Melvyn Green

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months in custody and 15 months' probation for robbery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence for a youthful first offender, ignoring the principle of restraint for a first custodial sentence, and failing to consider the appellant's Aboriginal status.

Based on fresh evidence of educational and occupational opportunities, the sentence was reduced to time served plus 15 months' probation.

The young offender appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on forensic evidence, opportunity, and prior discreditable conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give an alibi instruction and in her treatment of evidence regarding a prior threat to kill the victim.

The Court of Appeal held that an alibi instruction was not required as the evidence did not provide a complete alibi.

While the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the prior threat evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the circumstantial case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application for a judge-alone trial without Crown consent, and that the jury instructions regarding extreme intoxication and the standard of proof were flawed.

He also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on the Charter application, jury instructions, or the application of Gladue principles to the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, who had rejected a joint submission for 90 days intermittent incarceration.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge provided no analysis or basis for concluding that accepting the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown conceded the proposed sentence was within the proper range.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served, as the appellant had already served more than 90 days.

The member pleaded guilty to professional misconduct for committing boundary infringements with two female students under 14 years of age.

The Discipline Committee accepted the joint submission on penalty, noting the member's cooperation, acceptance of responsibility, and successful completion of a course on maintaining appropriate boundaries.

The Committee ordered a reprimand to be recorded on the register for three years and publication of the decision.

The member, a teacher, pleaded guilty to professional misconduct for committing boundary infringements with two female students under 14 years of age.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, finding the member guilty and ordering a reprimand to be recorded on the register for three years, along with publication of the decision.

The member had already completed a course on maintaining appropriate boundaries.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the elements of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge properly required the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, leaving only the possibilities of a planned murder or a spur-of-the-moment act.

The appellant was convicted of fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and public mischief after allegedly staging a break-in at his golf shop to collect insurance proceeds.

During the investigation, a police officer fabricated a witness statement to induce a confession from a co-conspirator.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the co-conspirator on his resulting statements and dismissed the appellant's application for a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that the fabricated statement constituted a forged document and an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered with the tainted evidence excluded.

The appellant appealed the refusal of an application to transfer his first degree murder charge to the Youth Court.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the transfer judge's findings of fact and agreed that the appellant failed to show the public could be adequately protected under the Young Offenders Act disposition scheme.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head outside a courthouse.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted in self-defence, fearing the victim would attack him due to previous gang-related shootings.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury and excluded expert psychological evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no air of reality to the defence of self-defence because there was no evidence of an imminent or reasonably apprehended attack at the time of the shooting.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence and dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the 8-year imprisonment term.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and other offences following a shooting at his high school.

At trial, he was found fit to stand trial and did not raise a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

On appeal, fresh psychiatric evidence established that the appellant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was NCRMD at the time of the offences.

However, the appellant was too mentally ill to participate in his appeal or instruct counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite the appellant's incompetence, as the Criminal Code does not require an appellant to be fit to prosecute an appeal, provided procedural fairness is ensured.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a verdict of NCRMD, finding that a new trial was unnecessary given the conclusive fresh evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his common-law wife.

At trial, the primary issue was whether the appellant had the requisite intent, given his intoxication and mental disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his voir dire testimony, evidence of his violent disposition, and the issue of intention, and appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable because the trial judge's reasons indicated the appellant only acted to aid the co-accused after the co-accused had already abandoned the attempt to take possession of the drugs.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, a black man, was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder of two white police officers.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in limiting his challenge for cause regarding racial bias to a single 'rolled-up' question, rather than allowing multiple questions about racial attitudes.

He also argued the trial judge erred in excusing a prospective juror when the triers could not agree, that the Crown improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, and that evidence of his immigration status and criminal record should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion during jury selection or in the admission of evidence.

The Court held that the peremptory challenge issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.

The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences involving two complainants and a custodial sentence of three years.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence on key factual conflicts, improperly treated character and conduct evidence, and erred in entering a gross indecency conviction on one count.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied the criminal standard of proof, adequately addressed the material evidentiary conflicts, and properly treated both the former-student evidence and the Crown’s reply evidence as being of little assistance.

The gross indecency conviction was upheld on the evidence, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the contingent basis for sentence reduction did not arise.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing in an apartment where multiple persons were present, including a witness with a motive to deflect blame.

The Crown conceded several material jury charge errors, including failure to give an adequate Vetrovec warning, misdirection on after-the-fact conduct, mischaracterization of an alternative suspect’s violent record, and inadequate instructions on intoxication and the manslaughter alternative.

The Court of Appeal held the errors were serious and declined to apply the curative proviso because it could not conclude the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The court also stated that protected statements made during a mental assessment under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code may be used only on credibility and not as positive evidence of guilt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the factors from R. v. Morin and agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was no unreasonable delay in bringing the accused to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a stolen vehicle and charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he was acquitted on the basis that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of having care or control while impaired is a general intent offence for which voluntary intoxication is not a defence.

The Court further held that the unavailability of the intoxication defence for this offence does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, or alternatively, any such violation is justified under section 1.