Andrew Eric Stastny

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the Crown's application for an assessment of criminal responsibility regarding Deeva John, who had entered guilty pleas to multiple assault-related charges.

The court found that although Ms. John suffers from Cluster B personality disorder traits, there were no reasonable grounds to doubt her capacity under section 16 of the Criminal Code to appreciate the nature and quality of her conduct or to know that it was wrong at the time of the offences.

The decision emphasized that the Crown failed to establish the lower threshold of "reasonable grounds to doubt" criminal responsibility due to mental disorder, as the evidence showed Ms. John’s conduct was purposeful and responsive to her environment rather than indicative of incapacity.

The court considered whether it could impose sentence under section 669.2 of the Criminal Code after the trial judge retired, where the trial judge’s reasons for conviction and acquittal on two counts of sexual assault were ambiguous and appeared to conflate evidence between counts.

The Crown argued for sentencing to proceed, while Amicus argued a mistrial was necessary due to the confusion in the trial judge’s reasons.

The court found the errors and conflation in the trial judge’s reasons too significant to proceed to sentencing and declared a mistrial, remitting the matter for a new trial.

The appellant, Marc Owusu-Boamah, appealed his conviction for administering a noxious substance and his global ten-year sentence following a kidnapping and extortion.

The trial judge found the appellant was a central player in a coordinated criminal scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the drugging was part of the coordinated plan, making the appellant culpable under s. 21(1) or s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for administering a noxious substance from six years to one year, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

The global sentence remained unaffected.

The applicant, Michael Francis, brought a motion for severance from his co-accused, Diane Campbell, in a joint criminal proceeding.

Francis, who had been in custody since February 2024, argued that significant prejudice would result from delays caused by Campbell's failure to secure legal representation.

The Crown and Campbell opposed the severance, citing concerns about inconsistent verdicts and the compellability of Campbell as a witness.

The court, applying the factors for severance outlined in R. v. Last, found that the prejudice to Francis, particularly his prolonged detention, outweighed the potential prejudice to the Crown and Campbell or the administration of justice.

The motion for severance was granted.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for manslaughter and robbery, appealed his designation as a high-risk accused (HRA) under s. 672.64(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's discretionary decision, considering the appellant's extensive history of severe mental disorder, repetitive violent behaviour against strangers, and treatment resistance.

The court found the trial judge's conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of the appellant using violence that could endanger the life or safety of another person was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of firearm possession and drug trafficking and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the information to obtain a search warrant (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds, specifically alleging the affiant misled the Justice of the Peace (JP) regarding the appellant's address and failed to establish reasonable grounds for drugs at his residence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the reviewing judge misapprehended one argument, it was immaterial as police observations provided sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded credit for time served, and the Court granted enhanced credit (1.5:1) for 145 days, resulting in 217 days credit.

The sentence appeal was allowed.

The defendants, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought a Garofoli application to quash a search warrant and exclude seized firearms.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to search the specific condominium unit where the firearms were found, thus quashing the warrant and finding a Section 8 Charter breach.

However, applying the Grant test, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the offences, the police's good faith, and the reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal and a stay of proceedings in a multi-accused robbery trial, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence and granting a stay for lost evidence.

The respondents cross-appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence due to insufficient reasons and in granting a stay without assessing prejudice.

The Crown's appeal was granted, setting aside the acquittals and stay, and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The respondents' cross-appeals against conviction were dismissed as the similar act rulings had benefited them or were consented to, and other grounds lacked merit.

Jason Hadfield was found guilty of robbery and manslaughter.

The Crown applied to have him found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder and designated as a high-risk accused (HRA).

Both parties agreed on the NCR finding due to schizophrenia.

The court then considered the HRA designation, which the defence resisted.

The court reviewed the nature of the offences, the accused's repetitive violent behaviour, current mental condition, past treatment, and expert opinions.

The court found a substantial likelihood that the accused, if unrestrained and untreated, would use violence endangering others.

Consequently, the accused was designated a high-risk accused, requiring detention in a hospital with strict conditions on absence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to impose a detention order instead of a conditional discharge, arguing procedural unfairness due to lack of notice regarding the rejection of a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found that a joint submission for conditional discharge did exist, despite the Crown's initial reservation and a dispute over a cannabis condition.

However, the court determined that the Board members' probing questions during the hearing provided adequate, albeit not ideal, notice that the joint submission was in peril.

Fresh evidence of the appellant's subsequent readmissions to hospital further supported the reasonableness of the detention order.

The appeal was dismissed.

Shadoe G. Moore pleaded guilty to robbery while armed with an imitation handgun and using an imitation handgun during the commission of an indictable offence.

