Jennifer Goulin

This decision concerns the trial of Tamaal Japp and Moses Tesfay for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Uchenna Achioso.

The court reviews the evidence, including agreed statements of fact, expert testimony, and the credibility of key witnesses.

The main issues are the identity of the accused and the extent of their criminal liability.

The court finds both accused guilty of manslaughter, not murder, concluding that while they participated in an unlawful act leading to death, the evidence does not establish the intent or planning required for murder.

Ali Hilal was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault and sexual interference with his stepdaughter, M.W., from age 9 to 13.

The offences involved multiple incidents, including vaginal intercourse, and occurred over four years, intensifying during pandemic restrictions.

The victim suffered severe long-term emotional and psychological impact, including estrangement from her mother and younger siblings.

The Crown sought 8-10 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 5-7 years, acknowledging ancillary orders.

The court imposed an eight-year term of imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and ordered various ancillary measures including DNA order, SOIRA registration for 20 years, a 10-year s. 161 order, and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The accused, Timothy Cormier, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault in relation to the stabbing of his sister.

He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial proceeded on the attempted murder count.

The central issue was whether the accused possessed the specific intent to kill.

The court considered evidence of the accused's cognitive deficits, history of epilepsy, brain surgery, and a fixed delusional belief regarding the victim.

Despite these factors, the court found that the accused's actions, including bringing a concealed knife, the nature of the attack (multiple stabs to vital areas), his stated motive (considering abortion to be murder), and his post-offence conduct (disposing of evidence and lying to police/doctors), demonstrated a specific intent to kill.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as untruthful.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The alleged violations included a delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel upon arrest and an unlawful vehicle search at the detachment, as well as unreasonable pat-down searches.

The court found a breach of section 8 regarding a third pat-down search and a breach of section 10(b) due to delayed counsel advice and access for some charges.

However, the court determined that the vehicle search at the detachment was a lawful continuation of a search incident to arrest.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had minimal impact on the accused's protected interests, and therefore, admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Four young persons were charged with multiple counts of armed robbery at Scotiabanks in Mississauga in May and June 2018, as well as related offences.

Three armed robberies occurred within two weeks in May 2018, all at Scotiabanks in Mississauga, committed by perpetrators wearing hoods and masks.

A fourth attempted robbery occurred on June 15, 2018, which was interrupted by police surveillance.

The Crown relied on video surveillance, witness identification, similar fact evidence, and circumstantial evidence to establish identity.

The trial involved complex evidentiary issues including the admissibility of recognition evidence under Leaney principles, similar fact evidence for identity purposes in a rotating group context, and Nikolovski video identification analysis.

The court dismissed charges related to the May 15 robbery due to insufficient evidence.

Convictions were entered on various counts with acquittals on others based on the court's careful analysis of identification evidence and the application of legal principles governing circumstantial evidence.

This ruling addresses a Browne and Dunn argument made by the Crown in closing addresses during a murder trial where the accused was convicted of manslaughter.

The judge provided a mild corrective instruction to the jury, explaining that counsel cannot argue Browne and Dunn to the jury without first raising it with the trial judge.

The judge found that in this specific case, no actual Browne and Dunn violation occurred as there was no ambush or surprise in the defence evidence.

The ruling concluded that the Crown's misstep caused no lasting harm given the jury's verdict of manslaughter.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for stabbing his half-brother during a fist fight.

The deceased initiated the physical altercation, but the offender escalated it by using a knife.

The court found the offender's actions were primarily for self-defence but disproportionate.

Considering the offender's remorse, the context of the fight, and the need for denunciation and individual deterrence, the court imposed a sentence of 6 years incarceration.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the net sentence was 15 months, followed by 3 years of probation.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to leave forcible confinement murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code with the jury as a route to liability.

The accused admitted to shooting the victim but claimed it was an accident.

The court applied the air of reality test and found that, based on the primary facts and circumstantial evidence, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the accused forcibly confined the victim by moving him from the front seat to the back seat of his car at gunpoint before shooting him.

The court ruled that this route of liability would be left with the jury.

The court issued reasons for two rulings made during a criminal trial for sexual assault: the voluntariness of an accused's statement to police and an application for a mistrial due to the accused's inflammatory closing address.

The statement was found voluntary, and the application for a mistrial was dismissed, with the court providing a strong curative instruction to the jury instead.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police administered the breath tests as soon as practicable following the arrest, as required by the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the accused failed a roadside screening device test and was arrested.

The accused was transported to the police station where he exercised his right to counsel before breath samples were taken on an Intoxilyzer device.

The defence challenged whether the approximately 23-minute period between the accused entering the breath room and the completion of the first breath test was adequately explained.

The court found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable and convicted the accused.

The applicant sought a determination on the constitutionality of section 85(4) of the Criminal Code, which mandates consecutive sentences for using a firearm during an indictable offence, arguing it violates section 12 of the Charter by imposing cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that section 85(4) was unconstitutional, as its "stacking effect" would lead to grossly disproportionate sentences for the applicant and reasonable hypothetical offenders, and could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the constitutionality of section 85(3), finding it severable.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.