He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial proceeded on the attempted murder count.

The central issue was whether the accused possessed the specific intent to kill.

The court considered evidence of the accused's cognitive deficits, history of epilepsy, brain surgery, and a fixed delusional belief regarding the victim.

Despite these factors, the court found that the accused's actions, including bringing a concealed knife, the nature of the attack (multiple stabs to vital areas), his stated motive (considering abortion to be murder), and his post-offence conduct (disposing of evidence and lying to police/doctors), demonstrated a specific intent to kill.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as untruthful.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct—specifically, an incident of physical abuse against another child—to cross-examine the complainant's mother if she testified for the defence.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to the mother's credibility, not for propensity reasoning.

The court found the evidence constituted other discreditable conduct and applied the balancing test from R. v. L.B. The application was dismissed, as the potential prejudicial effect of distracting the jury with a collateral issue outweighed the weak probative value of the evidence.

The accused was charged with multiple sexual offences after an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old boy on social media applications received sexually explicit communications and images.

The Crown's case on identity was entirely circumstantial, relying on the use of the accused's phone number, his likeness in the images, and his residence.

The court found that while the evidence was cogent, the lack of metadata, the failure to investigate another resident's devices, and the possibility of shared login credentials left a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was the person communicating with the officer.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for shooting his girlfriend three times, including while she was on the phone with a 911 operator.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 17 to 20 years, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found the domestic nature of the homicide, the abuse of trust, the use of a firearm, and the callousness of the killing to be significant aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the accused's expressions of regret and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his intimate partner, whom he shot three times.

The defence argued that the accused was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the shooting and lacked the specific intent for murder, seeking a verdict of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court admitted various hearsay statements and preposterous utterances to assess the accused's state of mind.

The court rejected the defence's expert psychiatric evidence, finding the accused had the intent to kill.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including sexual assault and sexual interference, involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The primary issue at trial was whether the accused had a mistaken belief about the complainant's age and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding his belief that the complainant was 19 to be not credible and objectively unreasonable.

The court concluded the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The accused was found guilty of sexual interference, sexual assault, and one count of uttering threats, but acquitted of procuring and administering a noxious substance.

The accused was charged with four offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm with an obliterated serial number and threatening to destroy property.

The charges arose after the accused's mother called 9-1-1 during a dispute, leading police to discover a loaded handgun in plain view on a dresser in the accused's bedroom.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including the location of the firearm near the accused's health card and clothing, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in knowing possession of the firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The anticipated delay to the end of trial was 19 months and 13 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the case's complexity and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the case was not particularly complex and the Crown failed to prove the pandemic caused the delay above the ceiling.

After deducting 20 days for a discrete event, the net delay was 18 months and 25 days.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The alleged violations included a delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel upon arrest and an unlawful vehicle search at the detachment, as well as unreasonable pat-down searches.

The court found a breach of section 8 regarding a third pat-down search and a breach of section 10(b) due to delayed counsel advice and access for some charges.

However, the court determined that the vehicle search at the detachment was a lawful continuation of a search incident to arrest.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had minimal impact on the accused's protected interests, and therefore, admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Four young persons were charged with multiple counts of armed robbery at Scotiabanks in Mississauga in May and June 2018, as well as related offences.

Three armed robberies occurred within two weeks in May 2018, all at Scotiabanks in Mississauga, committed by perpetrators wearing hoods and masks.

A fourth attempted robbery occurred on June 15, 2018, which was interrupted by police surveillance.

The Crown relied on video surveillance, witness identification, similar fact evidence, and circumstantial evidence to establish identity.

The trial involved complex evidentiary issues including the admissibility of recognition evidence under Leaney principles, similar fact evidence for identity purposes in a rotating group context, and Nikolovski video identification analysis.

The court dismissed charges related to the May 15 robbery due to insufficient evidence.

Convictions were entered on various counts with acquittals on others based on the court's careful analysis of identification evidence and the application of legal principles governing circumstantial evidence.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for impaired driving.

At trial, the accused argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated, seeking exclusion of the breath test results under s. 24(2).

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 10(a), but concluded that a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel violated s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach minimal and the evidence reliable.

The court found the accused guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, entering a conviction on the impaired driving count and a judicial stay on the excess blood alcohol count.

This ruling addresses a Browne and Dunn argument made by the Crown in closing addresses during a murder trial where the accused was convicted of manslaughter.

The judge provided a mild corrective instruction to the jury, explaining that counsel cannot argue Browne and Dunn to the jury without first raising it with the trial judge.

The judge found that in this specific case, no actual Browne and Dunn violation occurred as there was no ambush or surprise in the defence evidence.

The ruling concluded that the Crown's misstep caused no lasting harm given the jury's verdict of manslaughter.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for stabbing his half-brother during a fist fight.

The deceased initiated the physical altercation, but the offender escalated it by using a knife.

The court found the offender's actions were primarily for self-defence but disproportionate.

Considering the offender's remorse, the context of the fight, and the need for denunciation and individual deterrence, the court imposed a sentence of 6 years incarceration.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the net sentence was 15 months, followed by 3 years of probation.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to leave forcible confinement murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code with the jury as a route to liability.

The accused admitted to shooting the victim but claimed it was an accident.

The court applied the air of reality test and found that, based on the primary facts and circumstantial evidence, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the accused forcibly confined the victim by moving him from the front seat to the back seat of his car at gunpoint before shooting him.

The court ruled that this route of liability would be left with the jury.

The applicant was convicted of attempted robbery and subsequently retained new counsel to bring a mistrial application prior to sentencing, alleging ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

The applicant argued his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare, failed to cross-examine key Crown witnesses on prior inconsistent statements, and provided flawed advice regarding the waiver of a preliminary inquiry.

The Superior Court of Justice found that trial counsel's failure to cross-examine key witnesses on crucial evidence and failure to properly advise the applicant on the benefits of a preliminary inquiry compromised trial fairness.

The mistrial application was granted.