The court considered the interplay between ss. 85 and 343 of the Criminal Code, rejecting the "double-dipping" argument and affirming Parliament's intent for consecutive sentences.

The court also addressed the "step principle" in sentencing, rejecting its strict application for Indigenous offenders, and discussed the application of "Summers" and "Duncan" credit for pre-sentence custody conditions, particularly harsh due to lockdowns and COVID-19.

The judge applied Gladue principles, acknowledging the profound impact of intergenerational trauma and systemic factors on the offender's moral culpability.

A global sentence of three years was imposed, reduced by 338 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of two years and one month.

The applicant, Andre Cunningham, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including attempted murder and firearms offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace made two material errors in principle during the initial bail hearing: misapprehending evidence regarding the applicant's alleged gang affiliation and misinterpreting the mother's testimony about identifying her son in surveillance video.

Despite these errors warranting a new de novo bail hearing, the court conducted its own assessment of the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the proposed surety plan inadequate given the applicant's history of non-compliance while living with sureties, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic but found it did not override the primary considerations for detention, especially without evidence of an outbreak in the facility or the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities.

Consequently, the applicant was ordered detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for drug trafficking.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence based on a finding that the appellant had taken no steps toward rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, as the appellant had in fact taken significant steps toward rehabilitation both before and after his release on bail pending appeal.

The court allowed the appeal in part, varying the sentence from the trial judge's decision to eight months imprisonment while maintaining the probation term and setting aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft from mail contrary to s. 356(3) of the Criminal Code.

Both the Crown and the appellant agreed that the guilty plea was uninformed because the appellant was not aware of the immigration consequences of a conviction for that offence.

The parties agreed that had the appellant been fully informed, he would have pled guilty to the lesser included offence of theft under $5,000 contrary to s. 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

On consent, the appeal was dismissed, the conviction for theft from mail was set aside, and a conviction for theft under $5,000 was substituted.

The sentence remained unchanged and had already been served.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime based on an agreed statement of facts.

He subsequently brought a motion to stay the charges on the basis of entrapment.

An undercover officer, with minimal training and no reasonable suspicion regarding the target, called a phone number obtained from a confidential source and immediately requested to purchase a specific quantity of crack cocaine.

The accused agreed and supplied the drugs.

The court found that the officer provided the opportunity to commit the crime without reasonable suspicion about the person or the phone number, and that the bona fide inquiry exception did not apply due to insufficient corroboration of the tip.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

A youth was charged with six offences relating to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (.357 Smith and Wesson Magnum revolver) found hidden in a pillow in the basement games room of his residence.

The Crown alleged constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's control of the games room, the presence of ammunition and clothing from suspects in his bedroom, and the defendant's admission of the suspects to the home following a violent robbery.

The defence argued that while the defendant may have allowed suspects to store some evidence in his bedroom, there were reasonable alternative inferences that the firearm was hidden without his knowledge, either by one of the suspects during the extended time they spent in the home or by a suspect at the moment police arrived.

The court found that while the evidence was highly suspicious and could support an inference of guilt, reasonable alternative inferences existed when the totality of the evidence was considered, including the possibility that a suspect hid the firearm without the defendant's knowledge.

The accused pled guilty to trafficking 0.24 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer for $60.00.

At the time of the offence, the accused was 18 years old with no criminal record.

He had been on bail with an 11 pm to 6 am curfew for nearly two years, breaching it once.

The Crown sought 90 days intermittent custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months' probation, considering the accused's youth, lack of record, single instance of trafficking a minimal quantity, positive rehabilitation efforts, and community service.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a surety warrant for arrest and the searches conducted following his arrest.

The applicant argued breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found that although the surety warrant was not properly executed through the required procedure (the accused did not go into actual custody), it remained validly in existence on the CPIC system and grounded a lawful arrest.

The court rejected all Charter arguments, finding no breach of section 9 (arbitrary arrest), no breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) for either the pat-down search or the strip search, and no breach of section 10 (right to counsel).

The evidence was admitted at trial.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking following an undercover drug purchase.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the identification of the accused as the person who sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

The officer had viewed a photograph of the accused at a briefing prior to the transaction and subsequently identified the accused at trial.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification, arguing that the officer's prior exposure to the photograph tainted the identification process and that key identifying features were not recorded in contemporaneous notes.

The court found that while the officer had a good opportunity to observe the suspect and the conditions were favorable, the failure to record specific facial features at the time of the transaction, combined with the officer's expectation to see the accused, created a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the identification.

The accused was acquitted.