Vanora Simpson

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder after stabbing his friend during a drunken altercation.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on bad character evidence and by improperly instructing the jury on mens rea and intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no realistic possibility that the bad character evidence was used improperly and concluding that the jury instructions, while containing errors, adequately conveyed the necessary legal principles regarding intent and intoxication.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The Crown appealed a decision staying criminal charges against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The respondent faced multiple charges including domestic assault and firearms offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in calculating and allocating the periods of delay, particularly by failing to attribute delay to the respondent after he declined an early trial date.

The Court concluded that the total delay was not unreasonable and that the respondent's prejudice was largely negated by his lack of interest in an early trial.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Ministerial Surrender Order under s. 57 of the Extradition Act, ordering her extradition to Florida for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The applicant, a single mother of two teenage daughters, argued the Minister failed to properly consider whether surrender would be unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Act, and failed to consider alternatives such as delaying surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister fully considered the applicant's concerns and alternatives, and reasonably concluded that surrender was not unjust or oppressive.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of trafficking heroin and conspiracy to traffic heroin alongside two co-accused.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the testimony of his co-accused and by failing to properly explain the defence's position to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in not giving the Vetrovec caution, as the co-accused were not prosecution witnesses and trial fairness considerations were implicated.

The Court also held that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and thorough in presenting the defence's theory that the appellant did not know what his passengers were doing.

Following a successful Crown appeal against directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder, the Court of Appeal considered whether to set aside the respondents' convictions for forcible confinement.

Although the respondents had not cross-appealed, the Court invoked s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code to set aside the forcible confinement convictions.

The Court reasoned that the forcible confinement charge was inextricably bound to the first-degree murder charge under s. 231(5)(e), and allowing the convictions to stand would impair the respondents' fair trial rights at the new trial.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder.

The respondents had been convicted of manslaughter and forcible confinement after participating in the beating and confinement of the victim, who was left bound in a remote cabin and subsequently died.

The trial judge ruled there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function.

The Court held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, planning, and deliberation to leave the murder charges to the jury, and ordered a new trial on first-degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.